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Abstract

The previous chapter concluded that despite all its merits, the GSR is unlikely to be adopted as long as a comprehensive, supportive regulatory and supervisory framework is not in place, and stressed the need for immediate reform in this respect. It also mentioned that the creation of the ESFS partially addressed the concerns voiced by the GSR’s opponents and that the recently established Banking Union brought a number of substantial improvements in the banking sector, which could perhaps be adapted to the insurance sector. Another crucial observation was that given the high degree of interconnectedness of the financial markets both across geographic regions and industry sectors, a truly viable reform proposal must be a holistic one founded on a broader set of considerations reaching beyond the remit of the insurance sector, and that Banking Union is but the first in a long line of possible subjects for reflection.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Quaglia (2013) [15], p. 27.

  2. 2.

    See Pelkmans (2006) [14], p. 2.

  3. 3.

    Mundell (1961) [10], McKinnon (1963) [8], and Kenen (1969) [7].

  4. 4.

    See Bordo et al. (2011) [33], p. 5. For a concise survey of the dynamics of the OCA properties and the OCA theory literature see Mongelli (2002) [56].

  5. 5.

    See Balassa (1961) [1] and Pelkmans (2006) [14], p. 7 et seq.

  6. 6.

    Pelkmans (2006) [14], p. 345, and Mongelli (2002) [56], p. 7.

  7. 7.

    For a more extensive overview of the costs and benefits associated with currency area membership see Mongelli (2002) [56], p. 33 et seq.

  8. 8.

    Bordo et al. (2011) [33], p. 3.

  9. 9.

    Musgrave (1959) [11] and Oates (1972) [12].

  10. 10.

    Oates (1972) [12], p. 35.

  11. 11.

    See Brams (2006) [3], p. 44. Also instructive Moulin (2004) [9], p. 8.

  12. 12.

    Oates (1999) [13], p. 1122.

  13. 13.

    See Bordo et al. (2011) [33], Vallée (2014) [16], and Allard et al. (2013) [32].

  14. 14.

    See Black et al. (2009) [2].

  15. 15.

    Pelkmans (2006) [14], p. 12.

  16. 16.

    See van den Noord et al. (2008) [59], p. 4.

  17. 17.

    For further reading on EMU’s creation and monetary unions refer to Harold (2012) [6], Vallée (2014) [16], and de la Dehesa (2012) [37].

  18. 18.

    Articles 3(c), 119, and 127–133 TFEU.

  19. 19.

    See Articles 119–126 TFEU and Chang (2009) [4], p. 71 et seq.

  20. 20.

    Articles 121, 126 in conjunction with Protocol No 12 annexed to the Treaty, and 136 of the Treaty.

  21. 21.

    The SGP consists of a Resolution of the Amsterdam European Council [36] and two Council Regulations, Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 [19] (the preventive arm of the SGP) and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 [20] (the corrective arm of the SGP).

  22. 22.

    For more information on the EU budget refer to Commission (2014) [43] and the Definitive Adoption 2015/339 of the EU’s general budget [30].

  23. 23.

    Van den Noord et al. (2008) [59], p. 13.

  24. 24.

    For further details see Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, and van den Noord et al. (2008) [59], p. 4 et seq., which also provides a good overview of the reasons and implications of the SGP’s 2005 reform.

  25. 25.

    Article 121 TFEU.

  26. 26.

    Article 148 TFEU.

  27. 27.

    For more details on structural policy coordination see the relevant Treaty provisions and van den Noord et al. (2008) [59], p. 20 et seq.

  28. 28.

    For more on both paradigms, see Mongelli (2002) [56], especially p. 27 et seq.

  29. 29.

    Article 140 TFEU.

  30. 30.

    De Larosière Report [58], p. 7 et seq.

  31. 31.

    In line with the established EU jargon and distinctions made in the below introduced documents concerning EMU’s economic governance reform, the term economic policies will refer to structural policies only, while financial and fiscal policies shall be considered as separate categories in the remainder of this chapter.

  32. 32.

    De la Dehesa (2012) [37].

  33. 33.

    For more information on the causes and dynamics of financial sector imbalances and malfunctions see the de Larosière Report [58], p. 7 et seq., COM(2012) 777 final/2 [40], p. 3, and Drudi et al. (2012) [38].

  34. 34.

    Article 125 TFEU.

  35. 35.

    COM(2012) 777 final/2 [40], p. 2, and Allard et al. (2013) [32], p. 8 et seq.

  36. 36.

    COM(2012) 777 final/2 [40], p. 2.

  37. 37.

    Véron (2012) [62], p. 6.

  38. 38.

    For more details see Véron (2012) [62] and Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012) [57].

  39. 39.

    Drudi et al. (2012) [38], COM(2012) 777 final/2 [40], p. 8.

  40. 40.

    Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012) [57], p. 4.

  41. 41.

    For more details see Sect. 3.4.2

  42. 42.

    For a broader overview of the measures taken so far to alleviate the consequences of the crisis see COM(2012) 777 final/2 [40], p. 4 et seq. and HL Paper 134 (2014) [54], p. 11 et seq.

  43. 43.

    For more detailed arguments in favor of fiscal federalism see Vallée (2014) [16], p. 55 et seq.

  44. 44.

    Harold (2012) [6], p. 384 et seq.

  45. 45.

    See European Council President Van Rompuy’s Report [60], Parliament Resolution P7_TA(2012)0430 [53], Commission Communication COM(2012) 777 final/2 [40], and the Four Presidents’ Report [61].

  46. 46.

    Véron (2012) [62], p. 4 et seq.

  47. 47.

    Besides the respective documents cited as references at the end of the introduction of each GEMU pillar, see also HL Paper 134 (2014) [54], which provides a very well structured overview of the various stages and aspects of the GEMU project specifically highlighting the main issues of controversy, and the 5 Presidents’ Report [55] reflecting the newest developments with respect to GEMU.

  48. 48.

    COM(2012) 510 final [41].

  49. 49.

    For the assessment criteria of significance and the division of competences between the ECB and NCAs see Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 [21] and Articles 39–72 of Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 [22].

  50. 50.

    See Article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 [21] and HL Paper 134 (2014) [54], p. 25, para 36.

  51. 51.

    Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 [21].

  52. 52.

    Besides the text of the Regulation, see also COM(2012) 511 final [45] for details.

  53. 53.

    See Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 [28] and COM(2012) 512 final [48] for specifics.

  54. 54.

    Directive 2014/59/EU [26].

  55. 55.

    COM(2013) 520 final [49].

  56. 56.

    See Cases C-9/56 and 10/56 [17], in particular p. 152.

  57. 57.

    HL Paper 134 (2014) [54], p. 35 et seq.

  58. 58.

    See Council Press Release [35].

  59. 59.

    IGA 8457/14 [31].

  60. 60.

    Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 [29].

  61. 61.

    See COM(2014) 7674 final [42] and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 [23].

  62. 62.

    See COM(2014) 710 final [44] and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/81 [18].

  63. 63.

    For more details regarding the SRM see the SRM Regulation [29], the IGA [31], Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 [23], and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/81 [18].

  64. 64.

    See the Eurogroup and ECOFIN Statement [39].

  65. 65.

    HL Paper 134 (2014) [54], p. 44 et seq.

  66. 66.

    Directive 94/19/EC [27].

  67. 67.

    See COM(2008) 661 final [47] and Directive 2009/14/EC [24].

  68. 68.

    COM(2010) 368 final [46].

  69. 69.

    European Council President Van Rompuy’s Report [60], p.4.

  70. 70.

    See in particular COM(2012) 777 final/2 [40], p. 30 et seq. and the Four Presidents’ Report [61], p. 8.

  71. 71.

    Directive 2014/49/EU [25].

  72. 72.

    HL Paper 134 (2014) [54], p. 46 et seq.

  73. 73.

    For more details on the EU’s fiscal governance framework see Commission (2014) [50].

  74. 74.

    COM(2012) 777 final/2 [40], p. 30 et seq.

  75. 75.

    COM(2012) 777 final/2 [40], p. 25 et seq.

  76. 76.

    See COM(2012) 777 final/2 [40], p. 25 et seq. and Claessens et al. (2012) [34].

  77. 77.

    Evers (2015) [5].

  78. 78.

    COM(2012) 777 final/2 [40], p. 20 et seq. and COM(2013) 166 final [51].

  79. 79.

    COM(2012) 777 final/2 [40], p. 20 et seq. and COM(2013) 165 final [52].

  80. 80.

    COM(2012) 777 final/2 [40], p. 35 et seq.

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Erdélyi, O. (2016). Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union. In: Twin Peaks for Europe: State-of-the-Art Financial Supervisory Consolidation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30707-7_6

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