Abstract
This chapter adjudicates between the broad deontological and consequentialist frameworks of O’Neill and Sen to identify the most appropriate framework to guide action in the contemporary circumstances of assistance. There are a number of areas of overlap between these approaches as both seek to retain the imperfect nature of this duty, and also to place this duty into a wider moral landscape in which situated non-idealised agents are based. Using the idea of ‘practical’ to develop appropriate criteria for evaluation, it finds that an application and extension of a broad consequentialist approach provides a more practical framework to guide the actions of agents in the contemporary context. Three reasons are offered in defence of this claim. Firstly, I argue that a non-monistic pluralist theoretical framework provides a more inclusive moral basis to guide agents in the performance of this duty. Secondly, I argue a dualistic method of justification that blends both weighing of outcomes and testing of actions may remove and reduce conflict and manage uncertainty in a way that narrower methodological duty-based approaches cannot. In providing agents with a clear, but open framework for practical reasoning and evaluation, this procedural framework can avoid the risk of inaction and reduce confusion and uncertainty where possible, accepting that this may not always be possible. Thirdly, I argue that a pluralistic, non-idealised outcome-focused approach provides a stronger foundation for action, while seeking to minimise harms and unintended outcomes, and maximise responsibility for the outcomes of action. Through action, connection, and interconnection this approach explains how incremental moral duties can arise in the performance of assistance that can mark the beginning of special relationships rather than the complete fulfilment of a moral duty.
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Notes
- 1.
According to the UN definition, famine can only be declared when at least 20 % of households in an area face extreme food shortages; acute malnutrition rates exceed 30 %; and the death rate exceeds two persons per day per 10,000 persons. See http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39113#.VbY3fPnK1xg for more details.
- 2.
Disagreement on this point is evident in what appears to be a long running debate between these two philosophers. In his discussion on consequential evaluation (2000a), it seems that Sen is aware of the objections that O’Neill’s approach would raise and seeks to address these. O’Neill responds (not directly to Sen but to all those following a similar line of argument) with her rejection of this argument in 2004. Again, in Sen’s 2004, 2009 publication he returns to these objections and offers further defence of his argument.
- 3.
See for example Buchanan, A., 1996, “Perfecting Imperfect Duties: Collective Action to Create Moral Obligations”, Business Ethics Quarterly, 6(1), 27–42; Buchanan, A., 1987, “Justice and Charity”, Ethics, 97(3), 558–575; Ashford, E., 2007, “The duties imposed by the human right to basic necessities”, in Freedom from poverty as a human right: Who owes what to the very poor? New York: Oxford University Press, Chapter 7.
- 4.
As Rawls helpfully explains, there are three different components or elements of Kant’s account of the concept and content of duty – the Moral Law, the Categorical Imperative, and the procedure for the Categorical Imperative: ‘The moral law is an idea of reason. It specifies a principle that applies for all reasonable and rational beings… The Categorical Imperative as an imperative is directed only to those reasonable beings, who, because they are finite beings with needs [and desires, inclinations, and options] experience the moral law as a constraint’ (2000: 166). The Categorical Procedure is a tool or method that enables us to apply the Categorical Imperative to our own unique set of circumstances. The moral law and the Categorical Imperative are abstract concepts. But the procedure for applying the Categorical Imperative, as a practical tool for use in concrete circumstances, enables us evaluate and justify our moral decisions.
References
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Murphy, S.P. (2016). Adjudicating Between O’Neill and Sen on Assistance. In: Responsibility in an Interconnected World. Studies in Global Justice, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31445-7_5
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