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Best-Practice Pension Fund Governance

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Abstract

Increasing attention is being paid to the performance of institutional funds; whether public or private, large or small, well-governed or not, these institutions have come to play crucial roles in under-writing the welfare of many citizens of developed and developing countries. In terms of the volume of assets managed by these institutions, it is estimated that, as of 2006, across the world pension funds accounted for $US25,000bn, endowments and foundations $4bn, and the emerging sovereign funds $4bn.1 The price of poor performance is very high (as is noted by many commentators and academics; see Ambachtsheer (2007a) and Lerner et al. (2007)). Inevitably, institutional performance is conditioned by the inherited practices of various bodies that are responsible for these funds. At the same time, we should not be content with simply relying upon the past for the future.

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Clark, G.L., Urwin, R. (2016). Best-Practice Pension Fund Governance. In: Satchell, S. (eds) Asset Management. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30794-7_13

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