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Concluding Remarks

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Abstract

Sometime between 1003 and 1060 AD, one of our most celebrated poets, Nasir Khusrau, composed a collection of poems in the Valley of Yumgan, a remote mountainous region in Badakhshan (a present-day Afghanistan), called the Divan. One of the poems in this collection is called Eagle, a splendid narrative that still resonates today. The poem tells the narrative of how, one day, an eagle rose up from its rock perch, circling in the air full with self-pride and lavishly extending its wings and feathers. While soaring at great heights, the eagle marveled at his superior aptitude, his eyesight so keen he could even discern a tiny hair at the bottom of the sea or an insect on a twig. He boasted, “Who is a better creature than I, anywhere on earth or sky?” But suddenly, in the midst of this reverie of self-adoring, he is struck by a terrible pain and falls to the ground. In despair, he looks around to see the cause of his pain and spots an arrow wedged deep within him. In disbelief, he cannot fathom how an earthbound element such as an arrow, made of wood and metal, could strike a superior creature like him, a creature of the sky with power so superior that man only wishes to posses. It is only when his eye catches the arrow fletched with eagle feathers at its end that he realizes the source of his downfall (the arrow’s power). The recognition deeply affects his soul, and the eagle cries out:

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Nasir Khusrau is considered one of the greatest Persian poets. A Shi’i by upbringing, he later converted to the Ismaili sect. He was employed in the Saljuq government (of Turkish descent) , but unlike his predecessors who employed lengthy odes to play elaborate paeans to kings and princes, “his panegyric was direct towards the unity and majesty of God, the religious life, the pursuit of virtue, the praise of good leaning and good doing” (Arberry AJ (1958). Classical Persian Literature . George Allen & Unwin Ltd, p. 66). According to Arberry, “The technical virtuosity of Nasir Khusrau is dazzling in the extreme; no other poet has shown a greater rhyming dexterity, none has written clear, richer or purer Persian” (Ibid., p. 67).

  2. 2.

    Schadi M (2009) The Shrine of Nasir Khusraw : Imprisoned Deep in the Valley of Yumgan. In: Necipoglu G, Leal KA (2009) Muqarnas; An Annual On the Visual Cultures of The Islamic World, Volume XXVI. Koninklijke Brill, p. 77.

  3. 3.

    Arianpour Y (2007) Az Saba ta Nima: Azade va Tajadood (from Saba to Nima; Freedom and Modernity), Vol. II, 9th edition, pp. 133–134. Translation by the author.

  4. 4.

    Parsa M (1989) Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution . Rutgers University Press, p. 179.

  5. 5.

    Nategh H (1975) Aaz Ma-st ki Bar Ma-st. Aghah Publisher, p. 242. According to Peter Marshall, “Mazdak appeared around AD 487 in Persia. Retaining Zoroaster’s concepts of light and darkness, Mazdak preached a dualistic religion, but with socialist principle. He believed that all men are born equal but suffer from the unequal distribution of wealth and women, and since most fighting is caused by them, he proscribed private property and marriage. People should share their good and women like water, fire and grazing. They should also maintain respect for animals, thereby putting an end to slaughter. Mazdak’s ideal was a stoical and simple life, and he urged contentment and austerity … Thousand joined the movement but in AD 523 King Qobath arranged a massacre. Mazak was arrested and executed in AD 528 or 529.” (See Marshall P (2009) Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism. PM Press, p. 86).

  6. 6.

    Perhaps an analogy would make the point more apparent. When someone said he has a cold, he means he has a cold virus in his body that makes him ill. Therefore, he should not look elsewhere to treat his cold but seek treatment for the virus that lay within his body and no one else.

  7. 7.

    Ayatollahi H (2003) The Book of Iran: The History of Iranian Art. Alhoda, p. iii.

  8. 8.

    Known in Persian as Farārūd and in Arabic as Mā warāʼ al-Nahr (beyond the Oxus river) is the ancient name used for the portion of Central Asia corresponding approximately with modern-day Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, southern Kyrgyzstan, and southwest Kazakhstan. As Ferdowsi writes:

    A’gar Pahlevani nedani zabon  Farawrood ra Ma’wara’o’nahr Bekhan

    If a Chivalry does not know the language (Farsi)  call Farārūd the Mā warāʼ al-Nahr

  9. 9.

    Iliffe JH (1989) Persia and the Ancient World. In: Arberry AJ (ed) The Legacy of Persia. Oxford University Press, p. 1.

  10. 10.

    Savant SB (2013) The New Muslims of Post-Conquest Iran: Tradition, Memory, and Conversion. Cambridge University Press, p. 136.

  11. 11.

    Ansari AM (ed) (2014) Perceptions of Iran: History, Myths and Nationalism from Medieval Persia to the Islamic Republic. I.B. Tauris, p. 6.

  12. 12.

    Keddie NR (1973) An Assessment of American, British, and French Work since 1940 on Modern Iranian History. Iranian Studies 6(2/3), p. 153.

  13. 13.

    Parsinejad I (2003) A History of Literary Criticism in Iran (1866–1951) . IBEX Publishers, p. 76. To minimize any risk of being labeled impartial, here is the entire quotation: “Their mystical and Sufi poetry has led to nothing but laziness, animalistic sluggishness, and the production of beggars and vagabonds. Their lyrics about roses and nightingales have encouraged the youth to pursue pederasty and booze. Their facetiae and drollery have caused the speared of debauchery, prostitutions and vice.” Ibid.

  14. 14.

    Arberry AJ (ed) (1989) The Legacy of Persia. Oxford University Press, p. v.

  15. 15.

    Browne EG (1956) A Literary History of Persia: From the Earliest Times until Firdawsi, Vol. II. Cambridge University Press, p. 23.

  16. 16.

    Ghorashi H (2003) Ways to Survive, Battle to Win. Nova Publishers, p. 208.

  17. 17.

    Moazami B (2013) State, Religion, and Revolution in Iran, 1796 to the Present. Palgrave Macmillan, p. 24.

  18. 18.

    Having said that, one must also admit that the concept of collective identity is notoriously “slippery,” to the extent that there is no consensual definition. Nevertheless, this study, rather than forge a definition, assumed a general form in which an identity can be perceived as a cognitive framework. This means that members of the community do not necessarily have to be in complete agreement on ideologies, beliefs, interests, or goals in order to come together and generate collective action, an assertion that counters more structural understandings of what brings and keeps movement actors together (e.g., the concept of class consciousness in the Marxist tradition). Georg Simmel’s work in 1955 signified this approach as he explored the dynamics of group formation and highlighted elements that help us to understand formation of group cohesion during tension and conflict in specific historic contexts. (See Simmel G (1964). Conflict and the Web of group-affiliations. (trans: Wolff KH, Bendix R). Free Press, New York).

  19. 19.

    Betts GG (2002) The Twilight of Britain: Cultural Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and the Politics of Toleration. Transaction Publishers, p. 101.

  20. 20.

    Greenfeld L (2003) The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth. Harvard University Press , p. 2.

  21. 21.

    Sadri F (2010) How Early Muslim Scholars Assimilated Aristotle and Made Iran the Intellectual Center of the Islamic World: A Study of Falsafah [philosophy]. Edwin Mellen Prints, p. 163.

  22. 22.

    Ibid.

  23. 23.

    As renowned Ernest Renan’s sentence underlined, “Forgetfulness, and I would even say historical error, are essential in the creation of a nation.” (See Cabell KR (2013) Jaan Valsiner, The Catalyzing Mind: Beyond Models of Causality. Springer, p. 212).

  24. 24.

    According to Encyclopedia of Islam, “Collectively, Muslims understand themselves ideally to be members of a single community of believers, known as the umma.” (See Campo JE (ed) (2009) Encyclopedia of Islam. Facts on File, Inc, p. xxv). Moreover, the word umma is derived from the Arabic word for mother (umm) and literally has other meanings, which vary according to the context. For various uses, see http://muftionline.co.za/node/2848.

  25. 25.

    Freeden M (2003) Ideology: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, pp. 101–102. However, an inconsistency can be detected between Western liberal democracy, as integral part of egalitarian principle, and the notion of nationhood. The question that remained unanswered is, can we find a theoretical justification, consisting of liberal egalitarianism, for the practice of privileging national identities, national cultures, and national communities in decisions about the location (boundaries) and function of territorial boundaries?

  26. 26.

    It should be noted that similar terms have been used in other monolithic religion to galvanize believers for political purposes. For instance, as English King Henry VIII broke from Rome (Catholic Church) in the middle of the sixteenth century, the door opened wide to Protestantism, which perhaps was the most significant factor that furthered the development of the English national consciousness . One of the first protestant act, according to Liah Greenfeld, was to insist on the priesthood of all believers, which is based on suggestions in the Old Testament like “a chosen, godly people, a people which was an elite and a light to the world because everyone of its members was a party to the covenant with God. This message was not lost on England, and it is not coincidental that in the years of the great upheaval that brought Englishmen to assert themselves as a nation in the Puritan Rebellion, they believed themselves to be the second Israel, constantly returning to this metaphor in parliamentary speeches and pamphlets, as well as sermons” (Greenfeld L (1993) Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Harvard University Press, p. 52). Yet, and Unlike the Qu’ran, “there are no exact equivalents of the word ‘nation’ (especially in its modern sense) in either Biblical Hebrew or Greek. Yet all the English Bibles use the word” (Ibid.).

  27. 27.

    Renan E (1996) What is Nation. In: Eley G, Suny RG (eds) Becoming national: A Reader, Oxford University Press, p. 52.

  28. 28.

    According to Caleb Elfenbein, “Historically, in most cases only members of the umma [ummat] were subject to Islamic law, even if non-Muslims—or dhimmis—lived in areas ruled by Muslim leaders. Otherwise, non-Muslims, and particularly Jews, Christians, and in some cases Hindus, lived according to their own legal traditions. Although a territorial element can be found in the Islamic legal designations dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) and dar al-harb (abode of war), these came into effect only when Muslims came into contact with large non-Muslim populations, such as occurred through conquest or trade.” (See Elfenbein C (2009). Citizenship. In: Campo JE (ed) Encyclopedia of Islam. Facts on File Inc., p. 152).

  29. 29.

    This progressive approach, ironically, was copied from Persian. For instance, under Parthian rulers, the Greek settlers in cities founded by Seleucid Empire enjoyed considerable autonomy. (See Daryaee T (ed) (2012) The Oxford handbook of Iranian. Oxford University Press, p. 180).

  30. 30.

    Browne EG (1956) A Literary History of Persia: From the Earliest Times until Firdawsi, Vol. II. Cambridge University Press, pp. 232–233.

  31. 31.

    Savant SB (2013) The New Muslims of Post-Conquest Iran: Tradition, Memory, and Conversion. Cambridge University Press, p. 213.

  32. 32.

    Strauss CL (1962) Savage mind. Weidendfeld and Nicolson, pp. 233–234.

  33. 33.

    Ibid.

  34. 34.

    It is important to note that though comprehensiveness was the very essence of Lévi-Strauss’s approach, his researches were concentrated chiefly on various tribes of Amerindians in Guyana.

  35. 35.

    See Assmann J (2011) Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination. Cambridge University Press, p. 59.

  36. 36.

    Ferdowsi A (2006) Shahnameh: The Persian Book of Kings. Penguin, p. xi.

  37. 37.

    Talattof K (2000) The politics of writing in Iran: a history of modern Persian literature. Syracuse University Press, pp. 1–2.

  38. 38.

    Lang B (2008) Hebrew Life and Literature: Selected Essays of Bernhard Lang. Ashgate Publishing Ltd, p. 123.

  39. 39.

    According to Leonard Lewisohn, “The Islamic counterpart of the Hindu saddhu, the qalandar was a religious mendicant, a holy vagabond or faqīr [deprived] who attired himself in outlandish garb and often shaved all facial hair save the mustache, traveling from town to town occupied in devotional practices in order to mortify his soul and disengage himself from worldly concerns. The Sufi theoreticians of medieval Persia inform us that the difference between the malāmatī (literarily means blame and malamat denotes reproach] and qalandar mystics was that the former sought to conceal his acts of devotion and piety, whereas the latter endeavored to overturn and destroy established customs. In Ḥāfiẓ’s poetry both tendencies are visible. As an institution, the qalandariyya was closely connected with the early malāmatī tradition in tenth-/eleventh-century Nishapur in Khurāsān, which later, under the leadership of Jamāl al-Dīn Sāwī (d. circa 630/1232), developed into separate orders with their own Khānaqāhs scattered all over Egypt, Libya, Turkey, Persia and India. Historically speaking, the qalandariyya movement represented a sort of mass institutionalization of the high principles of the malāmatī moral philosophy. In Ḥāfiẓ’s poetry the qalandar libertine (rind-i qalandar) stands at the summit of the spiritual hierarchy. The qalandar is the supreme mystical monarch before whom even the prince must bend his knee to receive his crown:

    Around the tavern door

    The reprobates of God—qalandars—swarm

    They withdraw and they bestow

    The diadems of Empire.” (See Lewisohn L (Ed) (2010) Hafiz and the Religion of Love in Classical Persian Poetry (Vol. 25). IB Tauris, p. 37).

  40. 40.

    Lewisohn L (Ed) (2010) Hafiz and the Religion of Love in Classical Persian Poetry (Vol. 25). IB Tauris, p. 38. The hint at shaves his scalp suggests renouncing the world for the love of God. And it’s more or less the same for all religious practice of shaving the head, including Buddhist, Christian, Muslim, Hindu, etc.

  41. 41.

    Yarshater E (ed) (2009) Mystical poems of Rumi. Trans: Arberry AJ. University of Chicago Press, p. 80.

  42. 42.

    EJW Gibb Memorial Series (1907), vol. IV. Trans: Margoliouth DS. E. J. Brill, p. v.

  43. 43.

    Kermani N (2011) The Terror of God: Attar, Job and the Metaphysical Revolt. Polity, p. 61.

  44. 44.

    Nietzsche F (1997) Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy. Dover Publication, p. 75 (section 146).

  45. 45.

    Orwell G (1945) Animal Farm: A Fairy Story. http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks01/0100011.txt, p. 131. Orwell ends his book by the sentence. One may note that such characterization is nothing new to men, which I concurred. However, the point is, if so, then we should have courage to admit it.

  46. 46.

    Unless one believed that there are other factors at work such as national vested interest, external influence, and conspiracy, the world affairs, etc., to which I would point out that these examples are all, if assumed, valid, should be considered as instruments of provocation rather than the agent of change and in absence of people they are ineffective.

  47. 47.

    Stirner M, Leopold D (1995) Stirner: The Ego and Its Own. Cambridge University Press, p. xxvi.

  48. 48.

    Ibid., p. xxvii and 175.

  49. 49.

    On this note, Leopold reiterates Stirner’s brief and contrasting accounts of Socrates and Alcibiades (prominent Athenian statesman), by stating, “Socrates’ refusal to escape punishment, or even (earlier) to request banishment, was clearly grounded in a commitment not to weaken the community by undermining the system of law, and is roundly condemned by Stirner. Socrates was a ‘fool’ to concede to the Athenians the right to condemn him; his failure to escape was a ‘weakness,’ a product of his ‘delusion’ that he was a member of a community rather than an individual, and of his failure to understand that the Athenians were his ‘enemies,’ that he himself and no one else could be his only judge.” (See Ibid., p. xxvii and 191).

  50. 50.

    Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, act I, scene 2. As Brutus states, “There is a tide in the affairs of men which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune, omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound in shallow and in miseries. On such a full sea are we now afloat, And we must take the current when it served, Or lose our venture.” Cassius replied, “The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars. But in ourselves, that we are underlings.”

  51. 51.

    De Mesquita BB, Smith A (2011) The dictator’s handbook: why bad behavior is almost always good politics. PublicAffairs, p. 2. Indeed, the recent so-called Greek state’s bankruptcy confirmed the argument as it was first labeled a debt crisis but soon branded a political crisis, even by George Papandreou government, not because provision of public goods was significantly curtailed but rather the fact that the government runs out of the resources necessary to purchase political loyalty of its patrons including the national technocrats and lower bureaucrats.

  52. 52.

    For instance, the most celebrated type of governing body these days is called a representative democracy in which people’s participation in general election to select their leaders is perceived as an ideal feature of democracy. And yet, no attention is given to a number of people necessary to keep the government (as well as a leader) in an office, whom in fact are not elected by people.

  53. 53.

    Lambton AKS (1957) The Impact of the West on Persia. International Affairs 33, p. 12.

  54. 54.

    Mottahedeh R (1985) The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran. Simon & Schuster, pp. 379–380.

  55. 55.

    According to Fereydun Adamiyat , Amir Kabir was curiously a powerful prime minister to the extent that he took upon himself to determine the Shah’s monthly stipend. (See Adamiyat F (1969) Amir Kabir and Iran [in Persian]. 3rd edition, Karazmi Publisher, Tehran, p. 265).

  56. 56.

    Algar H (1980) Religion and State in Iran 1785–1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period. University of California Press, p. 129.

  57. 57.

    On the culture front, they also helped to reshape part of the literary tradition of Iranian critics and authors. For instance, the works of the “King of Poets”, Bahar, though highly classical in form, were great influence as they dealt with contemporary events and appealed to a wide public. Indeed, “one branch of modern Persian Literature is closely connected with a group of Persian who lived in Berlin after the First World War. There they established the Kaviani Press, and among the poems they printed were several by Aref Qazvini (died in 1934) , one of the first genuinely modern writers.” (The Britannica Guides: Britannica Guide to the Islamic World (2009) Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. Chicago, p. 331).

  58. 58.

    Mottahedeh R (1985) The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran. Simon & Schuster, p. 51.

  59. 59.

    Ali Gheissari also alluded to the similar direction when he wrote that the advocates “to purify the Persian language from Arabic words fell prey to another extreme, namely, the excessive use of European, mainly French terms.” (See Gheissari A (1998) Iranian Intellectuals in the Twentieth Century. University of Texas Press p. 24).

  60. 60.

    Kurzman C (2005) Weaving Iran into The Three of Nations. Int. J. Middle East Stud. 37:147–148. However, I would like to point to a distinct difference between Rasulzadeh who, at least, underlined the noun “willingness” as a precondition and Taqizadeh who utterly accepted the notion of cut-and-paste as a reliable approach to move the country forward.

  61. 61.

    For instance, Malkum Khan introduced words loaded with European influence and political and social concepts. One such was qanun, an Arabic word which Mirza Malkum Khan adopted to mean law—in contrast to the word Shari’a. (See Avery P (1965) Modern Iran. Fredrick A. Praeger, p. 116).

  62. 62.

    Oxford Dictionary of Islam described Naini as, “Iraqi Shii cleric. Leading theoretician of the 1905–1911 Constitutional Revolution in Iran. Led Iraqi nationalists in an independent movement against the British. Depicted those opposing Reza Shah Pahlavi’s rule as enemies of Islam, opening the door to the deposing of the Qajar dynasty.” (See Espositi JL (2003) The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Oxford University Press, p. 228).

  63. 63.

    Naini MH (2002) Government from the Perspective of Islam. In: Kurzman C (ed) Modernist Islam, 1840–1940: A SourceBook. Oxford University Press, p. 116.

  64. 64.

    Hairi AH (1977) Shi’ism and Constitutionalism in Iran. E. J. Brill, p. 4.

  65. 65.

    See Bagley FRC (1983) New Light on the Iranian Constitutional Movement. In: Bosworth E, Hillebrand C (eds) Qajar Iran: Political, Social and Cultural Change 1800–1925. Edinburg University Press, p. 54.

  66. 66.

    Hairi AH (1977) Shi’ism and Constitutionalism in Iran. E. J. Brill, p. 84.

  67. 67.

    This action by itself says much about ineptness of Iranian political leadership at the time.

  68. 68.

    Indeed there are noticeable similarities between 1905 Constitutional Revolution and 1978 Islamic Revolution, the effective coalition among opposition with dissimilar and to a certain extent contradictory interests, the vast numbers of intellectuals were among his Majesty’s opponents, the clerics role as the catalyst against the state, and resemblance of main themes such as despotic and decadent monarchy, un-Islamic, and anti-Western sentiments.

  69. 69.

    Muhammad Ali Shah is known to identify himself with a 6000-year tradition of Iranian monarchy, 3500 years more than Muhammad Riza Shah later claimed during his celebration at Persepolis/Shiraz in 1971. “Disorder, Muhammad Ali Shah declared in 1908, ‘is weakening the foundations of the 6000-year-old Iranian monarchy, and on the basis of extensive personal duty I do not consider it permissible to endure this in silence.’” (See Kurzman C (2005) Weaving Iran into The Three of Nations. Int. J. Middle East Stud. 37:147–148, p. 150).

  70. 70.

    Kasravi A (2006) History of Iranian Constitutional Revolution (Tarikh-e Mashrute-ye Iran) vol. I, trans. Evan Siegel, Mazda Publishers, pp. 295–296.

  71. 71.

    See Adamiyat F (1975) Social Democratic Thought in the Constitutionalist Movement (Fikr-i dimukrasi-yi ijtima_i dar nahzat-i mashrutiyat-i Iran). Intisharat-i Payam, p. 4.

  72. 72.

    See United States Dept. of State (1909) Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, part 2, U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 1217.

  73. 73.

    de Lorey E, Sladen D (1910) The Moon of the Fourteenth Night: Being the Private Life of an Unmarried Diplomat in Persia during the Revolution. Hurst & Blackett, p. 156. “Valmont” was a pseudonym; his entire observation was: “If I had not applied the brake, Allah alone knows how far the eloquence of this true son of Persia would have carried him. So long as he was not pinned down to the description of precise details, so long as he was allowed to reel off the visionary mirages of his own brain, he was never at a loss; but when I approached him with concrete questions born of my European and positive need of the actual truth, he became disconcerted, irritated, and absolutely incapable of giving any clear answer. And this is typical of the state of mind of the greater number of Persians. From one point of view it is an enviable condition, since it is pleasant to be able to lull oneself with illusions and dreams; but it explains the slow growth here of progress, and the lack of real comprehension of the spirit of the Constitution.” Italic added. It should be noted that as evidence of the difficulty modern institutions faced in an Islamic country, Valmont’s memoir included a cartoon, reproduced at left, showing a clerical figure pointing with one hand to the Qur’an and holding up his other hand to block curious onlookers from peeking. The caption reads: “Finding reasons for the constitution in the Koran (from ‘Mulla Nasir-ud-din[,’] the Persian ‘Punch’).” (See Kurzman C (2005) Weaving Iran into The Three of Nations. Int. J. Middle East Stud. 37:147–148, p. 3). The message seems clear: some may claim that Islam supports constitutionalism, but such claims don’t bear close scrutiny.

  74. 74.

    Ibid. pp. 117–118.

  75. 75.

    Particularly influential in disseminating European and in particular French ideas on constitutional government in Egypt and in the Arab-speaking world was the book by Rifa al-Tahtawi, Tahhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Baris, published in 1834 in Arabic and subsequently translated into Turkish. The book contained an Arabic translation of the 1814 French Constitution, the Charte Constitutionnelle, a detailed analysis of its main provision, and an extended account of the July Revolution, which put an end to the attempt of the Bourbon king Charles X to restore the absolute monarchy of the pre-1789 period. Al-Tahtawi, who had studied Arabic and Islamic theology in his native Egypt, was a member of the first Egyptian delegation sent to Europe by Muhammad ‘Ali in 1826. On his contribution to the birth of a constitutional reform movement in the different parts of the Ottoman Empire, see Rogan E (2009) The Arabs—A History. Allen Lane, pp. 85–88; Grote R, Röder T (2012) Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity. Oxford University Press, p. 4, Footnote 10.

  76. 76.

    Arjomand SA (1992) Constitutions and the Struggle for Political Order. European Journal of Sociology, 33 (01), June 1992. It is note worthy that the Belgian Constitution of 1931 owed its influence mainly to the fact that it was the first coherent codification of the principles of liberal constitutionalism in Europe. The different French constitutional texts, notably the Constitution of 1793 and the Charte Constitutionnelle of 1814, reflected radically different ideologies and either were never applied or soon lost their relevance. Other early liberal constitutions, like the Spanish Constitutions of Cadiz of 1812 or Norwegian Constitution of 1814, were much less accessible. (See Grote R, Röder T (2012) Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity. Oxford University Press, pp. 4–5, Footnote 11).

  77. 77.

    For instance, in 1857, the Tunisian bay (hereditary governor) declared a Fundamental Pact, which included basic rights which guarantee, e.g., the right to property and freedom of religion. This was followed four years later by a constitution that limited the power of the monarchial ruler and provided for the creation of an appointed body, the Grand Council, which had to approve new laws and changes in expenditure (Grote R, Röder T (2012) Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity. Oxford University Press, p. 5. See also Brown NJ (2002) Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World : Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government. State University of New York Press). About the same time, the reform movement of the Young Ottoman in Istanbul had been rewarded with the promulgation of the Ottoman Basic Law (Kanun-i Esasi) of 1876 and the convening of the first Ottoman Parliament . Six years later, the reform movement made progress in Egypt as well, leading to the establishment of a Consultative Assembly of Deputies. The reform debate culminated in the adoption of the Fundamental Law of February 1882, which provided for the election of the member of Assembly of Deputies instead of their appointment by the viceroy (Ottoman Turkish: Hıdiv) and gave the Assembly the right to convene on its own accord, to determine taxes, and to review the state’s budget (Grote R, Röder T (2012) Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity. Oxford University Press, p. 5).

  78. 78.

    Browne EG (1910) Persian Revolution of 1905–1909 . Cambridge University Press, p. 372. Here are names of some deposed kings around the same period: Morocco Sultan Abdelaziz was deposed in 1908; Turkey Sultan Abdul Hamid II was deposed by Young Turks in 1909; Portugal King Manuel II fled his native land following a 1910 revolution after which Portugal became a Republic; Korea Emperor Sunjong abdicated in 1910 by the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty ; Austria-Hungary Emperor-King Charles I and IV was deposed in 1918; Bulgaria Tsar Ferdinand I abdicated in 1918 in favor of his son Tsar Boris III; China Xuantong Emperor (Puyi) was forced to abdicate in 1912 following a Republican revolution; Ethiopia Emperor, the future Iyasu V, was deposed in 1916 for suspected conversion to the Muslim faith; Finland Grand Prince Nicholas II abdicated in March 1917; Greece King Constantine I was deposed in 1917; Russia Emperor Nicholas II abdicated after the February Revolution of 1917; German Emperor Wilhelm II abdicated in 1918 following Germany’s defeat in World War I; Prince William fled Albania in 1914 following the outbreak of World War I and was formally deposed in 1925; and Afghan King Amānullāh Khān abdicated in 1929.

  79. 79.

    Fellman D (1968–1973) Constitutionalism. In: Wiener PP (ed) Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas, vol 1, pp. 491–492.

  80. 80.

    Ali Gheissari offers an interesting argument about the term constitutionalism (Mashrutiyat), which is indicative of what the constitutional movement was all about. He first alluded to an ambiguity of the term, and once he established its total fabrication, he then turned his own argument into a “whatever it means,” which makes one wonder why he even offered an explanation. Here is his explanation: “Where the term Mashrutiyat comes from is unclear. Many authors contemporary to the movement used the term in its literal sense of ‘conditional’; others argue that it derived not from the Arabic word shart (condition) but from the French word le charte (charter), which had entered Iran via Ottoman Turkey. In his Persian Lexicon, Ali-Akbar Dehkhoda [a prominent Iranian linguist, and author of the most extensive dictionary of the Persian language ever published] … .writes ‘the term mashrutiyat was used neither in Arabic nor in Persian … [T]his word came into the Persian language via the Ottoman Turks, and indicates the rule of law; it is synonymous with the French word ‘constitution.’ Still other objected to the term mashruteh being identified with the French word constitution, maintain that the former was a mistaken translation of the latter, and that the term constitution should have been retained in its original French form in order to prevent intentional misinterpretation by the reactionaries … Whatever it means, the idea behind it was to challenged motlaqiyat (absolutism) and estebdad (despotism) and for that reason it was a fundamental element in reformist consciousness as a whole.” (See Gheissari A (1998) Iranian Intellectuals in the Twentieth Century. University of Texas Press, p. 24).

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    Brown NJ (2002) Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government. State University of New York Press, p. 161.

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    Avery P (1965) Modern Iran. Fredrick A. Praeger, p. 117.

  83. 83.

    See Arjomand SE (2012) The Kingdom of Jurists: Constitutionalism and the Legal Order in Iran. In Grote R, Röder T (eds) Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity. Oxford University Press, pp. 149–150.

  84. 84.

    According to Article 2 of the Fundamental Law of 1907, “It is hereby declared that it is for the learned doctors of theology (the ‘ulama’)—may God prolong the blessing of their existence—to determine whether such laws as may be proposed are or are not conformable to the principles of Islam; and it is therefore officially enacted that there shall at all times exist a Committee composed of not less than five mujtahids or other devout theologians, cognizant also of the requirements of the age, [which committee shall be elected] in this manner. The ‘ulama’ and Proofs of Islam shall present to the National Consultative Assembly the names of twenty of the ‘ulama’ possessing the attributes mentioned above; and the Members of the National Consultative Assembly shall, either by unanimous acclamation, or by vote, designate five or more of these, according to the exigencies of the time, and recognize these as Members, so that they may carefully discuss and consider all matters proposed in the Assembly, and reject and repudiate, wholly or in part, any such proposal which is at variance with the Sacred Laws of Islam, so that it shall not obtain the title of legality. In such matters the decision of this Ecclesiastical Committee shall be followed and obeyed, and this article shall continue unchanged until the appearance of His Holiness the Proof of the Age.” (See Browne EG (1910) Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. 373). Italic added.

  85. 85.

    Derrida J (1997) Of Grammatology. (trans: Spivak GC). The John Hopkins University Press, p. 162.

  86. 86.

    Others also underlined a similar observation. For instance, Said Amir Arjomand consented there was a shift from a constitutionalism based on civil liberty to a constitutionalism that mainly intends to protect ideologies (including religion) in Iran, but he argues that such an alteration was not a unique outcome in Iran and in fact should be considered as a common phenomenon during the time. (See Arjomand SA (ed) (2007) Constitutionalism and Political Reconstruction. Brill). Janet Afary, however, argues that “this shift to a constitution that safeguards religions doctrines was not a routine outcomes of the Constitutional Revolution but one that was confronted and challenged by progressive constitutionalists every step of the way.” (See Afary J (1996) The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911. Columbia University Press, p. 356, Footnote 1).

  87. 87.

    This claim can easily be noted by several articles in Qanun-i Asasi, which are contrary to the principle of secularism in its bill of rights; the freedom to publish idea (Art.20), to form associations [anjumans and ijtima’at] (Art. 21), and study of sciences, arts, and crafts were made contingent to being in conformity with the interest of the established religion (Art. 18). However, Art. 79 concerning “political and press misdemeanor [taqsirat], which presumably covers cases relating to Art. 18 and 20, requires a trial by jury and not by any Shari’a court”. It is note worthy that in the United States some of the secular principles also were not honored until the middle of twentieth century. For instance, the government-endorsed prayer in public school was only banned by the US Supreme Court decision (Angel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421) on June 25, 1962, which for the first time confirmed the separation of church and state.

  88. 88.

    Which is traditionally associated with a body of legal rules produced by a legislative authority within specific formalities and procedures.

  89. 89.

    It is important to note that Shari’a law and Islamic law are often used interchangeably. Affirming the difference, as Aharon Layish points, stresses that codification of the Shari’a (since the middle of nineteenth century) has “brought about the transformation of the shari’a from jurists’s law, that is, a law created by independent legal experts, to statutory law, in other word, a law promulgated by a national-territorial legislature. (See Layish A (2004) The Transformation of the Shari’a from Jurists’ Law to Statutory Law in the Contemporary Muslim World. Die Welt des Islam 44(1), p. 86; and Lee JCH (2010) Islamization and Activism in Malaysia. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p. 81). Moreover, Layish points out that “shari’a is not a positive law” (Ibid.). Instead, “it is first and foremost a system of religious ethical commandments and percepts some of which were translated over the years into legal terms with specified sanctions (as in the case of usury)” (Ibid., p. 87). He further stated, “legislative authority is alien to Islam” (Ibid., p. 88).

  90. 90.

    Sherif AO (2012) The Relationship between the Constitution and the Sharī‘ah in Egypt. In: Grote R, Röder T (eds) Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity. Oxford University Press, p. 126. Italic added. In a similar content but quite different tune, Erwin Fahlbushch has observed, “The Koran, sunna, and jurisprudence constitute Islamic Law or Shari’a (shari’a, ‘path’), which no longer has the original sense of the divinity revealed religion but now denotes the divinely willed earthly legal and social order embracing every sphere of life. The Shari’a is handed down by a professional class that, since Islam neither a hierarchical priesthood nor a central teaching office, acts as the collective guardian of tradition and the bearer of authority. This group is the class of jurists (fuqaha, sing. faqih) or scholars (ulama, sing. alim). The traditional place for these professional jurists is the madrasa (madrasah, ‘place of study’), a kind of legal and theological seminary … developed in eastern Iran in the tenth century and spread to the whole Islamic world (e.g., reaching Egypt by the twelfth cent).” (See Fahlbusch E (1999) The Encyclopedia of Christianity, Vol II. (trans: Bromiley GM). Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, p. 753).

  91. 91.

    For instance, Article 27 divided the power of the Realm into three categories, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, “by which is meant the determining of rights. This power belongs exclusively to the ecclesiastical tribunals in matters connected with the ecclesiastical law, and to the civil tribunals in matters connected with ordinary law.” (See Browne EG (1910) Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. 376). Article 71 made the administration of justice in matters of the Sacred Law and the privilege of the “just mujtahids” as it states, “The Supreme Ministry of Justice and the judicial tribunals are the places officially destined for the redress of public grievances, while judgment in all matters falling within the scope of the Ecclesiastical Law is vested in just mujtahids possessing the necessary qualifications” (Ibid., p. 381).

  92. 92.

    It is important to note that for all Muslims around the world, the essential article of Islam is that Qur’an is the absolute Word of God and delivered to Prophet Muhammad by the Angel Gabriel and revealed in stages over a period of 23 years. This means all Muslim accept Qur’an as a divine scriptural text free of human error. This, however, does not mean that a believer can attain the true meaning of the Qurans’ verses by going directly to the essential text, a notion that had been put forward by members of Akhbari school of theology founded by Shaikh Muhammad Sharif Astarabadi (d. 1624). (See Bayat M (1982) Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran. Syracuse University Press, p. 21).

  93. 93.

    Sherif AO (2012) The Relationship between the Constitution and Shari’a and Constitutional Interpretation in Egypt. In: Grote R, Röder T (2012) Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity. Oxford University Press, p. 126.

  94. 94.

    Hairi AH (1977) Shi’ism and Constitutionalism in Iran. E. J. Brill, p. 209.

  95. 95.

    Accounts of the prophet Muhammad daily practices.

  96. 96.

    Hairi AH (1977) Shi’ism and Constitutionalism in Iran. E. J. Brill, p. 209. Italic added.

  97. 97.

    According to Abdul-Hadi Hairi, “Shaykh Fazl Allah said that the freedom was guaranteed in the Constitution was against Islam … He noted that the article [Article 20, which states ‘All publication, except heretical books and matters hurtful to the perspicuous religion of Islam are free, and are exempted from censorship.’] is against Islam because it rules that only two things, i.e., the publication of ‘heretical books’ and ‘matter hurtful to Islam,’ are not allowed. However, by limiting this restriction to two, other things are permitted, such as malicious accusation (iftira), back-biting (ghaybat), slander, harm, obsession, abusive language, insult, threatening and the like, all of which are indisputably forbidden in Islam.” (See Hairi AH (1977) Shi’ism and Constitutionalism in Iran. E. J. Brill, pp. 217–218). Some observers may perceive the Sheiks’ reasoning as a bit unconvincing and implausible. However, I argue that his insight is absolutely correct, not in a sense that freedom is un-Islamic but rather in context of what John Searle called Speech Acts. (See Searle J (1969) Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press). In a nut shell, when we defend the notion of free-speech, we conveniently assumed that “what ought to be meant by ‘speech,’ in the context ‘free speech,’ is whatever it is that a correct justification of the right to free speech justifies one in protecting.” (See Langton R, Hornsby J (1998) Free speech and Illocution. Legal Theory, 4(1), March 1998, pp. 21–37). The Sheiks’ point of contention is directed to what we assumed when we defend the notion of free speech.

  98. 98.

    Browne EG (1910) Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. 373.

  99. 99.

    Imam Khomeini, the founder of Islamic Republic of Iran, delineated an Islamic government as follows: “ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT does not correspond to any of the existing forms of government … The fundamental difference between Islamic government, on the one hand, and constitutional monarchies and republics, on the other, is this: whereas the representatives of the people or the monarch in such regimes engage in legislation, in Islam the legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty. The Sacred Legislator of Islam is the sole legislative power. No one has the right to legislate and no law may be executed except the law of the Divine Legislator … In this form of government, sovereignty belongs to God alone and law is His decree and command. The law of Islam, divine command, has absolute authority over all individuals and the Islamic government. Everyone, including the Most Noble Messenger (s) and his successors, is subject to law and will remain so for all eternity—the law that has been revealed by God, Almighty and Exalted, and expounded by the tongue of the Qur’an and the Most Noble Messenger(s).” (See Khomeini I, Algar H (2002) Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist. Alhoda UK).

  100. 100.

    As our beloved poet Hakim Sanai once said: “Khofte ra khofte key konad bidar.” (Unaware cannot be awaken by unaware). (See https://dl.wdl.org/11962/service/11962.pdf).

  101. 101.

    Sa’di (1823) The Gulistan, of flower-garden of Shaikh Sadī of Shiraz: Together with an essay on Sadi’s life and genius. Trans: James Ross. Richardson. Apologue 16, p. 206. Italic added.

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Pirzadeh, A. (2016). Concluding Remarks. In: Iran Revisited. Arts, Research, Innovation and Society. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30485-4_8

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