Abstract
How to reframe the paradigm of participatory urban planning, according to a pragmatic and radical pluralistic perspective, as much consistent as possible with complexity and uncertainty of practices, subjects and meanings concerning contemporary cities’ transformation processes? This second chapter describes the theoretical framework of this work. Within relevant literature, I identified three main families of theories, three distinct interpretative “models” of reality, each of which copes differently with power and rationality dilemmas in planning (The literature review presented in the following paragraphs was supported by in-person interviews with the authors quoted. Among others, Susan Fainstein, Larry Susskind and Peter Galison.). On one side the “conflictual model”, frames planning action as a social mobilization practice, addressed to marginalized groups’ empowerment and social conflicts legitimation. On other hand, the “consensual model” conceives planning as collective decision-making practice according to organized and stable structures for consensus-building and conflicts resolution. In between the above theoretical domain we can find pragmatic approaches to participatory planning, among which a “trading zone model” represents an experimental and tentative way to reframe collaborative planning as a coordination activity on practical proposals in the presence of unstable, multiple and conflicting rationalities and values.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
With regard to the ethical framework of these approaches, it is important to remember that pragmatic theory conceives ethics as dependent on action and hence not derived from a pre-given moral horizon. Therefore, in a pragmatist world, ethical criteria don’t stem from external rules, but are tools to use in practice to make informed judgments. Through learning, emerging criteria in practice can flow into common habits and become integrated them, thereby communicating the ways that we react to, think about and imagine our worlds and our relations to others. Some pragmatists think that other theories can provide guidance on how to live morally: therefore each ethical perspective can affect habits and help us guide action. Specifically, Hugh LaFollette suggests a very interesting insight into this: “pragmatists take help wherever they can get it”. Utilitarianism does not provide any algorithm for deciding how to act, but shapes habits to help us “naturally” attend to the ways that our actions impact others. Deontology does not provide a list of general rules to follow, but cultivates an awareness of the ways our actions might promote or undermine respect for others. Contractualism does not resolve all moral issues, but sensitizes us to the need for broad consensus. That is why it is wrong to assume that a pragmatist makes specific moral judgements oblivious to rules, principles, virtues and collective wisdom of human experience. A pragmatist absorbs these insights into their habits and thereby shapes the way they usually react and deliberate, when deliberation is required. This also explains why criterial moralities tend to be rninirnalistic. They specify minimal sets of rules to follow in order to be moral. On the other hand, like virtue theories, pragmatism is more concerned with emphasizing exemplary behaviors that is, using morally relevant features of action to determine the best way to behave rather than the minimally tolerable one” (LaFollette and Persson 2001).
- 2.
Chantal Mouffe is mainly known for her contribution to the analysis of the contemporary political discourse (the so-called Essex School, in cooperation with Ernesto Laclau), a post-Marxist inquiry that draws on Antonio Gramsci’s Marxism and promotes a sort of sociological Marxism with a focus on the theory of identity and on restructuring of the democratic concept in a radical path.
- 3.
Going back to neo-Marxist theorists, during the 70s an important change occurred in the macro-economic forces affecting cities, as a result of the changing relationship between capital, state and local communities. Thus, neo-Marxist theorists started observing that planning as a public practice hardly attempted to achieve redistributive results, as it was naturally supposed to, primarily supporting the owners of the capital instead. This situation brought some planners to start working for community-based organizations, rather than only for city governments and developers (Fainstein 2005), thus acting as advocates of marginalized social groups (the poor and the weak, Davidoff 1965). The evolution of this approach to planning was already discussed in the Chap. 1.
- 4.
The Democratic Paradox, explains that political conflict belongs to two different fields: distribution, following the logic of equality, and individual rights, following the logic of liberty. The democratic paradox consists in the fact that democratic societies strive for a form that satisfies both logics, equality and liberty, even if these principles are always necessarily in tension: equality restricts freedom and freedom subverts equality (Mouffe 2000).
- 5.
Contractualism, as the philosophical tradition that combines ethical and moral dimension with political sciences, found its main author in Hobbes, who first theorized human beings’s morality as directly stemming from the constitution of a political contract and a civil society; a sort of artificial contract, that could not exist in nature, but that instead represents an epiphenomenon of the political contract in itself (Stein and Harper 2005).
- 6.
The author asserts that the confrontation among rational individuals should occur in a condition of “original equality” by covering people with the “veil of ignorance” which, metaphorically deprives individuals of their social position or their accumulated knowledge, due to which individuals make choices on the basis of “their own principles”. In this way, people can collectively produce their “free choice” as free, rational and equal individuals, knowing only those conditions which make the need for justice principles rise. Thus, by only disregarding the individual’s social condition, it could be possible to reach an “overlapping consensus”, conceived as the collective achievement of a shared agreement on rights and liberty issues (Stein and Harper Ibid. 2005).
- 7.
Rawls refers to this principle by using the phrase: “prevent excessive concentrations of property and wealth”, which basically implies a realistic utopianism—the expectation being reducing material inequality rather than eliminating it.
- 8.
Iris Marion Young (1949–2006) was a philosopher and a professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. As a feminist moral and political philosopher, she explored issues of social justice and of oppression theory, especially studying the relationship between contemporary democratic forms, the issue of inclusion and the politics of difference. Young is interested in deliberation as the appropriate procedural norm, arguing that it will promote justice. However, she didn’t regard consensus as a likely or desired outcome of deliberation. Rather, she saw conflict as fruitful and unavoidable, as possibly emerging in situations of clashing values and systems of meaning. In particular, in her defense of “the politics of difference”, she looked at the city as the venue in which such difference can flourish andeven brings to conflicts, thus becoming the basis for achieving justice: “In the ideal city, life freedom leads to group differentiation, to the formation of affinity groups, but this social and spatial differentiation of groups is without exclusion. (…) The interfusion of groups in the city occurs partly because of the multiuse differentiation of social space. What makes urban spaces interesting, draws people out in public to them, gives people pleasure and excitement, is the diversity of activities they support” (Young 1990).
- 9.
This quotation is drawn from an in person interview with the author given on November 29th 2011.
- 10.
Interview of February, 16th 2011 in http://rorotoko.com/interview/20110216_fainstein_susan_on_the_just_city/?page=3.
- 11.
Chapter 1.
- 12.
Interestingly, the step forward concerns his previous opinion about bargaining and negotiation, which in 1989 he attributed to a utilitarian and instrumental “economical rationality”, not aimed at enhancing mutual understanding, but at perpetrating power domination (Forester 1989). Well known in this path is Forester’s criticism of Lindblom’s Partisan Mutual Adjustment, as already mentioned in Chap. 1.
- 13.
Recently, this approach has also been defined by Susskind as “facilitative leadership” (Susskind and Cruickshank 2006). In this respect, he claimed what follows: “Let me be clear: by “mediation” I mean the specific skilled practice of (1) assessing stakeholders’ options and initial interests, (2) convening representatives of those parties to present their views and data, questions and proposals, (3) enabling parties to engage in joint inquiry and learning, and (4) enabling a process of inventing options and formulating agreements that satisfy at least four specific criteria, as follows: (1) inclusiveness (including representatives of environmental-spatial quality among others), (2) achieving mutual efficiency gains (rather than lose–lose outcomes), (3) stability, and (4) being technically well-informed” (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987, 2006).
- 14.
Forester’s attempt to reframe deliberative rationality starting from complexity and contentiousness urges him to go back to pragmatist roots of communicative tradition, particularly to Dewey: “This much might sound like old news, for we have thought about participatory processes as modes of social learning for many years, dating not just from the systems literature of the 1960s and 1970s, but from work like John Dewey’s wonderful and prescient The Public and Its Problems another 40 years earlier!” (Forester 2009, p. 238). I believe that this reference is very interesting, especially according to the hypothesis of this work, that is trying to reframe pluralistic spatial planning based on critical pragmatism: the third theoretical model explained in this chapter attempts to provide an exact political framework and a set of theoretical principles and practical tools to reconsider pluralistic rationality in planning according to a pragmatist perspective, in the light of John Dewey’s Theory of Inquiry and Charles Sanders Peirce’s Theory of Meaning.
Interestingly enough, even in the field of Political Theory, theorists of deliberative democracies such as Mansbridge and Parkinson are reexamining deliberation by reframing the Habermasian transcendent conception of meaning. In particular, in Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at Large Scale (2012), Mansbridge and Parkinson point out the importance of functionally distributed deliberation in the deliberative systems, also taking into consideration the role of contestation, as well as that of collaboration. “A system here means a set of distinguishable, differentiated, but to some degree independent parts, often with distributed functions and a division of labor, connected in such a way as to form a complex whole. It requires both differentiation and integration among the parts. (…) A deliberative system is one that encompasses a talk-based approach to political conflict and problem solving through arguing, demonstrating, expressing and persuading. In a good deliberative system, persuasion that raises relevant considerations should replace suppression, oppression and thoughtless neglect. Normatively, a systemic approach means that the system should be judged as a whole in addition to the parts judged independently”. (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012, pp. 4–5). Their research starts exactly from exploration of the problems in experimenting deliberative democracy in the real world, made of competing norms, institutions and powerful interests. According to their systemic view, practices which are not exactly deliberative can be seen as constitutive elements of a deliberative process that affects societal decisions.
- 15.
“Organizational Learning” is the sum of processes through which organizations produce knowledge and learn from experience. Each decision-making process generates a field of behavioral strategies that becomes a kind of environment to which every choice and action has to relate. Thus, interaction in collective decision-making processes implies a progressive adjustment of a single individual according to others’ choices and hence a reciprocal learning process. The level of learning of an organization is determined by individuals and depends on their capacity to activate a “double-loop learning”—which consists in modifying values and fundamental assumptions of the organization—and on their “second-level learning”—which implies learning to adopt new learning processes. At the same time, organizations are considered as elastic and growing bodies, which can themselves include different kinds of knowledge (Argyris and Schön 1978).
- 16.
In Action Science’s studies carried out by Argyris and then later, together with Schön, the authors start from the hypothesis that every individual and organizational action and behavior has a cognitive foundation embedded in an action theory which general form is explained as follows: “in a situation S, if you want to produce the consequence C based on premises ato n, you do A” (Argyris and Schön 1978, Ibid.). A theory of Action hence, is a theory of the deliberated human behavior, that, while according to the agent is a theory for control, when from the observator has ascribed to the agent, allows to explain and predict his behavior. A theory of action has two fundamental components: a declared theory (TD) and a theory-in-use (TU). Declared Theory is the one enunciated by the agent to describe his behavior; on the other hand, theory in use, is the one governing real actions and behaviors. TU is a sort of program, a scheme for action through which the agent tries to reach his goals by even influencing environmental variables. Theory in use can be compatible or non compatible with declared theory. The agent can be either aware or not of the incompatibility between the two theories.
- 17.
There is a difference between mediation, facilitation and other forms of reconciliation activities defined as non-binding arbitrations. According to Susskind and Cruickshank (1987) mediation is a process in which an impartial third party helps disputants resolve a dispute or plan a transaction. Mediators can use “interest-based” approaches, while others use “rights-based” approaches. Some mediators are “facilitative,” providing only process assistance for negotiation and using interest-based approaches. Facilitation is a process by which a third party helps coordinate the activities of a group, assist them prevent or manage tension and move productively toward decisions.
- 18.
In Menkel-Meadow p. 17: “Although most political theorists have focused on the role of rationality or reasoned persuasion as the main mode decision-making mode in democracy, more recent work in political decision-making has concentrated on the ‘a-rational’ not only in terms of affective, emotional, ethical and communitarian (or value based and religious) modes of belief and opinion (Elster 1999), but also more instrumental and practical forms of preference bargaining or trading in how decisions are reached in groups”. Here the authors refer also to Susskind and Cruickshank 1987, as new cultural reference for deliberative theorists.
- 19.
This quotation is taken by an in person interview with the author, given on November 25th 2011 in Boston.
- 20.
Interviewed on November 25th, 2011.
- 21.
Interviewed on November 25th, 2011.
- 22.
This quotation is taken by an in person interview with the author, given on November 25th 2011.
- 23.
Susskind, November 25th 2011.
- 24.
Susskind, November 2th 2011.
- 25.
A first reference to Dewey’s Theory of Inquiry was made in Chap. 1, where a deeper exploration on Dewey’s philosophy was presented. Dewey’s Theory of Inquiry has certainly been influential for all of those theories related to reflective action and sense-making. It describes how practitioners, professionals and scientists actually move from a doubtful problematic situation to get through a phase of “Intellectualization” and “probing” of hypothesis to reframe the problem every time, adding new knowledge and meaning to a former position.
- 26.
Habermasian theory of communication is influenced by Kantian universalism in ethics. Kant’s principle for a moral universalization has deeply influenced the theory of discourse, which holistic perspective made this conception of communication unfeasible.
- 27.
An interesting comparative analysis on Peirce and Wittgenstein was elaborated by Fabbrichesi Leo (2002).
- 28.
As stated in How to Make our Ideas Clear by Peirce (1931–1958), “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object”. This conception might be considered as close to the utilitarian stream of the pragmatic thought, according to which “the maxim of logic (is) that the meaning of a word lies in the use that is to be made of it” (Peirce 1975–1987) in Ketner K. And Cook J., ed. by, Contribution to the Nation, Lubbok, Texas Teck University).
- 29.
“Public Truth” in Peirce’s work refers to this “social form of action” (Fabbrichesi Leo 2002).
- 30.
Among the most interesting sociological interpretations of this philosophical understandings we can find Blumer’s symbolic interactionsm (…..). His theory convincingly argues that collective meanings are the result of social interactions and symbolization processes. Throughout this linguistic exchange with society, each individual’s system of values and understandings of facts, objects, things is subjected to a transformative process. See Blumer (1969).
- 31.
Giovan Francesco Lanzara theorizes this negative capability as the ability of the decisor (the planner, the designer) to face complexity by producing new cognitive settings and new action settings which are closer to practice than to theory and routines. According to Lanzara, the generative action is made of two main components: first of all the ability to break traditional contexts and establish new ones, starting from local actions. Second, generative action is a dynamic process of practical experimentation: to some extent, it seems closer to constructing and creating coherence in practical activities (such as craft works and arts), rather than to means-ends logics, typical of decision-making practices. Acting is not only about gestures generating predictable results, but also about mere acts which are free from any instrumental orientation and give meaning to an experience by contextualizing it (Lanzara 1993).
- 32.
Policy Inquiry tradition goes beyond Policy Analysis tradition, as described by Friedmann (1987) in Planning in the Public Domain. Indeed, authors and theories that can be listed in the Policy Inquiry framework are those related to analysis of public policies like collective decision-process, social learning and dynamical settings. Policies are conceived as social constructs, as products of interactions, learning processes, complexity or simply cahos. Policy making processes are analyzed as knowledge-in-action practices, in which collective interaction and social learning are fundamental for the experimental character of any public policy. Policy Inquiry tradition considers the reflective practice as a necessary element for policy makers.
- 33.
The reference here is to the Chapter in the book named “Interazioni: pratiche, politiche e produzione di pubblico. Un percorso attraverso la letteratura, con attenzione al conflitti”, p. 133.
- 34.
In colonized societies, artificial pidgin languages were generated between parent languages of “colonizers” and “colonized”, as localized linguistic practices of trade—some of which may have later—turned into full-blown creole languages (Galison 1997, pp. 673–674.). Pidgin is a simplified language that develops as a means of communication between two or more groups that do not have a language in common, in situations such as trade. Creole can evolve from pigjin as a new consolidated language (Galison 1997).
- 35.
“Boundary objects are objects which are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites. They are weakly structured in common use, and become strongly structured in individual-site use. They may be abstract or concrete. They have different meanings in different social worlds but their structure is common enough to more than one world to make them recognizable, a means of translation. The creation and management of boundary objects is key in developing and maintaining coherence across intersecting social worlds.” [Star and Griesemer (1989), p. 393 quoted in Galison (2010)].
- 36.
- 37.
Boyd Fuller’s doctoral thesis analyzes a case of Collaborative Water Management in Florida through the implementation of the trading zone concept to explain conflicts mediation in planning, when stakeholders, to be mediated through and to engage in the creation of a TZ, are readily identifiable. He argued that a trading zone can work as a practical tool for experiencing Forester's critical pragmatism (Fuller 2006).
- 38.
An interactional expert is an agent with such an understanding of the languages and norms of the different cultures involved in the zone as to favor trades. For example, early in the development of MRI (Magnetic Resonance Image), surgeons interpreted as a lesion what an engineer would have recognized as an artifact of the way the device was being used. This gap in creole language between these communities was recognized and bridged by an interactional expert with a background in both physics and medicine [Baird and Cohen (1999), quoted in Gorman et al. (2010)].
References
Argyris, C., & Schön, D. (1978). Organizational Learning: A theory of action perspective. MA: Reading Addison-Wesley.
Argyris, C., & Schön. D., (1996). Organizational Learning II. Theory, method and practice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Bäcklund, P., & Mäntysalo, R. (2010). Agonism and institutional ambiguity: Ideas on democracy and the role of participation in the development of planning theory and practice—the case of Finland. Planning Theory, 9(4), 333–350.
Baird, D., & Cohen, M. (1999). Why trade? Perspectives on Science, 7, 231–254.
Balducci, A. (2013). Trading zone: A useful concept for some planning dilemmas. In A. Balducci & R. Mantysalo (Eds.), Planning as a Trading Zone, (pp. 23–35). Springer.
Balducci, A., & Mäntysalo, R. (Eds.). (2013). Urban planning as a trading zone. London: Springer.
Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Crosta, P. L. (1994). “Conoscenza e azione. Due approcci rivali al piano come processo d’interazione: la prospettiva dell’osservatore e quella dell’agente”, in Maciocco G. (a cura di), La città, la mente, il piano, Franco Angeli, Milano.
Crosta, P. L. (2010). Pratiche. Il territorio “è l’uso che se ne fa”, Franco Angeli, Milano.
Dal Pra, M. (1998). La filosofia contemporanea, seconda metà del Novecento, Tomo 1, Ed. Francesco Vallardi, Piccin Nuova Libraia, Milano.
Davidoff, P. (1965). Advocacy and pluralism in planning. Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 31(4), 331–338.
De Carlo, G., & Schirollo, L. (1992). a cura di. Editori Riuniti, Roma: Gli spiriti dell’architettura.
Dente, B. (1990). Le politiche pubbliche in Italia. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Dewey, J. (1938). Logic: The theory of inquiry. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Dewey, J., & Bentley, A. F. (1949). The Knowing and the Known. In J. A. Boydston (Ed.) (1989), The later works of John Dewey 1925–1953 (Vol. 16). Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Elster, J. (1999). Alchemies of the mind: Rationality and the emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fabbrichesi Leo, R. (2002). Cosa significa dirsi pragmatisti, Pierce and Wittgenstein a confronto. Milano: CUEM.
Fainstein, S. (2000). New directions in planning theory. Urban Affaires, 4, 451–478.
Fainstein, S. (2005). Planning theory and the city. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 25, 121–130.
Fainstein, S. (2009). Spatial Justice and Planning. Journal on Spatial Justice and Planning, 1(1), 58–77
Fainstein, S. (2009). Spatial Justice and Planning («Justice spatiale et aménagement urbain», traduction: Philippe Gervais-Lambony), JS/SJ, n. 01, Sept, http://www.jssj.org
Fainstein, S. (2010). The just city. Cornell: Cornell University Press.
Flyvbjerg, B. (1998). Rationality and power: Democracy in practice. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Flyvbjerg, B. (2002). Planning and Foucault: In search of the dark side of planning theory. In P. Allmendinger & M. Tewdwr-Jones (Eds.), Planning futures: New directions for planning theory (pp. 44–62). London and New York: Routledge.
Forester, J. (1989). Planning in the face of power. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Forester, J. (Ed.). (1993). Critical theory, public policy, and planning practice: Toward a critical pragmatism. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Forester, J. (1999). The deliberative practitioner. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Forester, J. (2001). An instructive case study hampered by theoretical puzzles: Critical comments on Flyvbjerg’s “Rationality and Power”. International Planning Studies, 6(3), 263–270.
Forester, J. (2008). Are collaboration and participation more trouble than they’re Worth? Planning Theory & Practice, 9(3), 299–304.
Forester, J. (2009). Dealing with differences: dramas of mediating public disputes. New York: Oxford University Press.
Forester, J. (2013). Planning in the face of conflict. The surprising possibilities of facilitative leadership. Chicago: APA Planners Press.
Foucault, M. (1988). The ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom. In J. Bernauer & D. Rasmussen (Eds.), The Final Foucault. Mass: MIT Press, Cambridge.
Foucault, M. (1990). The history of sexuality (Vol. 1). London: The Penguin Books.
Friedmann J. (1987). Planning in the public domain: From knowledge to action. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fuller, B. (2006). Trading zones: cooperating for water resource and ecosystem management when stakeholders have apparently irreconcilable differences. Doctoral thesis, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Galison, P. (1997). Image and logic: A material culture of microphysics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Galison, P. (2010). Trading with the enemy. In M. E. Gorman (Ed.), Trading zones and interactional expertise. creating new kinds of collaboration. Boston: MIT Press.
Gorman, M. E., et al. (Eds.). (2010). Trading zones and interactional expertise. Creating new kinds of collaboration. Cambridge: The Mit Press.
Habermas, J. (1996). Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Healey, P. (1992). Planning through debate. The communicative turn in planning theory. The Town Planning Review, 63(2), 143–162.
Healey, P. (1997). Collaborative planning: Shaping places in fragmented societies. London: Macmillan.
Healey, P., & Hillier, J. (2008). “Contemporary movements in planning”, Critical essays in planning theory (Vol. 3). Aldershot: Ashgate.
Hillier, J. (2002). Direct action and agonism in democratic planning processes. In P. Allmendinger & M. Tewdwr-Jones (Eds.), Planning futures: New directions for planning theory. London: Routledge.
Hillier, J. (2003). Agonizing over consensus: Why habermasian ideals cannot be “real”. Planning Theory, 2(1), 37–59.
Hirshman, A. (1970). Voice, Exit and Loyalty. Cambridge: Harvard Univeristy Press.
Hoch, C. (1984). Pragmatism, planning and power. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 4(2), 86–95.
Hoch, C. (1992). The paradox of power in planning practice. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 11(3), 206–215.
Hoch, C. (1994). What planners do: Power, politics and persuasion. Chicago: APA Planners Press.
Hoch, C. (1996). A pragmatic inquiry about planning and power. In S. J. Mandelbaum, L. Mazza, & R. W. Burchell (Eds.), Explorations in planning theory (pp. 30–44). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Center for Urban Policy Research.
Hoch, C. J. (2002). Evaluating plans pragmatically. Planning Theory, 1(1), 53–76.
Hoch, C. (2007). Pragmatic communicative action theory. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 26, 272–283.
Innes, J., & Boher, D. (2010). Planning with Complexity: and introduction to collaborative rationality for public policy. New York p: Routledge. 116.
LaFollette, H., & Persson, I. (Eds.). (2001). The Blackwell guide to ethical theory, Wiley-Blackwell.
Lanzara, G. (1993). Capacità nengativa. Capcità progettuale e modelli d’intervento nelle organizzazioni, Ed. il Mulino, Bologna.
Lanzara, G. (2005). “La deliberazione come indagine pubblica”, in Pellizzoni L. (a cura di), (2005), La deliberazione pubblica, Meltemi Editore, Roma.
Latour, B. (1998). La scienza in azione: introduzione alla sociologia della scienza. Torino: Edizioni di comunità.
Lindblom, C. E., & Cohen, D. K. (1979). Usable knowledge: Social science and social problem solving. Yale University Press.
Mäntysalo, R., Balducci, A., & Kangasoja, J. (2011). Planning as agonistic negotiation in trading zone. Re-examining Lindblom’s Partisan Mutual Adjustment. Planning Theory, 10(3), 257–272.
Mazza, L. (1994). Distribuzione e giustificazione nei procesi di pianificazione. In S. Moroni (acura di), Territorio e giustizia distributiva, Franco Angeli Milano.
Menkel-Meadow, C. (Ed.). (2012). Introduction & Coda, Multi-Party Dispute Resolution, Democracy and Decision Making, Volume II of Complex Dispute Resolution. Farnham, U.K: Ashgate.
Miessen, M. (2011). The nightmare of participation. London: Sternberg Press.
Moroni, S. (1997). Etica e Territorio. Prospettive di filosofia politica per la pianificazione territoriale. Milano: Franco Angeli.
Mouffe, C. (1999). Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism. Social Research, 66(3), 745–788.
Mouffe, C. (2000). The democratic paradox. London: Verso.
Mouffe, C. (2005). On the Political. Thinking in Action. New York: Taylor & Francis.
Mouffe, C. (2007). Artistic activism and agonistic spaces. Art and Research, 1(2), 1–5.
Parkinson, J., & Mansbridge, J. (Eds.). (2012). Deliberative systems: Deliberative democracy at large scale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pløger, J. (2004). Strife: Urban Planning and Agonism. Planning Theory, 3(1), 71–92.
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice as fairness. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J. (2001). Justice as fairness: A restatement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Schön, D. A. (1979). Generative Metaphor: a perspective of problem setting in social policy. In A. Ortony (Ed.) (1998), Metaphor and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schön, D. A. (1983). The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action. London: Temple Smith.
Star, S., & Griesemer, J. (1989). Institutional ecology, ‘translations’ and boundary objects: Amateurs and professionals in Berkeley’s museum of vertebrate zoology. Social Studies of Science, 19(3), 387–420.
Stein, S. L., & Harper, T. N. (2005, July). Rawls Justice and Fairness: A moral thesis for contemporary planning theory. Planning Theory, 4(2), 147–172.
Susskind, L. (2009a). Multiparty Negotiation. Cambridge: Sage.
Susskind, L. (2009b). “Deliberative Democracy and Dispute Resolution”, article based on the Schwartz Lecture on Dispute Resolution given at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law on April 10, 2008. Ohio State Journal On Dispute Resolution, 24, 3.
Susskind, L., & Cruikshank, J. (1987). Breaking The Impasse. New York: Basic Books.
Susskind, L., & Cruikshank, J. (2006). Breaking the Robert’s Rule. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Susskind, L., McKearnan, S., & Thomas-Larmer, J. (Eds.). (1999). The consensus building handbook: A comprehensive guide to reaching agreement. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Yiftachel, O. (1999). Planning theory at a Crossroads: The third Oxford Conference. Journal of Planning and Education Research, 18, 267–271.
Young, M. I. (1990). Justice and the politics of difference (pp. 238–239). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Zach, T. (2008). Critical pragmatism in planning: The case of the Kathorus Special Integrated Presidential Project in South Africa. Doctoral thesis published at http://hdl.handle.net/10539/5682
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Saporito, E. (2016). Looking for a Way Out. Three Models of Participative Planning: The “Conflictual”, “Consensual” and “Trading Zone” Approaches. In: Consensus Building Versus Irreconcilable Conflicts. SpringerBriefs in Applied Sciences and Technology(). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30829-6_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30829-6_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-30827-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-30829-6
eBook Packages: Earth and Environmental ScienceEarth and Environmental Science (R0)