Abstract
It was established in Chap. 2 that the role of assumptions presents a special problem in investigating the relationship between strategy and intelligence. It is precisely because of the special nature of this problem that their presence must be analysed in detail. In Chap. 2 it was argued that assumptions permeate all areas of the Strategy Bridge, framing, shaping and conditioning the thought processes that leaders bring to any policy issue. Identifying and understanding these assumptions are mandatory prerequisites in carrying out any rigorous policy or strategic analysis, for they establish the context within which thinking took place, and, hence, which actions were ultimately taken.
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Steed, D. (2016). What Assumptions Existed Within the British Government at the Time of the Suez Crisis?. In: British Strategy and Intelligence in the Suez Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31453-2_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31453-2_4
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