Constitutional Institutions

  • Carl Wellman
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 115)


Because the primary function of a constitution is to constitute a government, the primary constitutional rights in any national legal system are the rights of its governing institutions. This chapter provides a critical assessment of the reasons for and against the institutions of federalism, the separation of powers, a presidential system, a bicameral legislature, exclusion, cloture, and judicial review. It ends by distinguishing between more and less basic justifying reasons.


Federal Government National Government Chief Executive Judicial Review United States Constitution 
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carl Wellman
    • 1
  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentWashington University in Saint LouisSaint LouisUSA

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