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Public Officials

  • Carl Wellman
Chapter
  • 212 Downloads
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 115)

Abstract

Because the actions of any institution consist in the actions of public officials acting in their institutional roles, the constitutional rights of public officials are essential to any national legal system. This chapter provides a critical examination of the reasons for and against several actual or proposed rights of public officials: the presidential war powers, the presidential power to remove administrative officials, the presidential line-item veto, the speech or debate immunity of congressmen, and the life tenure of federal judges. Finally the moral foundations of such rights are described.

Keywords

United States Constitution Supreme Court 1880 Judicial Independence Democratic Accountability Federal Spending 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carl Wellman
    • 1
  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentWashington University in Saint LouisSaint LouisUSA

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