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Misuse of Frame Creation to Exploit Stack Underflow Attacks on Java Card

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9514))

Abstract

Stack underflow attacks against Java Card platform attempt to access undefined local variables or operands to corrupt data that are not supposed to be accessible. Indeed, their exploitations rely on changing system data (return address, execution of context, etc.). The current attacks are restricted to the main assumption that the frame system data is located between the operand stack and the local variable area. However, Java stacks are implementation dependent and their structures are not always in the above configuration. This article presents a new attack which does not rely on the Java stack implementation model and that exploits specific countermeasure omission during frame allocation. Nevertheless the attack relies on ill-formed application that does not undergo the Bytecode Verifier. In spite of that, it is well-known that fault injection can be used to turn harmless code sequence into malicious code. We then suggest a new combined attack that allows performing several type confusions with one fault model.

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Correspondence to Benoit Laugier .

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Laugier, B., Razafindralambo, T. (2016). Misuse of Frame Creation to Exploit Stack Underflow Attacks on Java Card. In: Homma, N., Medwed, M. (eds) Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications. CARDIS 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9514. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31271-2_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31271-2_6

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-31270-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-31271-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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