Abstract
There is one element in the history of Iran that I continue to find particularly intriguing. This has to do with the relationship between intellectual impartial analysis and political conviction. How is a scholar (or the work of a social scientist or philosopher) affected by his or her political convictions? Intellectual sincerity seems like a straightforward thing: scholars should pursue their findings as the facts and inferences guide them and provide a better understanding of how the world works, based on their best reading of the evidence. This means to avoid “spinning” events or processes into alignment with subscribed political ideologies or commitments.
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Notes
- 1.
Parsons T, Shils EA (eds) (1954) Toward a General Theory of Action, Harvard University Press., p. 167.
- 2.
Selection, as such, often leads to what is known as selection bias.
- 3.
Carr EH (1961) What is history? Vintage Books, p. 9. He further clarified his stand on historical facts by stating, “No [historical] document can tell us more that what the author of the document thought—what he thought had happen, what he thought ought or would happen, or perhaps only what he wanted others to think he though, or even only what he himself thought he thought.” Ibid., p. 16.
- 4.
McCullough D (2009) The Course of Human Events. Simon & Schuster. Excerpt, including the quote, is available at http://www.neh.gov/about/awards/jefferson-lecture/david-mccullough-lecture.
- 5.
It might seem, however, that what I suggest is the core essence of determinism, which teaches that consequences are made inevitable by conduct as truly as actions are made inevitable by past deeds. However, this is not my intention.
- 6.
This is not a post hoc analysis since the objective is not to determine causality but rather develop a better understanding of the present in light of the past (or understand the past relative to the present).
- 7.
In fact, the entire ancient East was acquainted with liberalism of the modern Imperial powers through invasions and assaults that begun in 1798 Napoleon occupation of Egypt. In the West, however, the grant narrative of such liberal militarism formed when Napoleon’s defeat of the Prussian monarchy at the Battle of Jena in 1806, which according to Hegel, was the turning point in humanity’s struggle for freedom, as he remarked in a letter to Niethammer, “I saw the Emperor—this world-soul—riding of the city on reconnaissance. It is indeed a wonderful sensation to see such an individual, who, concentrated here at a single point, astride a horse, reaches out over the world and masters it … this extraordinary man, whom it is impossible not to admire.” (See Pinkard T (2001) Hegel: A Biography. Cambridge University Press, p. 228.) Moreover, “England’s imperialism,” noted the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises in his 1929 work Liberalism , “was primarily directed not so much toward the incorporation of new territories as toward the creation of an area of uniform commercial policy out of the various possessions subject to the King of England.” (See von Mises L (1985) Liberalism. Trans: Ralph Raico. Cobden Press, p. 124.)
- 8.
In fact, the nomadic power was the main reason why “Several of Iran’s royal house, including the Saljuqid, Il-Khan, Timurid, Safavi, Zand and Qajar, were carried to the throne.” (See Issawi C (ed) (1971) The Economic History on Iran 1800–1914. University of Chicago Press, p. 4).
- 9.
de Planhol X (2000) The Geographical Setting [of Islamic Society and Civilization]. In: Holt PM, Lambton AKS, Lewis B (eds) (2000) The Cambridge History of Islam, volume 2B. Cambridge University Press, pp. 463–464.
- 10.
Prior to the Safavid dynasty and since the fall of Sasanian Empire, Iran did not exist as an independent country for more than 800 years.
- 11.
For instance, he ordered putting out the eyes of 20,000 inhabitants of city of Kerman because they allowed his predecessor (Lotf Ali the fifth of the Zand Dynasty line to succeed Karim Khan) to refuge in their city.
- 12.
Some readers may object to such characterization of France. In this case, I refer them to the newly published book by Adam Zamoyski and William Collin’s work entitled Phantom Terror: The Threat of Revolution and the Repression of Liberty 1789–1848, published by Basic Book, 2015.
- 13.
The Treaty of Finkenstein acknowledged, “the territorial integrity of Iran and her historic claims of Georgia[annexed by Russia in 1801]; promised to make every effort to obtain the Russian evacuation of that province, and to bring about a peace between Iran and Russia; and meanwhile, to assist the Iranian army with weapons and military advisors. Iran, in turn, undertook to declare war on Great Britain; to expel British citizens from Iranian territory; to work with the Afghans and Marathas to attack the British possessions in India; and, should napoleon embark upon the invasion of India, to give the French army passage across the country.” (See Graves R (1991) Iranian Relations with Great Britain and British India, 1798–1921, p. 374.)
- 14.
Which was apparently in direct violation of the treaty signed between Iranian government and British Army Colonel Sheil on January 25, 1853, in respect to the honoring of the Afghanistan sovereignty. (See Markham CR (1874) A General Sketch of the History of Persia, Longmans. Green and Co, p. 499.) In regard to capturing Herat by the Iranian army, Markham also wrote, “The Persian General could never taken the place by force, his officers were cowards, and the besieged [Afghans] were fighting with heroic bravery; but famine did its work, and on October 26, 1856, the Persian took possession of Herat” (Ibid., p. 504).
- 15.
Wilber DN (1976) Iran: Past and Present. Princeton University Press, p. 67.
- 16.
Markham CR (1874) A General Sketch of the History of Persia, Longmans. Green and Co, p. 505. Emphasis added.
- 17.
There is a wealth of research on this topic that underlined the exact conclusion. For instance, see Farrokh K (2011) Iran at War: 1500–1988. Osprey Publishing, p. 181; Mehr F (1997) A Colonial Legacy: The Dispute Over the Islands of Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs. University Press of America, pp. 101–102; Garthwaite GR (2008) The Persians. John Wiley & Son, p. 193; and Ward SR (2014) Immortal, Updated Edition: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces. Georgetown University Press, pp. 63–67.
- 18.
Marcus A (1989) The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century, Columbia University Press, p. 1.
- 19.
Issawi C (ed) (1971) The Economic History on Iran 1800–1914. University of Chicago Press, p. 14.
- 20.
Ibid.
- 21.
Ibid., p. 15.
- 22.
Curtis GE, Hooglund E (ed) (2008) Iran: a country study. Federal Research Division Library of Congress, p. 24. Emphasis added.
- 23.
Issawi C (ed) (1971) The Economic History on Iran 1800–1914. University of Chicago Press, p. 15.
- 24.
Avery P, Hambly G, Melville C (eds) (1991) The Cambridge History of Iran (Vol. 7): From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 188.
- 25.
Ibid., p. 266.
- 26.
Farsoun SK, Mashayekhi M (eds) (2005) Iran: political culture in the Islamic republic. Routledge, p. 58.
- 27.
This type of sweeping statement may bear an intoxicated appeal by transforming real-world occurrences into simple images, so that simple images seem real, but nevertheless fail to convey any substantive meaning because real social reflections (and their relations to other factors) are reduced to a mere form of an anxiety disorder, which is quite misleading and erroneous. For instance, if certain groups or segments of a society worry about losing their grip over power, economic interests, etc., in face of a challenge, then fear is not a trigger factor, and instead the focus must be on the challenge as an underlying element.
- 28.
In its most general form, the word “crowd” implies a gathering of individuals regardless of cause or causes that have brought them together. However, the significance of the notion of crowd in this study is related to the psychological aspects of the expression, to which Le Bon stated, “Under certain given circumstances, and only under those circumstances, an agglomeration of men presents new characteristics very different from those of the individuals composing it. The sentiments and ideas of all the persons in the gathering take one and the same direction, and their conscious personality vanishes. A collective mind is formed, doubtless transitory, but presenting very clearly defined characteristics. The gathering has thus become what, in the absence of a better expression, I will call an organized crowd, or, if the term is considered preferable, a psychological crowd. It forms a single being, and is subjected to the law of the mental unity of crowds.” (See Le Bon G (2001) The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. Batoche Books, p. 13.) Emphasis added.
- 29.
Ibid., p. 8.
- 30.
For a detailed discussion of the destructive attribute of crowds, see Canetti C (1973) Crowds and Power. Trans: Carol Stewart. Continuum Publishing Company, pp. 19–20.
- 31.
Le Bon G (2001) The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. Batoche Books, p. 14.
- 32.
Ibid., p. 17.
- 33.
The reader should note that protests, which demanded for self-determination like Azerbaijan and Kurdistan between 1941 to 1946 are excluded. For one thing, these movements should be considered as secessionists that were supported by USSR in order to dominate Iran. Moreover, there is no clear consensus as the nature of local population’s support for them. Nevertheless, I argue that if they had such supports they would have succeeded. (For an informative discussion on Azerbaijan successional movement see Shaffer B (2002) Border and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijan Identity. MIT Press).
- 34.
For informative discussions of Tobacco Protest, see: Lambton AKS (1965) The Tobacco Regie: Prelude to Revolution I. Studia Islamica 22, pp. 119-157; Lambton AKS (1965) The Tobacco Regie: Prelude to Revolution II. Studia Islamica 23, pp. 71-95; Keddie NR (1966) Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892. Psychology Press
- 35.
The contrasting example is the Constitutional Revolution, which signifies the failure of contemporary social movement in Iran due to: 1) its innate copycat nature that originated substantially from the bourgeoisie of the West; 2) lack of overall national support of masses because of its unfamiliar and foreign core; and 3) deviation from the framework of the Shi’i system of government and abandon its commitment to ulama leadership, particularly Shaykh Fazi Allah Nuri and his mashruhe camp. (On the last point see Abdul-Hadi H (1977) Shi’ism and Constitutionalism in Iran. E. J. Brill, pp. 4; and Amanat A (2009) Memory and Amnesia in the Historiography of the Constitutional Revolution. In: Atabaki T (ed) Iran in the Twentieth Century: Historiography and Political Culture. I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, p. 25).
- 36.
The granted concession basically stated that, “all producers were required to inform the concessionaires of the amount of crop that they produced annually and then sell their entire crop to the British company. All tobacco merchants were required to seek permits from the concessionaires and immediately pay, in cash, for all tobacco they obtained … Basically, the arrangement would have interjected the British company into the traditional relationship between individual producers and regional sellers of tobacco . In effect, it was a scheme to replace the [Iranian] traders who bought the crop with a British interest.” (See Gilbar GG (2008) The Rise and fall of the Tujjar Councils of Representatives in Iran, 1884–1885. Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 51, p. 640.)
- 37.
Keddie NR (1966) Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892. Psychology Press, p. 65.
- 38.
Gilbar GG (2008) The Rise and fall of the Tujjar Councils of Representative in Iran, 1884–1885. Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 51, p. 640.
- 39.
Lewis B, Lambton AK, Holt PM (eds) (1977) The Cambridge History of Islam: The Central Islamic Land Since 1918, volume 1B. Cambridge University Press, p. 619.
- 40.
In describing the Tobacco affair, Edward Browne noted, “Only one great and good thing came out of all this wretched business. The Persian people, led by their spiritual guides, and led, moreover, on the whole with wonderful wisdom and self-restraint, had shown that there was a limit to what they would endure, that they were not the spiritless creatures which they had been supposed to be, and that henceforth they would have to be reckoned with. From that time especially, as I believe, dates the national awakening of which we are still watching the development.” (See Browne EG (1910) The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. 57. Emphasis added.)
- 41.
Silk cocoons, wheat, rice, cotton, and opium were the other main cash crops of that time. There were various advantages attached to the cultivation of opium. It yielded higher returns in cash than wheat and barley as it was of higher value per pound. It was easily transportable in cases on the backs of pack animals, as there were no roads in the country. Consequently, former wheat lands were turned over to the cultivation of opium. Amin al-Zarb became aware, early on in his commercial career, of the advantages of exporting opium and became a major exporter of that product, making an enormous profit from it. (See Mahdavi S (2000) For God, Mammon, and Country: A Nineteenth-Century Persian Merchant, Haj Muhammad Hassan Amin Al-Zarb. Westview Press, p. 11.)
- 42.
Kazemi R (2014) The Tobacco Protest in Nineteenth-Century Iran: The View from a Provincial Town. Journal of Persianate Studies 7(2):251–295, p. 254.
- 43.
Keddie NR (1991) Iran Under The later Qajars, 1848–1922. In: Avery P, Hambly G, Melville C (eds) The Cambridge History of Iran (Vol. 7): From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 195. She also underlined similar insight in her early book, Keddie NR (2003) Modern Iran: Roots and Result of Revolution. Yale University Press, p. 61.
- 44.
Mahdavi S (2000) For God, Mammon, and Country: A Nineteenth-Century Persian Merchant, Haj Muhammad Hassan Amin Al-Zarb. Westview Press, p. 95.
- 45.
Moaddel M (2005) Islamic modernism, nationalism, and fundamentalism: episode and discourse. University of Chicago Press, p. 41.
- 46.
The general consensus among experts is that the nullification of the Tobacco concession was successful as a result of the issued fatwā. For instance, see Keddie NR (1966) Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892. Psychology Press. However, Mangol Bayat discussing Fereydun Adamiyat suggests, “He [Adamiyat] recognizes the contribution of Ashtiani and Shirazi [two clergymen/olama who issued fatwa] but insists the olama were not the leader. Merely the followers of the merchant and then ‘people.’” (See Bayat M (1991) Iran’s First Revolution: Shi’ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1909. Oxford University Press, p. 19.)
- 47.
Browne EG (1910) The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. 41.
- 48.
Ibid., p. 50.
- 49.
Bayat M (1991) Iran’s First Revolution: Shi’ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1909. Oxford University Press, p. 21.
- 50.
The reader should note that the sequential concessions in Qajar’s era actually begun in 1872, when special commercial privileges granted to a Baron de Reuter, comprised of “a comprehensive country-wide monopoly, which included railway construction, mining [mineral and oil], and banking.” (See Upton JM (1968) The History of Modern Iran An Interpretation. Harvard University Press, p. 8.) Few years later in 1879, Qajar king (Nasir al-din Shah) agreed to the creation of a brigade of Persian Cossacks, which was instructed and commended by Russian officers. In 1888, a Russian subject gained a comprehensive concession covering fishing rights in the Caspian and the Discount Bank of Persia, a Russian institution, opened in Tehran in 1891. According to Wilber, between 1855 and 1900, “at least 15 foreign countries gained capitulation right for their subject residing in Iran.” (See Wilber DN (1976) Iran: Past and Present. Princeton University Press, p. 68.)
- 51.
Conceptually, Lomborg observed, “the national currency has symbolic value matched only by the national flag.” (See Lomborg B (2004) Global Crises, Global Solution. Cambridge University Press, p. 269.)
- 52.
Browne EG (1910) The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. 32.
- 53.
Ibid., Emphasis added.
- 54.
Martin V (2013) Iran Between Islamic Nationalism and Secularism: The Constitutional Revolution of 1906. British Academic Press, p. 68.
- 55.
An argument may put forward to refute this observation by claiming that the lack of care among Iranians is related to the fact that Iranians occupied these lands, and hence people were not sympathetic because we (Iranian) had no right to them. Be as they were, the argument is not about origin of tenures, but rather once the ownership was established, their annexation implies that such ownership has been revoked without the due process. Indeed, the ownership was not challenged; instead, the territories were simply confiscated. No doubt, no one suggests, certainly I don’t, that these territories are God-given properties of Iran. However, I contend that their ownership, not their deed of trust , was held by Iranian government, and hence their seizure should be considered as loss of ownership. Indeed, the manner in which such revocation occurred confirmed the argument.
- 56.
These treaties re-delineated, to use a politically correct term, the borders between Iran and Russia as part of the conditions to end each of the successive wars between them. “Under the Gulistan Treaty, Iran lost most of Azerbaijan to Russia. In the Treaty of Turkmenchay it lost the rest of the Caucasus, including Armenia and all of Azerbaijan north of the Araz River.” (See Gammer M (ed) (2004) The Caspian Region, Volume 1: A Re-Emerging Region. Routledge, p. 139.) It is noteworthy that Article 1 of the Treaty of Gulistan reads “enmity and disputes between the Russian Empire and the Persian State shall end once and for all.” However, Russia did not cease its ambition to capture more Iranian territories because its enactment did not balance the legal standing of the two countries. Article 5 stipulated that “except for the Russian State, no other state may have a military flag on the Caspian Sea.” Article 8 of the Treaty of Turkmenchay also states, “ regarding naval vessels, since ancient times some naval vessels under the Russian military flag could sail the Caspian Sea, for this reason this prior exclusive right is granted to it and affirmed so that, except for Russia, no other power may have naval ships on the Caspian Sea.“ (See IBP Inc. (2012) Turkmenistan Business Law Handbook: Strategic Information and Laws. International Business Publications, pp. 218–219).
- 57.
Zonis M (2015) Political Elite of Iran. Princeton University Press, p. 165.
- 58.
Hershlag ZY (1964) Introduction to The Modern Economic History of The Middle East. Brill Archive, p. 344. For the entire text of concession, see pp. 344–345.
- 59.
See Browne EG (1910) The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. 35.
- 60.
Hershlag ZY (1964) Introduction to The Modern Economic History of The Middle East. Brill Archive, p. 344.
- 61.
Ibid.
- 62.
As Article 6 stated, the price “is to be given to the owner, or to the producer will be settle in a friendly manner between the producer or the owner and the proprietors of this concession.” Ibid.
- 63.
Ibid.
- 64.
To assess the Iranian Tobacco Régie, one must make a comparative judgment. In doing so, an evaluator would see astonishing irregularities. As concessionaire clearly indicated “in the prospectus,” the total net annual profits to the Imperial Tobacco Corporation of Persia was estimated to be around £371,875, which was more than half of its total capitalization, which consisted of £650,000. In short, the company would regain more than half of its start-up capital in one year. The main cause of this peculiar term was noted by, “the experience gained in the working and administration of the Turkish Tobacco Régie … established in the year 1884 … , and inasmuch as the rent payable by them (i.e., the Persian Tobacco Corporation) is only £15,000 per annum, as against £630,000 per annum payable by the Turkish Régie, and the term of their concession is for 50 years as against the term of only 30 years in the case of the Turkish Concession , their business will be entered on under much more favorable conditions.” (See Browne EG (1910) The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. 33.)
- 65.
Keddie NR (1966) Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892. Psychology Press, p. 38.
- 66.
Martin V (2013) Iran Between Islamic Nationalism and Secularism: The Constitutional Revolution of 1906. British Academic Press, p. 85.
- 67.
Ibid.
- 68.
Ibid.
- 69.
Ibid., p. 23.
- 70.
Abrahamian E (1982) Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton University Press, p. 39.
- 71.
Moaddel M (1993) Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution. Columbia University Press, p. 114. However, Moaddel further explained, “[T]he influence of the guilds begun to decline and by 1909, when they were barred from representation in the Majles, the guilds completely lost power. Never again did they acquire the same political influence. The guilds produced no important political leader. They acted cohesively in politics only as long as their political patrons had a common basis for cooperation.” Ibid., pp. 114–15.
- 72.
Afary J (1996) The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911. Columbia University Press. p. 33.
- 73.
Haddad WW, Rostam-Kolayi J (2014) Imperialism and its manifestation in the Middle East. In: Ismael TY, Perry GE (eds) The International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East: Subordination and Beyond. Routledge, p. 67.
- 74.
See Keddie NR (1991) Iran Under The later Qajars, 1848–1922. In: Avery P, Hambly G, Melville C (eds) The Cambridge History of Iran (Vol. 7): From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 205.
- 75.
Oddly, this issue has not been examined by many Iranian and non-Iranian scholars and totally left outside the mainstream history of Modern Iran.
- 76.
Safai I (1973) Mirror of History. Ministry of Art and Culture Publication, p. 13.
- 77.
Browne EG (1910) The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. 57.
- 78.
Ibid., p. 58.
- 79.
Such a point of reference would make us understand what the Qajar rulers should have done under the given circumstances and relative to comparable conducts elsewhere (instead of evaluating how they encounter the situations at the time and what they did, or did not do, to overcome them).
- 80.
For instance, various analyses of the so-called D’Arcy concession are made by ignoring many significant factors such as the fact that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company —an organization which has great financial strength and which possesses extraordinarily rich petroleum deposits, a worldwide marketing system, and strong alliances—ranks at the time in the 1930s among the leading petroleum companies of the world. In this respect, an ability of a country such as Iran to impose new conditions, which were utterly just, cannot be examined as if the parties engaged in the negotiating both started on an equal footing.
- 81.
Martin V (2005) The Qajar pact: bargaining, protest and the state in nineteenth-century Persia (Vol. 4). IB Tauris, p. 1. In response, however, one may point to several shortcomings of such conclusion. First, a complete breakup of Iran did not happen because of the rejection of the treaty by the Bolshevik government and Lenin rejection of its imperial content. Although, the same government had attempted to establish the first Soviet-style Persian Socialist Republic of Gilan, but failed (for more detail analysis, see, for instance, Abrahamian E (1982) Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton University Press). Second, as long as the Qajar rulers were willing to grant concessions at almost no cost to their counterpart, breaking up the country made no sense since both Russia and Britain needed the stable Iran to reap benefits that they could easily secure (or were already given to them). Finally, a plausible reason why a full-scale invasion of Iran was considered imprudent by either Russia or Britain is related to the presence of each imperial power that deterred others to the incursion of Iran and risked a full military engagement with its mighty rival.
- 82.
Wilber DN (1976) Iran: Past and Present. Princeton University Press, p. 68. However, Wilber’s reasoning for Shah’s lack of success is quite different than mine, as he further elaborates, “Although the [Nasir an-din] shah made a serious attempt to improve the system of justice and the public administration, his efforts were not crowned with lasting success and the country came increasingly under the influence of the clergy.” Ibid., p. 69.
- 83.
Markham CR (1874) A General Sketch of the History of Persia, Longmans. Green and Co, p. 499.
- 84.
As Shuster states, “According to the Convention of 1907 between Russia and Britain, which both parties are so fond of quoting to Persia, the latter’s complete independence and sovereignty are fully recognized, although the need for such avowal is not apparent. Yet in the face of that document Russia has put forward and still maintains, under the name of ‘Protégé-ship ,’ the most novel and remarkable theory ever heard of in international relations. The Russian Legation and Consulates not only claim absolute rights in Persia over all Russian subjects, ‘legal or illegal,’ but they claim a species of protectorate over another class of persons, chiefly well-known reactionaries and traitors, who are admittedly Persian subjects, yet against whom Russia will not permit the simplest govern mental step to be taken, under penalty of incurring her anger and her vengeance. This Protégé-ship is likewise used to shield these persons from paying their taxes to the Persian Government, and, as most of them are rich through methods well known in the former regime, there is not only a decided financial loss, but the loss of prestige to the Government and the encouragement thus given others to rebel against the payment of their just dues are even worse. In many instances the Russian authorities do not even claim that the ‘Protégé ’ is anything but a Persian subject; in others, some of the pretexts alleged for claiming for them Russian nationality are bizarre beyond the wildest dreams. Ask the Russian Legation to explain seriously, for instance, why the Princess Banou Uzma, of Isfahan, should not pay the Persian Government the thousands of tumans of taxes which she has been owing for the past few years, and you will be unable to restrain a smile at the answer. Or the famous Kamran Mirza, uncle of the ex-Shah. Or why the Russian Legation interfered recently when the tax collector of Teheran seized the horse of Prince Ezted Dawla for failure to pay his contributions to the Government under which he lives. Beyond all this, of course, is the trifling fact that even foreign subjects in Persia are not exempt from paying their local taxes, despite the truly absurd claims as to the meaning of Article IV of the Customs Convention between Persia and Russia.” (See Shuster WM (1912) The Strangling of Persia: A Personal Narrative. The Century Company, New York, pp. 364–365. Emphasis added.) The underlined section should be viewed as an attempt by the national government to protect its interest whenever it could, and hence ease the agitation among many who received the Qajar rulers as traitorous sovereigns.
- 85.
Wilber DN (1976) Iran: Past and Present. Princeton University Press, p. 82. A savvy reader would notice here that I used Wilber’s book that was published in 1950, instead of the eight edition of 1976. The reason is that this quotation has been mysteriously omitted in the eight edition and instead the author stated, “While in Europe he [the shah] had been unfavorably impressed by the military reviews and continual preparations for was made by each nation.” Ibid., pp. 68–69.
- 86.
Kaplan RD (1997) Was Democracy Just a Moment?. The Atlantic, December 1997. Available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/12/was-democracy-just-a-moment/306022/
- 87.
Behbahani S (1999) A Cup of Sin: Selected Poems. Syracuse University Press, p. 18.
- 88.
Ansari AM (2012) The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran. Cambridge University Press, pp. 64–65.
- 89.
Moslem M (1995) The Making of A Weak State, University of Westminster.
- 90.
I borrow the thought from A. J. Arberry. (See Arberry AJ (ed) (1989) The Legacy of Persia. Oxford University Press, p. vi.)
- 91.
Fakhreddin Azimi stated, “In 1906 Iran became a pioneer in the nonwestern world in seeking to establish a constitutional representative democracy of citizens.” (Fakhreddin Azimi, Quest for Democracy in Iran, p. x); “The Constitutional Revolution of the early twentieth century was intended to establish government based in law as well as modernize the country along European lines.” (See Katouzian H (2013) Iran: Politics, History and Literature. Routledge, p. xiv.) However, in fairness, Katouzian also followed his observation by stating, “But the fall of the arbitrary state resulted in chaos rather than democracy, as it had done throughout Iranian history” (Ibid.).
- 92.
Gane M (2006) Auguste Comte. Routledge, p. 76.
- 93.
Abrahamian E (1982) Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton University Press, p. 92.
- 94.
I borrowed the phrase from Louis Francis Salzman. (See Salzman LF (1901) The History of the Parish of Hailsham: The Abbey of Otham and the Priory of Michlham. Farncombe, p. 9.)
- 95.
According to Abrahamian, these groups were, “Wealthy merchants and street peddlers, wholesale dealers and small shopkeepers, seminary students and Dar al-Fonun graduates, clergymen and civil servants, rising commercial companies and declining craft guilds, Muslims and non-Muslims, Persians and non-Persians, Haydaris and Ni’matis, Shaykhis and Mutashar’is, Sunnis and Shi’is, bazaaris in the capital and bazaaris in the provinces.” (See Abrahamian E (1982) Iran Between Two Revolutions . Princeton University Press, p. 92.)
- 96.
Here, formalization intends to imply what has been inscribed in the original constitutional laws or, more precisely, the Fundamental Law, containing 51 articles, promulgated on December 30, 1906, by Mozaffar ad-Din Shah and the following supplementary laws that were ratified by his successor, Mohammad Ali Shah on October 7, 1907.
- 97.
Afary J (1996) The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911. Columbia University Press, p. 89.
- 98.
Browne EG (1910) The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. 372.
- 99.
Here is the entire Article 2: “At no time must any legal enactment of the Sacred National Consultative Assembly, established by the favor and assistanc e of His Holiness the Imam of the Age [the Messiah] (may God hasten his glad Advent!), the favor of His Majesty the Shahinshah of Islam (may God immortalize his reign!), the care of the Proofs of Islam (may God multiply the like of them!), and the whole people of the Persian nation, be at variance with the sacred principles of Islam or the laws established by His Holiness the Best of Mankind (on whom and on whose household be the Blessing of God and His Peace!) It is hereby declared that it is for the learned doctors of theology (the ‘ulama’ )—may God prolong the blessing of their existence!—to determine whether such laws as may be proposed are or are not conformable to the principles of Islam; and it is therefore officially enacted that there shall at all times exist a Committee composed of not less than five mujtahids or other devout theologians, cognizant also of the requirements of the age, [which committee shall be elected] in this manner.
The ulama and Proofs of Islam shall present to the National Consultative Assembly the names of 20 of the ‘ulama possessing the attributes mentioned above; and the Members of the National Consultative Assembly shall, either by unanimous acclamation, or by vote, designate five or more of these, according to the exigencies of the time, and recognize these as Members, so that they may carefully discuss and consider all matters proposed in the Assembly, and reject and repudiate, wholly or in part, any such proposal which is at variance with the Sacred Laws of Islam, so that it shall not obtain the title of legality. In such matters the decision of this Ecclesiastical Committee shall be followed and obeyed, and this article shall continue unchanged until the appearance of His Holiness the Proof of the Age (may God hasten his glad Advent!).” Ibid., pp. 372–373.
- 100.
For instance, Edward Browne observe, “I wish to insist that in Persia the party which is variously terms Nationalist, Constitutionalist and Popular is essentially the patriotic party, which stand for progress, freedom, tolerance, and above all for national independence and Persia for the Persian, and that it was primarily called into existence”. (Browne EG (1910) The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. xx, Emphasis origin).
- 101.
Browne EG (1910) The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. 18.
- 102.
In which I mean that it is a common knowledge that the 1906 Constitution Laws modeled after the Belgian Constitution of 1831 and borrowed elements from the Bulgarian and Ottoman laws, and by some account, Germany, Japan, and Russia in reducing monarchial powers. (See Afary J (2013) The place of Shi’i clerics in the first Iranian Constitution. Critical Research on Religion 1(3):327–346, December 2013.) Add to this bewildering situation, “While in exile in London, Hasan Taqizadeh gave a speech to the Central Asian Society on November 11, 1908, where he explained that he and his colleagues had based the Supplementary Constitutional Laws ‘largely on the Belgian (Constitutional) laws, partly on the French, and partly on the laws prevalent in Bulgaria.’ We are unaware of the language in which the Bulgarian law was initially examined.” (Ibid., p. 71, Footnote 15)
- 103.
Of course, this school of thought faced various resistances. However, the hostility was not directed toward Islam, but the disagreement was about the means to achieve desired outcomes. The opponent mainly came from deputies, journalists, and intellectuals of the time. Most notable among them was Sayyid Hasan Taqizadeh, a son of Seyyed Taqi Ordubadi, a clergyman and a celebrated and articulated member of the parliament (Majlis), who took off his garment in pursuit of left nationalism, liberalism, and social democratic ideas. His position was a quite unorthodox, as a man of faith, as he stated, “Fanaticism is dead in Persia.” However, as mentioned earlier, the debate was about the means and not Islam, as Taqizadeh told his audience, “We had forgotten a word of the prophet, namely, that ‘the Hand of God is with the multitude.’ And, glory be to God, we have seen that the union of the people made the whole world tremble. Now I will remind the people that a year ago they had not one by one this strength, and were under the yoke of tyranny and despotism. But from the time that they gave each other the hand and united, they have seized o their rights; and we hope that this unity may last until the coming of the Twelfth Imam (may God hasten his glad advent!).’ (Remark [Browne noted] this quaint touch at the end of this so western speech. It may not inaptly be compared to the cock which Socrates ordered his disciples to sacrifice on the day of his death.)” (See Browne EG (1956) A Literary History of Persia: From the Earliest Times until Firdawsi, Vol. II. Cambridge University Press, pp. 167–168). After Reza Shah and his Cossack Brigade took over the government in June 1908, Taqizadeh (along with some others) sought asylum and took refuge at the British legation, which he was subjected to severe criticisms by none but his compatriots who were innately endowed with the natural talent of scorning their fellow citizens but never themselves.
- 104.
For instance, the original document substantially curtailed the authority of the shah. While he remained the head of state, his ministers were accountable to the Majlis and could be dismissed; Majlis was given the right to ratify all major financial transactions as well as concessions with foreign power; freedom of press was guaranteed and Majlis sessions were open to the public.
- 105.
For instance, the Article 46 of supplementary laws stated, “The appointment and dismissal of Minister is effected by virtue of the Royal Decree of the King,” and subsequent articles granted the king the right to grant “military rank, decoration and other honorary distinction” (Art. 47), “the choice of officials as heads of various government department, whether internal or foreign” (Art. 48), “The supreme command of all the forces” (Art. 50), and convoke.
- 106.
Bayat M (1991) Iran’s first revolution: Shi’ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1909. Oxford University Press, p. 5.
- 107.
Kermani N (1969) History of Iranian Awakening (Tarik-i Bidari-i Iranian). Cultural Foundation of Iran, 1969 (1349), vol. IV, p. 21. Translation by the author of the present study.
- 108.
Ibid., vol. II, p. 121. Translation by the author of the present study.
- 109.
The intention here is not to outline a comprehensive Iranian psychological profile, but rather to identify, as Jahangir Amuzegar observed, “certain features of the Persian psyche, embedded in the Iranian culture, are distinctly recognizable; and despite essential human similarities, some of these archetypical traits are different from other cultures … The objective is merely to pinpoint certain salient features of the Persian personality that guide the sociopolitical attitude and behavior among the politically active.” (See Amuzegar J (1991) The Dynamic of the Iranian revolution; The Pahlavis’ Triumph and Tragedy, State University of New York Press, pp. 99–100.)
- 110.
The tendency to deny reality is also dominant among our academicians and scholars, whom sometimes sound desperate to reject what is staring at them. For instance, Shapour Suren-Pahlav observed, “The period after the Islamic conquest is described by Iranian scholars as the ‘Two Centuries of Silence.’ There is no inscriptional or textual evidence for New Persian and only very scanty indications for the continuing use of Middle Persian. However scholars consider it unlikely that Iranians deserted their mother tongue and only cultivated Arabic. The lack of any literary evidence from this period will certainly have been compounded by the destruction of Iranian libraries by the Mongols under Genghis Khan and his successors—and there may also be other reasons unknown to us.” (See Suren-Pahlav S (2007) Persian Not Farsi: Iranian Identity Under Fire. The Circle of Ancient Iranian Studies, p. 3. Emphasis added.)
- 111.
Passivity according to Levinas (1989) refers to the ethical obligation of the self toward the other. For the topic of passivity and servitude, see Biceaga V (2010) The Concept of Passivity in Husserl’s Phenomenology (Vol. 60). Springer Science & Business Media.
- 112.
A compatible case can be drawn to illustrate this tendency, e.g., the relationship between pain and the brain. When you whack yourself with a hammer, it feels like the pain is in your thumb. But really it’s in your brain. That is because our perception of pain is shaped by brain circuits that are constantly filtering and interpreting the information coming from our sensory nerves.
- 113.
Badiou A, Toscano A (2005) Handbook of inaesthetics. Stanford University Press, p. 31. The original of the passge is ‘Il n’est pas de Présent, non—un présent n’existe pas … Faute que se déclare la Foule, faute—de tout.
- 114.
Levinas E (1987) Collected philosophical papers (Vol. 100). Springer Science & Business Media, p. 134.
- 115.
According to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature. The idea is ancient, but first became subject to clarification and mathematical analysis in the eighteenth century. Determinism is deeply connected with our understanding of the physical sciences and their explanatory ambitions, on the one hand, and with our views about human free action on the other. In both of these general areas there is no agreement over whether determinism is true (or even whether it can be known true or false), and what the import for human agency would be in either case.” See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/.
- 116.
Mainly because, as Hannah Arendt observed, “we are of the world and not merely in it.”
- 117.
Deleuze G, Félix G (2005) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans: Brian Massumi. University of Minnesota Press, p. 428. However, the authors later stated that such machinic enslavement “is no more voluntary than it is forced.” Ibid., p. 460. Emphasis original.
- 118.
Butler J (1991) The Psychic Life of Power. Stanford University Press, p. 2.
- 119.
Amuzegar J (1991) The Dynamic of the Iranian revolution; The Pahlavis’ Triumph and Tragedy, State University of New York Press, p. 102.
- 120.
Butler J (1991) The Psychic Life of Power. Stanford University Press, p. 2. Anecdotally, the first man we meet on the street in Iran is immediately ready to share his displeasure for injustice, oppression, and brutality in the current institutional practices. It is a fraternity in the bitterness of servitude.
- 121.
And stated, “He who, to hold his own, must count on the absence of will in others is a thing made by these others, as the master is a thing made by the servant. If submissiveness ceased, it would be all over with lordship.” (See Stirner M (2000) The Ego and Its Own, Cambridge University Press, p. 175.) For Stirner, subordination to Power is nothing but foolishness and weakness irrespective of circumstances. In Stirner’s eyes, for instance, Socrates’ refusal to escape punishment or even (earlier) to request exclusion was a clear indication of Socrates’ lack of commitment to weaken the community by undermining Power, e.g., the system of law, which i s utterly condemned by Stirner. Stirner sees Socrates as a “fool” to concede to the Athenians the right to condemn him; his failure to escape was a “weakness,” a product of his “delusion” that he was a member of a community rather than an individual, and of his failure to understand that the Athenians were his “enemies,” that he himself and no one else could be his only judge. (Ibid., p. xxvii).
- 122.
Contrary to some who considered the anarchism as a political notion and ideology, it is rooted in discipline of philosophy. In fact, Kant is also known as a proto-anarchist philosopher. (See May T (1990) Kant the Liberal, kant the Anarchist: Rawls and Lyotard on Kantian Justice. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (4), pp. 535–538.)
- 123.
de la Boétie E (1942) The Discours sur la servitude volontaire. Trans: Harry Kurz. Columbia University Press.
- 124.
de la Boétie E (1975) The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude. Free Life Editions, p. 13. This issue was also raised in various disciplines. For instance, Dostoevsky’s “the Grand Inquisitor,” is a critical satire on modern theological rationalism and authoritarianism in general and Roman Catholicism in particular. The idea is that Christ revisits earth, coming to Spain at the period of the Inquisition, and is at once arrested as a heretic by the Grand Inquisitor. The imposed question is why is Christ’s message transformed into a practice of submission? The Inquisitor responds that people do not want freedom and truth, which only caused them deprivation and suffering; they want miracles, eternal salvation, and authority. The pain that accompanies compliance is preferable to the pain that attends freedom.
- 125.
Century later, Thomas Hobbes underlined exactly the opposite notion in his most cerebrated work Leviathan when he stated, “And commonly they [men] that live under a monarch, think it the fault of monarchy; and they that live under the government of democracy, or other sovereign assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that form of commonwealth; whereas the power in all forms, if they be perfect enough to protect them, is the same; not considering that the state of man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest, that in any form of government can possibly happen to the people in general, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a civil war; or that dissolute condition of masterless men, without subjection to laws, and a coercive power to tie their hands from rapine and revenge.” (See Hobbes T (1998) Leviathan. Oxford University Press, p. 122.) David Hume, however, concurred Boétie’s principle 200 years later, as he lucidly stated, “Nothing appears more surprising to those who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall find, that, as Force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular. The soldan of Egypt, or the emperor of Rome, might drive his harmless subjects, like brute beasts, against their sentiments and inclination. But he must, at least, have led his mamalukes or prætorian bands, like men, by their opinion.” (See Hume D (2011) Essays. Available at: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/36120/36120-h/36120-h.htm.)
- 126.
De Jouvenel B (1993) On Power: The Natural History of Its Growth, Liberty Fund, p. 15.
- 127.
Latour B (1986) The Power of Association. In: Law J (ed) Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge. Routledge Kegan & Paul, p. 276.
- 128.
Ibid.
- 129.
Michels R (1915) Political parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Hearst’s International Library Company, p. 88.
- 130.
de La Boétie E (1975) The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude. Free Life Editions, p. 46.
- 131.
As Boétie stated, “Shall we call subjection to such a leader cowardice? … If a hundred, if a thousand endure the caprice of a single man, should we not rather say that they lack not the courage but the desire to rise against him, and that such an attitude indicates indifference rather than cowardice? When not a hundred, not a thousand men, but a hundred provinces, a thousand cities, a million men, refuse to assail a single man from whom the kindest treatment received is the infliction of serfdom and slavery, what shall we call that? Is it cowardice? … When a thousand, a million men, a thousand cities, fail to protect themselves against the domination of one man, this cannot be called cowardly, for cowardice does not sink to such a depth …. What monstrous vice, then, is this which does not even deserve to be called cowardice, a vice for which no term can be found vile enough.?” (See de la Boétie E (1975) The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude. Free Life Editions, p. 48.)
- 132.
For Hegel, unhappy consciousness is torn between a yearning for “what could be” and a disappointment with “what is.” In this respect, Pinkard observed, “The slave begins to realize the slave has consciousness; thus, the slave is free in his head but not in reality. The slave must either rebel against the master or live a life that does not align with the slave’s conception of itself. This is significant; Hegel called this mindset ‘slave consciousness,’ and many people have interpreted his work to mean that no one is a slave who did not both voluntarily become one and continue to be one by virtue of their choice not to rebel.” (See Pinkard T (1996) Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason. Cambridge University Press, pp. 53–63.)
- 133.
Nietzsche F, Person KA, Diethe C (eds) (2006) On the Genealogy of Morality. Cambridge University Press, p. 154.
- 134.
See Kaufmann WA (1964) Religion from Tolstoy to Camus: Basic Writings on Religious Truth and Morals. A Companion Vol. to Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre. Harper & Row, pp. 191–200. It is noteworthy that both Hegel and Nietzsche, in their accounts of master-slave relationship, describe the slave as the historical figure. However, for Hegel, this symbolized an early advance in history, while for Nietzsche it represented a threat, because he believes that slave morality in modern society sets a dangerous precedence.
- 135.
Perhaps that is why, unlike the Marxist-Leninists, “anarchists insisted that the state must be abolished in the first stages of the revolution: if, on the other hand, state power was seized by a vanguard and used—under the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’—to revolutionize society, it will, rather than eventually ‘withering away,’ expand in size and power, engendering new class contradictions and antagonisms.” (See Newman S (2010) Voluntary Servitude Reconsidered: Radical Politics and the Problem of Self-Domination. Anarchist Development in Cultural Studies 1, p. 36.)
- 136.
Riech W, Wolef TP (1946) The Mass Psychology of Fascism. Orgone Institute Press. It should be noted, however, while Riech failed to provide a convincing argument to build his thesis, the Marx’s notion has some merit in explaining why people inclined to servitude to Power. According to Warren Frederick Morris, “Marx ideology is motivated by a conflict of material interests between competing social classes. Resolution is attempted by ideas of the dominant class that constitute an ideology claimed as universal truth. Ideological beliefs conceal and suppress the true interest of a subservient class by substituting a false consciousness of social reality. Socialization of the whole society proceeds with an unconscious general acceptance of ideology. A Marxist ideological false consciousness has psychological parallels with Freudian conceived neurosis: conflicting class interest with an interpersonal conflict of instinctional needs; ideological false ideas with neurotic symptoms; suppression of subservient class interest with a repression of instinctual gratification; a dominating social class with a dominating authority figure; ideological socialization with ego ideals introjected [as the process where the subject replicates in itself behaviors, attributes, or other fragments of the surrounding world, especially of other subjects] from a paternal (patriarchal) authority figure; ideological concealment of dominant motivating class interest with disguised desire wrought by repression.” (See Morris WF (2010) Understanding Ideology. University Press of America, p. 99.)
- 137.
Deleuze G, Felix G (2005) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans: Brian Massumi. University of Minnesota Press, p. 215.
- 138.
Ibid.
- 139.
In discussing Heidegger’s notion of becoming, Maturana and Varela explained, “our becoming is an expression of our manner of being autonomous living.” (See Maturana HR, Varela FJ (1992) The tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding. Shambala, p. 241.)
- 140.
As they observed, “The knot, bond, capture, … travel a long history: first, the objective, imperial collective bond; then all of the forms of subjective personal bonds; finally, the Subject that binds itself, and in so doing renews the most magical operation, ‘a cosmopolitan, universal energy which overflows every restriction and bond so as to establish itself instead as the sole bond.’ Even subjection is only a relay for the fundamental moment of the State, namely, civil capture or machinic enslavement. The State is assuredly not the locus of liberty, nor the agent of a forced servitude or war capture. Should we then speak of ‘voluntary servitude’? This is like the expression ‘magical capture’: its only merit is to underline the apparent mystery” (Deleuze G, Felix G (2005) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans: Brian Massumi. University of Minnesota Press, p. 460).
- 141.
Clastres P (1994) Archeology of Violence. Trans: Jeanine Herman. Semiotext (e), New York, p. 94.
- 142.
Here, I am talking about conquerors as individuals and not a system.
- 143.
It should also be noted that 1789 bears a particular importance since some historians have argued that crop failure in 1788 and cold weather in the winter of 1788/1789 led to peasant revolts in various parts of France, which resulted to the French Revolution.
- 144.
Taine HA (2001) The Origins of Contemporary France: The Ancient Regime. Trans: John Durand. Blackmask Online, p. 225.
- 145.
Ibid., pp. 226–227.
- 146.
Paulo Freire brilliantly used the metaphor of Hunger to delineate such realization, as he writes, “ … our hunger was of the type that arrives unannounced and unauthorized, making itself at home without an end in sight.” (See Freire PRN (1996) Letters to Cristina. Routledge, p. 15.)
- 147.
From the contemporary perspectives, scholars like Paulo Reglus Neves Freire and Peter McLaren should be used as reference for theoretical ground (critical cultural pedagogy) of both conditions.
- 148.
The implication of such convergence is obvious: liberty could never be achieved since the underlying problem is denied, and hence status quo remain as is!
- 149.
Ferdowsi means “from paradise,” and is derived from the name Ferdous (cf. Avestan pairi-daeza, later para-diz then par-des or par-dos, arabized to fer-dos). Tusi means “from Tus.” In the poet’s case, the name Ferdowsi Tusi became a name and a title: The Tusi Poet from Paradise (see http://www.heritageinstitute.com/zoroastrianism/shahnameh/).
- 150.
The term Turk is referring to the Turkmen tribe, one of descendants of the Moghuls that invaded Persia.
- 151.
In this study, reasoning is perceived to construct a logical structure that facilitates our understanding of an event, a necessary precondition that provides a target for criticism.
- 152.
For one thing, it denies history as a social phenomenon. Moreover, there is always Marx, who convinced almost everybody that “Men make their own history,” which corresponds to Edward Hallett Carr’s proclamation, “history is made above and beyond.”
- 153.
In the simplest form, for instance, if you pour salt into your coffee because you thought it was sugar, you made a mistake, while to commit and conceal fraudulent conduct or embezzlement is a choice.
- 154.
At this juncture, it is important to delineate further the nature of servitude to Power under consideration here, which is an inclination for possible material and “worldly” rewords. In this respect, servitude to higher power, God, or the obligations that are demanded under the national legal system are not under the consideration. The reason for this exclusion, particularly on the first type of submission is related to what Elias Canetti called “religious submission,” in which he observed, “The distinction between force and power can be seen in another quite different sphere, that of the varying degrees of religious submission. Everyone who believes in God believes that he is continuously in His power and, in his own way , has come to terms with it. But there are those for whom this is not enough. They await some sharp intervention, some direct act of divine force, which they can recognize and feel as such. They live in expectation of God’s commands; for them He has the cruder features of a ruler. His active will and their active and explicit submission in each particular case become the core of their religion. Religions of this kind incline to the doctrine of predestination; their adherents are always able to feel that everything which happens to them is a direct expression of God’s will. Thus, all their lives, they find fresh occasions to submit. It is as though they were already in God’s mouth, to be crushed in the next instant. But they have to live their whole lives in this terrible place, undaunted by it and still striving to do right.” (See Canetti E (1960) Crowds And Power. Trans: Carol Stewart. Continuum, p. 282.)
- 155.
Mill JS (2002) On Liberty. Dover Publication, p. 48. Emphasis added.
- 156.
Here, authority refers to the structure or the inner order of an association, whether this be political, religious, or cultural, and is given legitimacy by its roots in social function, tradition, or allegiance.
- 157.
See Tönnies F, Harris J (2001) Tönnies: Community and Civil society. Cambridge University Press; Weber M, Parsons T, Henderson AM (1947) The theory of social and economic organization. Free Press; and Durkheim E (1951/1897) Suicide. Trans: John A. Spaulding and George Simpson. Free Press, pp. 328–359.
- 158.
Haidt J, Graham J (2009) Planet of the Durkheimians, Where Community, Authority, and Sacredness Are Foundations of Morality. In: Jost JT, Kay AC, Thorisdottir H (eds) Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification. Oxford University Press, p. 377. Nevertheless, Tönnies also described that mutually beneficial relationship is often threaten and susceptible to collapse when authority become distant from the population. In this case, the public must still make a choice as a best way to secure benefit from the authority.
- 159.
A similar instances with totally different outcomes occurred elsewhere. For instance, Farley Grubb observed, “Throughout the colonial period many of these emigrants [Germans] purchased passage to America by voluntary selling some of their future labor, this being the only other asset at their disposal. Some emigrants became indenture servants by signing fixed-term future labor agreements before embarkation, exchange this contract for transportation. Others borrowed the passage fare from their respective shippers pledging to sell themselves as servants in America, if necessary, to repay the loan. This process was known as redemptioner servitude . These institutions of immigrant servitude were the private market’s solution to financing the voyage of those who could not pay in advance. It gave the poorer part of the population the ability to finance moving from low-productivity areas to high-productivity areas, thereby improving their own welfare as well as the overall welfare of society.” (See Grubb F (2013) German Immigration and Servitude in America, 1709–1914. Routledge, p. 159.)
- 160.
Mistrust has often been cited as a widespread and important feature of Iranian society, see for instance: Westwood AF (1965) Politics of Distrust in Iran. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, p. 123–135; Ajami I (1970) Shishdangi, puzhuhishi dar zaminah-ʻi jamiʻah-shinasi-yi rustaʻi, Danishghai-i Pahlavi Shiraz, Ch. 9; Zonis M (2015) Political elite of Iran. Princeton University Press, Princeton; Beeman WO (1976) What Is (Iranian) National Character? A So-ciolinguistic Approach. Iranian Studies 9(1):37–39.
- 161.
Shuster WM (1912) The Strangling of Persia: A Personal Narrative. The Century Company, New York, p. 22.
- 162.
Zonis M (1971) The Political Elite of Iran. Princeton University Press, p. 276.
- 163.
The term Luti in Farsi insinuates a wide range of meanings, with both positive (a person of generous disposition) and negative (rogue) connotations. In the content of this study, the term applied to an individual who deliberately uses intimidations and threats to influence the opinion and actions of others toward some specific end. In short, he is a predator that is bullying people. Because of their fighting skills and local connections, luṭis were often utilized by secular and religious leaders in their towns. For an interesting discussion of the term, see http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/luti.
- 164.
Algar H (1980) Religion and State in Iran 1785–1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period. University of California Press, p. 112. The author also noted that “in 1839–1840, an army under Manuchir Khan Mu’tamad ud-Daula was dispatched to put a definite end to the chaos in Isfahan. More than 150 of the lutis were executed, and a similar number banished to Ardabil.” Ibid.
- 165.
Ibid., p. 134. Emphasis is added. In the same passage, in reciting Nadir Mirza, the author noted, “Stevens’ policy appears to have been consonant with Sheil’s attempts to maintain bast at the Masjid-i-Shah (Royal Mosque) in Tehran, and Amir Kabir complained accordingly in a letter to Sheil… Although the implication is clear that the British wished for some kind of popular base…that might be made use of in later contingencies. (Ibid., Footnote 51).
- 166.
Keddie NR (1991) Iran Under The later Qajars, 1848–1922. In: Avery P, Hambly G, Melville C (eds) The Cambridge History of Iran (Vol. 7): From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 178.
- 167.
While both tactic and strategy are often used interchangeably, each refers to separate and distinct functions and applications. Generally, strategy involves planning, a next move so the speak, in which the future path of possible actions is determined. Tactics, however, are not planning since they involve short-term actions. They are rather the action steps that must be taken to obtain certain predetermined objectives. (See for instance Paquett L (2002) Political Strategy and Tactics: A Practical Guide. Nova Publishers. For an illuminating discussion of topic see Tso-Peng L (1966) Strategy: One Against Ten Tactics: Ten Against One. Foreign language Press.)
- 168.
For instance, a strategy may take forms like censorship, discrediting, glorification, fear mongering, lying, etc., to gain or secure position of power, while a tactic may composed of collaboration with power, evading, rational persuasion, inspirational appeal, force to gain legitimacy.
- 169.
Algar H (1980) Religion and State in Iran 1785–1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period. University of California Press, p. 113; and Keddie NR (1991) Iran Under The later Qajars, 1848–1922. In: Avery P, Hambly G, Melville C (eds) The Cambridge History of Iran (Vol. 7): From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 179, Footnote 5. In fact, according to Algar, Amir Kabir (who served as Prime Minister under Naser al-Din Shah Qajar) attempted to restrict bast in shrines in large cities like Isfahan, Tabriz, and Tehran, as he has seen mosques sheltering the armed followers of the ulama as a constant attempt to gain control and power, and hence endangered government authority. Amir Kabir also sought to obtain clerical sanction, notably that of the imam jum’a of Tehran to strengthening his hand. (Algar H (1980) Religion and State in Iran 1785–1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period. University of California Press, p. 133). This is due to that fact that some of the ulama, as Nikki Keddie observed “the government-appointed imam junta’s of the cities, tended to side with the government, and others might hoard, cheat, extort, or take bribes, in general they were thought to do this less than government officials.” (Keddie NR (1991) Iran Under The later Qajars, 1848–1922. In: Avery P, Hambly G, Melville C (eds) The Cambridge History of Iran (Vol. 7): From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 179).
- 170.
O’Quinn D (2012) Tears in Tehran/Laughter in London: James Morier, Mirza Abul Hassa Khan, and the Geopolitics of Emotion. Eighteenth-Century Fiction 25(1), p. 87.
- 171.
This is particularly true in the Qajar period, in which we have “witnessed the growing power of a new, non-indigenous group who profoundly affected Iranian history: the foreigners. Although foreign nationals did not overrun Iran to the same extent as they did Egypt, the Levant, or Turkey, Iran was nearly as much affected as they were by the policies of foreign governments and of a small number of foreign businessmen. Beginning with the strategic involvement of France, Great Britain, and Russia with Iran during the Napoleonic Wars , Iran came to be affected particularly by the policies of Great Britain and Russia. In addition to their economic interest in Iranian trade, and later in concessions, Great Britain and Russia had strong political and strategic interests in Iran. The former was concerned to keep control of the Persian Gulf, to keep other powers out of it, and to safeguard southern and eastern Iran for the defense of India. Russia, after taking some Transcaucasian territory from Iran in two wars in the early nineteenth century, wished to make northern Iran an area of overwhelming Russian influence, and tried, as did Britain, to be the paramount influence over the Iranian government.” (See Avery P, Hambly G, Melville C (eds) (1991) The Cambridge History of Iran (Vol. 7): From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 179–180.)
- 172.
As a result of oppressive conducts of the rulers in the Fars province as well as the firing on a crowd of people in the holy city of Mashhad, the bastinado of clergymen in cities like Qazwin and Kirman, and the arbitrary conduct of M. Naus of Iranian Customs, of whom a photograph was published of him dressed as a mulla. (See Browne EG (1910) Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. 112).
- 173.
Who was described to Edward Browne as “an old-fashioned Persian Nobleman, arrogant, ignorant, hating foreigners and at first but little susceptible to their advances.” Ibid.
- 174.
Including the afterward celebrated leaders “Sayyid’ Abdu’llah Bahbahani and Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba’i and the orator Aqd Sayyid Jamalu’d-Din, who was one of the chief promoters of the Revolution, and who was among those who perished after the coup d’etat of June, 1908.” (Ibid., pp. 112–113).
- 175.
Ibid., p. 113. See also Keddie NR (1991) Iran Under The later Qajars, 1848–1922. In: Avery P, Hambly G, Melville C (eds) The Cambridge History of Iran (Vol. 7): From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 202 and Upton JM (1968) The History of Modern Iran An Interpretation. Harvard University Press, pp. 12–15.
- 176.
Shuster WM (1912) The Strangling of Persia: A Personal Narrative. The Century Company, New York, p. 364.
- 177.
Browne EG (1910) Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. 119.
- 178.
Ibid., p. 131.
- 179.
Martin V (2013) Iran Between Islamic Nationalism and Secularism: The Constitutional Revolution of 1906. British Academic Press, pp. 73–74. Evidently, the Consul responded to the crowd request by stating, “they would need five years’ residence in Britain.” Ibid., p. 74.
- 180.
Shuster WM (1912) The Strangling of Persia: A Personal Narrative. The Century Company, New York, p. xviii. As noted by others, there were many factors that may also have had some bearing on how revolution was conceived in Iran such as the failed Russian revolution of 1905. Moreover, the constitutional movement may also contributed to several events in the region such as, The Young Turk Revolution of 1908–1909 and the abdication of Sultan ʿAbd-al-Ḥamīd II in Istanbul, shortly before the overthrow of Moḥammad-ʿAlī Shah.
- 181.
(See Arjomand A (1992) Constitutional Revolution iii. The Constitution. December 15, 1992).
- 182.
Blaustein AP (1988) Constitutions That Made History. Paragon House, p. 270.
- 183.
As Janet Afary stated, “Though the men responsible for creation of the Iranian Constitutional laws of 1906–1907 looked for guidance in a number of other constitutions, their most important model was the Belgian Constitution of 1831. Along with the commercial and political ties that several of Iran’s framers had to Belgium, the success of the Belgian Constitution in codifying new rights without creating an entirely new social structure attracted Iranian reformers confronted with a conservative and powerful Islamic clergy.” (See Afary J Civil (2005) Liberties and Iran’s First Constitution. Foundation for Iranian Studies). It is also noteworthy that M. Hennebicq, a Belgian citizen, was a legal adviser the Persian Government for four years. (See Browne EG (1910) Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. 110).
- 184.
“The main cause of the Belgian Revolution was the domination of the Dutch over the economic, political, and social institutions of the Kingdom (although at that time the Belgian population was larger than the Dutch). Catholic bishops in the south had forbidden working for the new government. This rule, originated in 1815 by Maurice-Jean de Broglie, the French nobleman who was bishop of Ghent, caused an underrepresentation of Southerners in government and the army.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belgian_Revolution).
- 185.
Indeed, and according to Amir Arjomand, even the term for “constitution” (in Persia, qānūn-e asāsī, which means literary “fundamental law”), was borrowed from the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. Arjomand further observed, “Throughout the earlier Islamic period qānūn had been the common term for financial and administrative regulations laid down by the ruler independent of the religious law (Šarīʿa) of Islam. This notion of independent state law culminated in the great qānūns of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, notably that of Uzun Ḥasan in Persia and those of Moḥammad (Mehmed) the Conqueror, Bāyazīd II, and Solaymān Qānūnī (Lawgiver) in the Ottoman empire (Inalcik, IVa, pp. 558–559; idem, IVb, p. 566). Probably owing to the establishment of Shiʿism as the state religion in Persia at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the qānūn did not become institutionalized there as it had done in the Ottoman empire; Shah Ṭahmāsb I (930-84/1524-76) did, however, issue a decree on the ‘law of monarchy’ (Āʾīn-e Šāh Ṭahmāsb). From the beginning of modernization in the Middle East, therefore, qānūn, conceived as state law, constituted the precedent for adoption of legal codes in the Western sense. In Persia, too, the term came to denote codes inspired by European legislation and introduced by the state. The constitution, as the foundation of public law, was naturally regarded as ‘the fundamental qānūn.’” (See Arjomand A (1992) Constitutional Revolution iii. The Constitution. December 15, 1992.)
- 186.
Baktiari B (1996) Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran: The Institutionalization of Factional Politics. University Press of Florida, p. 10.
- 187.
For instance Arjomand stated, “five (Arts. 13, 18, 23, 25, 42) corresponded to provisions in the Bulgarian Constitution of 1879, though none was a verbatim translation.” See Arjomand A (1992) Constitutional Revolution iii. The Constitution. December 15, 1992.
- 188.
Booker C (2015) What happens when the great fantasies, like wind power or European Union, collide with reality?. The Telegraph, Thursday 16, April 2015.
- 189.
The term imported ideas is used here not as an insinuation of cultural imperialism but rather to emphasize the unfamiliarity of concepts in the host culture.
- 190.
Ayatollah Beheshti also underlined this point. According to Arjomand, “In an important lecture delivered on the eve of the referendum on the 1979 Constitution at the birthplace of Islamic ideology in Iran, Tehran’s famous Hossaynia Ersha¯d, its chief architect, Ayatollah Beheshti, reflected on the theoretical foundations of the proposed Constitution. He disclosed the true character of the political regime that the Constitution was designed to create as the ‘regime of the umma [the community of believers] and Imamate [umma divine leadership].’ The fundamental error of Iran’s first revolution, the Constitutional Revolution, he argued, was to call the new order it created ‘constitutional’ (mashruta), a concept that was ‘borrowed and did not pertain to the Islamic culture.’” (See Arjomand SA (2009) After Khomeini: Iran Under His Successors. Oxford University Press, p. 29. For more comprehensive explanations of terms umma and imamate see p. 220).
- 191.
It should be noted that Shaykh Fazi Allah was indeed among those who took bast in the Masjid-i Shah, and according to Edward Browne “[he] was at that time regarded by the people as one of the ‘three Proofs’ or ‘Founder’ of the Constitutional Movement, the other two being Sayyid ‘Abdullah and Sayyid Muhammad Tabatabai, to whom in point of learning he was greatly superior.” (See Browne EG (1910) Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. 113). So the question of why the Shaykh defected from the constitutional movement and support Mohammad Ali Shah’s reactionary has been controversial. Browne suggested that his “defection” is related to jealousy at Sayyid Abdullah and Sayyid Muhammad Tabatabai’s superior influence over the movement. (see Ibid.) Hadi Enayat seems to offer the most accurate account of the Shaykh’s reason when he stated, “Shaykh Fazlollah understood, perhaps more clearly than most of his contemporaries, that constitutionalism posed a threat to the shari’a. One of his main arguments was that legislation was forbidden in Islam. A national assembly was not only illegitimate, but it had also created a conflicting source of authority that undermined the shari’a.” (See Enayat H (2013) Law, State, and Society in Modern Iran: Constitutionalism, Autocracy, and Legal Reform, 1906–1941. Palgrave Macmillan, p. 57.) It should be noted that there was another faction that identifies with the liberal constitutionalist led by Mirza Mohammad Hosein Na’ini. According to Houchang Chehabi, Na’ini, “like most other constitutionalist ulema, was as confused as to the meaning and implication of Western-Style parliamentarism. He wanted the total ulema control over the judiciary and legislative branches of government and would not admit complete equality of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, positions not compatible with our modern notion of democracy: he nevertheless argued that a constitutional government with an elected assembly was preferable to a despotic regime. According to Na’ini a despotic regime usurped the legitimate rights of God, the twelfth Imam, and the people, whereas a constitutional regime usurped only the right of the Imam, the right of the Imam, who, being in transtemporal occulation, cannot exercise his rightful domination.” (See Chehabi HE (1990) Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran Under the Shah and Khomeini. I.B. Tauris, p. 44.)
- 192.
On the former, the incompatibility issue, Sheikh Fazlollah provided the revealing argument as he stated, “During the Revolution some naturalist intellectuals presented concepts such as constitutionalism, the legitimacy of the opinion of the majority, and so on, and because of supporting social justice, I tolerated them. But afterwards when they came to write the Constitution I felt that there was a heresy there; otherwise, what does a deputy [of the Majles] mean? What is a parliamentary system? … If it aims to codify law, there is no need of such a system; if it aims to interfere in religious affairs; such deputies are not entitled to interfere in this area. In the period of the Occultation this right belongs only to the ulama, not to people like grocers or cloth-sellers.” (See Enayat H (2013) Law, State, and Society in Modern Iran: Constitutionalism, Autocracy, and Legal Reform, 1906–1941. Palgrave Macmillan, p. 57.) Under this condition, the text was prepared. Article 1 of the constitution stated that Islam (the orthodox Ja’fari doctrine of the Ithna ‘Ashari branch) was the official religion of the country and that the shah was obligated to “profess and promote” Islam. Article 2 stated that the laws of the Majlis (Parliament) could not be at variance with the principle of Islam or those set forth by the prophet Muhammad. In return for these religious items, article 15 underscored the liberal notion and states: “The National Consultative Assembly is founded and established in conformity with the Farman, Founded on justice … the National Consultative Assembly represents the whole of the people of Persia, who thus participate in economic and political affairs of the country … . [The assembly has] the right in all questions to propose any measure that it regards as conductive to the well-being of the Government and The People.” Finally, as a concession to the court [royalists], Article 43 gives the king authority to nominate thirty senators to an upper house of sixty senators. However, Bahman Baktiari points out that this article was nullified by the next article 44 in which the Regulation of the State “had to be approved by the national consultative assembly.” (See Baktiari B (1996) Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran: The Institutionalization of Factional Politics. University Press of Florida, pp. 7–8.) According to Baktiari, Sheikh Fazi Allah’s objection began with Article 35, that declared, “The sovereign is a trust confided (as a Divine Gift) by the people to the person of the King.” (Ibid.) In direct contrast, the Belgian Constitution, by decree, is subject to constant scrutiny and possible alteration. For instance, the 1831 centralized unitary state changed into a federal state in 1917. A more striking difference, relative to the Iranian constitution, is Article 2 which divides Belgium into three communities: the Flemish Community , the French Community , and the German-speaking Community, whereas Article 3 divides Belgium into three regions: the Flemish Region, the Walloon Region, and the Brussels Region. Article 4 divides Belgium into four language areas: The Dutch language area, the French language area, the bilingual (French and Dutch) area of Brussels-Capital and the German language area. Moreover, while the Constitution speaks of the rights of the Belgians, in principle they apply to all persons on Belgian soil. The point is: diversities are celebrated in Belgium, while uniformity was the principle pillar of Iranian constitution.
- 193.
Some may reject this conclusion on the ground that such opinion excludes “the crucial part played by the Caucasian émigré constituency, including a large body of Iranian oil workers in Baku, in backing the Iranian constitutionalists through financial, moral, and ideological support, and later by joining the Iranian Constitutionalists during the 1908–1909 civil war which included Azarbaijani Muslim, Armenian and Georgian volunteers.” (See Amanat A (2009) Memory and Amnesia in the Historiography of the Constitutional Revolution. In Atabaki T (ed) Iran in the Twentieth Century: Historiography and Political Culture. I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, p. 25.) For one thing, the point that I was making related to lack of public participation in the constitutional movement and not the civil war, which occurred few years later, and hence a direct link between the events around 1905 and civil war of 1908–1909 is hard to establish. Second, the drama of the civil war took place mostly in Tabriz, (See Abrahamian E (1982) Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton University Press, p. 97), while the rest of the country were in deep hibernation. Third, as Kasravi, an eyewitness of the civil war in Tabriz, observed, “The driving forces of these men [in Tabriz] was toward anarchy. First to overthrow the despotic power of the court [in Tabriz], then to turn against the rich and the propertied classes”, which indicates embracing the constitution objectives was the least people of Tbariz were concern about. (Ibid., p. 98).
- 194.
Again, this observation does not mean that the revolution has failed, but rather it is the people who failed it.
- 195.
Duguit L (1921) Law In The Modern State (1919). Trans: Frida And Harold Laski. Allen & Unwin, p. xii.
- 196.
Nevertheless, one must admit that Fazi Allah Nuri, as a representative of his social/intellectual environment, had done remarkable service for his constituents by forcing the compromise, and eventually altered the content of the draft constitution.
- 197.
In the short Treaties, Part 2, Ch. 26, Spinoza observed, “It is not the case as is commonly represented that we must first subdue our passion before we can attain to the knowledge, and thereby to the love of God. This would be like saying that a man who is ignorant must first get rid of his ignorance before he can attain to knowledge. But just as knowledge alone is the cause of the destruction of ignorance, so too without virtue, or (to express it better) without the guidance of the intelligence, everything goes amiss.” (See Duff RA (1903) Spinoza’s political and ethical philosophy. J. Maclehose and Sons, pp. 13–14.) The reader should note that my intention is not philosophical but rather a casual characterization of general tendency in which there is not clear distinction between what we hold as the ideal and what there is as the actual. However, philosophy is relevant here in a sense of how Hegel follows Spinoza in regarding consciousness, and the activities of thinking and understanding, as he observed, “if thinking stops with substance, there is no development, no life, no spirituality or activity. So we can say that with Spinozism everything goes into the abyss but nothing emerges from it … what differentiated and forms the particular is said to be just a modification of the absolute and nothing absolute in its own self … this is what is unsatisfying in Spinoza.” (See Hegel GWF (1892). Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 3. (trans: Haldane ES, Simson FH). Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & CO. pp. 154–155. Emphasis added).
- 198.
Zargarinejad G (1386) Constitution Tracts. Institute for Development and Research for Humanities, p. 29.
- 199.
Ibid., p. 31. This debate that epitomized the difference between the mashrooteh (constitution) and mashru’at (literally it means conditional governance), in which the latter term implies a new sociopolitical order of modernity.
- 200.
De Jouvenel B (1993) On Power: The Natural History of Its Growth, Liberty Fund, p. 13. The difference between now and then is that in the ancient regime, Bertrand De Jouvenel explained, “society’s moving spirits [resistance to power], who had, as they knew, no chance of a share of Power, were quick to denounce its smallest encroachment. Now, on the other hand, when everyone is potentially a minister, no one is concerned to cut down an office to which he aspired one day for himself, or to put sand in a machine which he means to used for himself when his turn comes.”
- 201.
Schneier B (2015) Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World. W. W. Norton.
- 202.
Baktiari B (1996) Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran: The Institutionalization of Factional Politics. University Press of Florida, p. 1.
- 203.
For a contemporary debate on this subject see James Bovard, who diagnoses a national malady called “Attention Deficit Democracy,” characterized by a citizenry that seems to be paying less attention to facts, and is less capable of judging when their rights and liberties are under attack (Bovard J (2005) Attention Deficit Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan).
- 204.
To reaffirm this observation, one only needs to recognize that majority of political-men, in Iran and elsewhere, who fought for liberty also sought domination and endorsed some kind of obedience, while knowing too well that disobedience is the pillar of such noble notion. In response, a plausible argument may put forward that follows, more or less, this line of rationale, in country like Iran, a concurrent prevalence of obedience and domination is inevitable due to the absence of nationally established norms (that prescribed command and obedience). Indeed, Weber also points to the same direction when he notes that the existence of legal authority requires the prior existence of a legal code consisting of a system of abstract rules which regulates the command-obedience relationship, so that both acts of obedience and of command constitute forms of adherence to a norm rather than acts of personal devotion or an arbitrary freedom. (See Weber M, Parsons T, Henderson AM (1947) The theory of social and economic organization. Free Press, pp. 329–330.) Nevertheless, such a rationalization, while it explained the phenomenon it does not deny it occurrence, which is the point of my contention.
- 205.
As Kasravi wrote, “As in the French revolution, a group of propertyless and barefoot people had come forward and were gradually prevailing. This was the sign that the revolt had grown roots and was now finding its ‘character.’ It is a character of revolts that the masses first join hands to free themselves from the self-indulgent and the courtiers and then the propertyless and the oppressed come forward to seek revenge on the wealthy and affluent. In Paris, Danton and Robespierre and Hebert led this group and it was with their support that they accomplished a series of fearsome historic deeds. In Tabriz there were no leaders such as Danton and Robespierre or else ‘terror’ would rule here as well.” (Afary J (1996) The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911. Columbia University Press, p. 107, Footnote 60).
- 206.
Upton JM (1968) The History of Modern Iran An Interpretation. Harvard University Press, p. 31.
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Pirzadeh, A. (2016). Qajar Period and the Constitutional Revolution. In: Iran Revisited. Arts, Research, Innovation and Society. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30485-4_6
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