Abstract
This chapter examines debates among researchers and practitioners concerning the ethical basis of the practice of assistance. There are two dominant approaches evident in the literature– deontological, or duty-based approaches, and consequentialist, or out-come based approaches. The former are more dominant in the humanitarian space, with the latter traditionally evident in the development space. In this chapter, an examination of debates concerning the tensions between these approaches is examined, with a particular focus on the humanitarian domain. Here it has been argued that traditional duty-based approaches are particularly problematical and not fit for purpose in the complex moral circumstances of contemporary assistance. Three reasons are offered in defence of this claim: (i) they cannot give sufficient consideration to the outcomes of action; (ii) they are essentially rigid and conservative; and (iii) they can result in harmful outcomes. Further, it has been argued that a shift towards approaches that lend greater weight to outcomes is required. This chapter examines this proposition. It examines both duty-based and outcome-based approaches and finds much greater common ground between these ethical frameworks and their conceptualisation of assistance than is widely assumed in the characterisations that have informed some of these debates. Through a comparative analysis of contemporary characterisations and foundational moral accounts, this analysis clarifies the points of conflict and distinction between these moral approaches that yield different substantive accounts of what a moral duty to assist would entail within each framework.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
However, as Barnett remarks, these norms are not part of ‘humanitarianism’s original DNA’ (Barnett 2011: 5). For this, according to Barnett, we would need to examine religious practice, beliefs, and ideas of salvation.
- 3.
Duties of virtue are sometimes described as duties of charity but I avoid using this term as it carries thick religious and faith-based meanings that this particular account of moral duty does not entail.
- 4.
Brian Barry (1991, 1995), in his analysis of the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, describes perfect duties as ‘rights-based duties’ and imperfect duties as ‘goal-based duties’. Perfect duties are correlatives of rights, such that, if an agent has a right, then specifiable others have a duty to act in certain ways or avoid certain acts. If a rights-based duty is violated, then specifiable others can be coercively required to act. Imperfect duties, on the other hand, are ‘goal-based’, aiming more broadly at goals, ends, or outcomes. Act-types are not clearly specified and are not correlated with particular rights.
- 5.
See https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/about-iasc for further details.
- 6.
I take this weaker claim from Onora O’Neill’s (1996) Kantian account of the duty to avoid systematic injury, and the sometimes unavoidable occurrence of gratuitous injury.
- 7.
The original formulation of this approach is attributed to Former UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Barnett and Snyder 2008: 150).
- 8.
It is important to note that this approach does not restrict imperfect duties to ‘internal’ constraint, meaning that imperfect duties can be enforced through legal mechanisms and instruments if this is what is required to maximise a particular value, such as utility or happiness.
- 9.
For an exposition of both of these positions see for example Peter Jones (1994) Rights.
- 10.
For an extensive discussion of the limits of the duty of beneficence see Barbara Herman’s ‘The scope of moral requirement’, (2001).
- 11.
Daniel Statman develops this point in a rich, eloquent, and thoughtful essay entitled ‘Who needs imperfect duties’ (1996).
References
Anderson, M. 1999. Do no harm: How aid can support peace or war. Boulder: Lynne.
Anderson, M. 2004. “Do No Harm”: Reflections on the impacts of international assistance provided to the occupied Palestinian territories. Report. Cambridge, MA: Collaborative Learning Projects.
Barnett, M. 2011. Empire of humanity. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Barnett, M., and J. Snyder. 2008. The grand strategies of humanitarianism. In Humanitarianism in question, 143–171. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Barnett, M., and T. Weiss. 2008a (eds.). Humanitarianism in question. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Barnett, M., and T. Weiss. 2008b. Humanitarianism: A brief history of the present. In Humanitarianism in question, 1–48. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Baron, M.W., P. Pettit, and M. Slote. 1997. Three methods of ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Barry, B. 1991. Humanity and justice in global perspective. In Liberty and justice: Essays in political theory 2, 182–210. New York: Oxford University Press.
Barry, B. 1995. Justice as impartiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Herman, B. 1984. Mutual aid and respect for persons. Ethics 94(4): 577–602.
Herman, B. 2001. The scope of moral requirement. Philosophy and Public Affairs 30(3): 227–256.
Herman, B. 2008. Morality unbounded. Philosophy and Public Affairs 36(4): 323–358.
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the ICRC. 1994. The code of conduct for the international Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief. URL, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/code-of-conduct-290296.htm.
Jones, P. 1994. Rights. New York: Palgrave Macmillan press.
Kant, I. 1964. (Gregor, M. Gregor translation and introduction). The metaphysics of morals: The doctrine of virtue. New York: Harper & Row.
Kant, I. 1996. The metaphysics of morals. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. 2002. Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals. New York: Oxford University Press.
O’Neill, O. 1996. Towards justice and virtue. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Reiff, D. 2002. A bed for the night: Humanitarianism in crisis. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Riddell, R. 2007. Does foreign aid really work? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rubenstein, J. 2008. The distributive commitments of international NGOs. In Humanitarianism in question, 215–234. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Shapcott, R. 2010. International ethics. Malden/Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Sidgwick, H. 1901. The method of ethics, 6th ed. London: Macmillan.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. 2006. Consequentialism. In Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy. URL http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/.
Statman, D. 1996. Who needs imperfect duties. American Philosophical Quarterly 33(2): 211–224.
UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182. 1991. URL, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r182.htm
Weiss, T. 1999. Principles, politics, and humanitarian action. Ethics and International Affairs 13(1): 1–22.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Murphy, S.P. (2016). Contemporary Ethical Approaches to the Practice of Assistance and Foundational Accounts of Moral Duty. In: Responsibility in an Interconnected World. Studies in Global Justice, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31445-7_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31445-7_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-31443-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-31445-7
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)