Abstract
If goals are to fulfil their typical function of regulating action in a way that contributes to an agent’s long-term interests in getting what he or she wants, they need to have a certain stability. At the same time, it is not difficult to imagine situations in which the agent could have a reason to revise his or her goals; goals that are entirely impossible to achieve or approach to a meaningful degree appear to warrant some modification. This chapter addresses the question of when it is rationally justified to reconsider one’s prior goals. In doing so, it enriches the strictly instrumental conception of rationality. Using Bratman’s (1992; 1999) theory of intention and Edvardsson and Hansson’s (2005) theory of rational goal-setting, the chapter critically analyses the steps in the argumentative chain that ought to be considered before it can be concluded that a decision maker has sufficient reason to reconsider her goals. Two sets of revision-prompting considerations are identified: achievability- and desirability-related considerations. It is argued that changes in the agent’s beliefs about the goal’s achievability and/or desirability could give her a prima facie reason to reconsider the goal. However, whether there is sufficient reason—all things considered—to revise the goal hinges on additional factors. Three such factors are discussed: pragmatic, moral and symbolic factors.
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Notes
- 1.
In the following, the terms “goal revision” and “goal reconsideration” are used interchangeably. It could be argued that reconsideration and revision are two different things and that there could be reasons to reconsider a goal that nevertheless do not support goal revision. In this chapter, no such distinction between the two terms will be upheld.
- 2.
See Hansson and Hirsch Hadorn (2016) for a discussion of different types of uncertainties. A common distinction in decision theory is between decision-making under risk and decision-making under uncertainly. The former refers to situations wherein the decision-maker knows both the values and the probabilities of the outcomes of a decision, whereas the latter refers to situations wherein the decision-maker can value the outcomes but does not know the probabilities or has only partial information about the probabilities. In addition, the term “decision-making under great uncertainty” is sometimes used to refer to situations wherein the information required to make decisions under uncertainty is lacking. Hansson (1996) identifies several such types of information shortages, including unidentified options or consequences, undecided values and undetermined demarcation of the decision. Goal setting often involves uncertainty about the probabilities of certain outcomes (that is, how likely it is that a certain state of affairs will be achieved given that it is formulated as a goal), but it could also involve more radical types of uncertainties.
- 3.
The Oxford English Dictionary (2015) defines the adverb “prima facie” as “at first sight; on the face of it; as it appears at first”. To have a prima facie reason to reconsider a goal thus means that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the agent is justified in reconsidering the goal.
- 4.
A goal typically describes a desired state of affairs that is yet to be achieved, although the maintenance of a current state of affairs could also be a goal (Wade 2009). The goal to remain married despite relationship deterioration would be an example of the latter.
- 5.
As noted by Edvardsson and Hansson (2005), goals could be set for other reasons than to achieve them. An example would be a government that adopts the goal to halt biodiversity loss within its national borders with the sole aim to facilitate business partnerships with environmentally friendly states. Although such uses of goals and goal setting may be frequent in political practice, they will not be discussed in this chapter.
- 6.
Another way to put it is to say that goals serve as departure points for practical reasoning about what to do.
- 7.
See Nozick (1993: 9–12) for a related discussion on the coordinative function of principles. In game theoretical settings, knowledge of an agent’s goal can help other agents to plan in a way that makes it easier to achieve their individual goals.
- 8.
- 9.
Although goals and intentions play a pivotal role in deliberation about what to do, it is important to note that there could be differences in how strongly they influence an agent’s actions. Intentions typically involve a stronger commitment to action than goals. When I have a goal or intention to practice on my violin for at least 14 h the coming week, I have a disposition towards actions that will bring me closer to the goal. However, the relationship between my having this disposition and letting it influence my actions is stronger for intentions than for goals and stronger still for goals than for desires. Thus, while it makes sense to say “I desire to practice on my violin for at least 14 h this week, but I shall not (or cannot) do it”, it typically does not make sense to say “My goal is to practice on my violin for at least 14 h this week, but I shall not (or cannot) do it”. Further to the point, saying “I intend to practice on my violin for at least 14 h this week, but I shall not (or cannot) do it” comes out as being even more inconsistent (modified from Hansson et al. 2016, cf. Bratman 1992 on “strong consistency”).
- 10.
This example is modified from Baard and Edvardsson Björnberg (2015).
- 11.
As suggested by Hirsch Hadorn (2016), this problem could be avoided if the government partitions the decision problem by adopting a system of goals wherein the 2025 and 2035 targets are set sequentially as sub-goals to the overall goal of reducing emissions by at least 70 % by 2050.
- 12.
This could involve either a total or a partial rejection of the agent’s desires or values. A partial rejection of the agent’s values could, for example, be the result of her coming to embrace new values, which means her prior values fade into the background.
- 13.
Here, it could be objected that cognitive changes, such as a change in belief, are also changes in the world. This would make the distinction between ontological and epistemological interpretations meaningless. This objection will not be addressed in this chapter.
- 14.
The examples and discussion below are taken from Baard and Edvardsson Björnberg (2015) with some modifications.
- 15.
That is, it does not lead to a high percentage of true beliefs (see also Nozick 1993: 64 ff.).
- 16.
As noted by Hansson (1996), the notion of ‘expertise’ is vague. There could be uncertainties regarding an expert’s knowledge and there could be multiple experts with competing but well-grounded opinions. In the literature on evidence, the question of higher-order evidence has received substantial attention in recent years (Feldman 2014; Kelly 2010).
- 17.
The last point touches on one of the central questions in the ethics of belief, namely what norms ought to govern belief formation. A distinction is commonly made between strict evidentialist accounts, according to which an agent should base her beliefs always and solely on relevant evidence, and moderate evidentialist and non-evidentialist accounts, which permit non-epistemic considerations to have some bearing on what should count as a justified belief (Chignell 2013). As an example of the latter, Chignell (2013) mentions William James (1896[1979]), who emphasises the central roles played by prudential and moral values in the ethics of belief. Allowing the magnitude of the consequences of setting (or not setting) goals to have some bearing on what counts as a justified belief in goal achievability/desirability departs from strict evidentialism.
Recommended Readings
Bratman, M. E. (1999). Intentions, plans, and practical reason. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Edvardsson, K., & Hansson, S. O. (2005). When is a goal rational? Social Choice and Welfare, 24, 343–361.
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Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn and Sven Ove Hansson and the participants of the workshop in Zürich 26–27 February 2015 for their valuable comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this chapter. Any remaining errors (if any) are my own.
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Edvardsson Björnberg, K. (2016). Setting and Revising Goals. In: Hansson, S., Hirsch Hadorn, G. (eds) The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 10. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30549-3_7
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