Abstract
Truth, meaning, and objectivity go together. A representationalist will usually subscribe to a form of correspondence theory of truth where something is true if and only if it correctly represents a state of affairs. Common-sense realists tend to agree with this. In this chapter John Austin’s proposal for a correspondence theory of truth is discussed. It is argued that the theory brings useful elements to a coherent understanding of truth. But it is also argued that according to the evolutionary naturalist, who opposes representationalism, these elements cannot stand alone. The additional elements should be borrowed from the theory of coherence. Thus it is argued that the truth relation is not an internal relation, as suggested by the correspondence theory, but instead an external relation holding between, say, a statement and a particular state of affairs. In the end this notion of truth is related to linguistic meaning and Michael Dummett’s argument for semantic antirealism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Cameron (2010), p. 252.
- 2.
See Lowe (2002), pp. 6–7.
- 3.
Ruse ([1986]1998), p. 202.
- 4.
Wright (1992), p. 72.
- 5.
Horwich (1990), p. 17.
- 6.
In contrast to Horwich, Searle (1978) argues that the truth conditions of all sentences reflect some background beliefs about the context in which it is appropriate to utter the sentences.
- 7.
Putnam (1981), p. 64.
- 8.
Austin (1950), p. 22.
- 9.
See Strawson (1950), p. 44, who is very critical of Austin’s view, and Warnock (1962), p. 67n.
- 10.
Of course this argument predates Quine! But it just seems silly because many states of affairs can be simply pointed to or located by conventional indexicals that reach outside the circle of language. If this were true, “radical translation” of the sort Quine considers would be simply impossible; everyone would be totally a prisoner of his own language. There could be no “gavagai” scuttling through the bush, because in this strange world ostention is forbidden; we must keep our hands in our pockets.
- 11.
Kirkham (1992) contains one of the best and more recent expositions of different theories of truth including various epistemic-based theories.
- 12.
I do not intend to claim that Kant and contemporary constructivists are of a common mind, The whole point of Kant’s program was that he claimed to deduce—to prove transcendentally—the constitutive elements as universal and necessary (which secured “objective validity”), whereas contemporary constructivists want to make these constitutive elements relative and arbitrary.
- 13.
See Faye (2014), Chap. 2.
- 14.
Putnam (1981), p. 75.
- 15.
This is the great theme of Dummet’s investigation into philosophy of language. See, for instance, Dummett (1973), (1976), and (1978), where he develops his arguments for semantic antirealism.
- 16.
See Devitt ([1984]1991) and McMullin (1984).
- 17.
Dummett (1973), Chap. 5 and Chap. 6, as well as Dummett (1976), Sect. VI.
- 18.
Cf. Dummett (1973), 464–470; Dummett (1976), pp. 81–82; Dummett (1978), pp. xxvii–xxxiv.
- 19.
See, for instance, Armstrong (2004), Rodriguez-Preyera (2005) and Cameron (2008). They all defend truth-maker maximalism. Armstrong says: “My hope is that philosophers of realist inclinations will be immediately attracted to the idea that a truth, any truth, should depend for its truth on something ‘outside’ it, in virtue of which it is true” (p. 7). Similarly, Rodriguez-Preyera claims that “the root of the idea of truthmakers is the very plausible and compelling idea that the truth of a proposition is a function of, or is determined by, reality” (p. 20).
- 20.
Cf. Dummett (1976), p. 80, and Dummett (1973), pp. 460–462.
- 21.
Cf. Dummett (1978), pp. 216–217.
- 22.
The use of probabilities in this discussion is meant as an illustration.The pretty much inescapable fact is that we use probability statements in a variety of ways, and it seems to me inadvisable to try to shoehorn them all into a single interpretation of probability statements. There are clearly many times when we say the probability of X in circumstances C is 1/n as a simple induction from a record of frequencies, we simply add up all the incidents where C obtained and where X did or did not occur, and calculate that percentage of the total. Here probability is purely empirical, and all evidence on which a judgment is made is empirical. If I am absolutely in ignorance about the truth condition of probability statement P, I may say the probability of P is true is 50 % purely as a point of logic. When the weatherman says the probability of rain in Zealand tomorrow is 50 %, it is neither a logical truism nor an induction from past frequencies, but a matter of deduction from the physics of the atmosphere as best (but imperfectly) understood by meteorological science. It is also relevant to point out that there is no calculus of inductive probability.
- 23.
See Petersen (1985), Rohrlich (1986), and Krips (1987).
- 24.
See Faye (1989), pp. 86–89.
- 25.
Wright (1987), p. 5 and pp. 148–49.
- 26.
I intentionally use assertion here. A “declarative” sentence is a kind defined in grammar, ending in a period. Not all declarative sentences make assertions, although that is their ordinary purpose; however, there is no single matchup between the grammatical categories—declarative, interrogative, imperative and exclamatory—and the purposes sentences may serve, and of course sentences may serve multiple purposes, and in any case the purpose a sentence may serve cannot be decided out of context involving reference to both speaker and audience. However, by definition, only those sentences that make “assertions,” no matter what their grammatical form, have truth value. So I’d recommend avoiding the declarative grammatical category altogether.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Faye, J. (2016). Truth, Language, and Objectivity. In: Experience and Beyond. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31077-0_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31077-0_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-31076-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-31077-0
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)