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Universally Composable Oblivious Database in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries

  • Huafei ZhuEmail author
Conference paper
  • 319 Downloads
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9565)

Abstract

The core technique for constructing oblivious database is to get efficient implementations of oblivious transfer. This paper studies universally composable 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer (OT\(_1 ^n\)) in the presence of malicious adversaries under the standard cryptographic assumptions. Our oblivious transfer protocol is constructed from the Damgård and Jurik’s double trapdoor encryption scheme and the Damgård and Nielsen’s mixed commitment scheme, where the master key of the underlying double trapdoor cryptosystem is used to extract implicit input of a corrupted sender while the corresponding local keys are used to extract implicit input of a corrupted receiver. We claim that the proposed oblivious transfer framework realizes the universally composable security in the common reference model under the joint assumptions that the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem and the decisional composite residuosity problem are hard as well as all knowledge proof protocols applied are zero-knowledge.

Keywords

Double trapdoor cryptosystem Mixed commitment scheme Oblivious transfer Universal composability 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Computer and Computing ScienceZhejaing University City CollegeHangzhouChina

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