Abstract
Three main cultural groups inhabit the present terrestrial boundaries of Western Asia, commonly referred to as Near East: The Iranians, the inhabitants of Arabian Peninsula, and the Turks (the Ottoman founded in 1299). The Turks are the unseasoned of the three and geographically closest to Europe, which perhaps why they are generally perceived as less unreceptive (most open) to Western Influence. The Arab world, including the in Persian Gulf (also known as Pirate Coast), is utter creation of its religion conviction created by the dynasty of caliphs of the Umayyad House as well as the post-WWII international political inventions. Iran, the oldest among the three, depicts a totally different picture in a sense that its civilization is not based on ethnicity, or delineate simple as the kinship in blood, like the Turks and the Arabs but rather upon the terrain. Although in the present-day culture, the dominant formative agent is Islam, some elements of what was a uniquely Iranian civilization go back to pre-Islamic history and still have persisted today. For instance, language, mythology, and historical identity all preserve something of the pre-Islamic past that makes up the characteristics of the Iranian (National) Character.
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Notes
- 1.
In this book, civilization is considered as an encompassing term that represents the cumulative intellectuals, culture, and social achievements that have evolved over a considerable period and whose norms are practiced by a group of people. Similarly, a society is a more tangible term that can be viewed as a collection of people that are subject to and work under the rules of authority—A Muslim society implies that the majority of the population is living under Islamic rules.
- 2.
It should be noted that the notion of national character is quite different than ethnicity. Ethnic groups are not a fact of nature, like species, and cannot be defined by objective physiological attributes. They have been socially constructed throughout history, as the French historian Ernest Renan pointed out in his pioneer lecture on the origin of nation at the Sorbonne I 1882, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” (What is a nation?): “A Frenchman is neither Gaul, nor a Frank, nor a Burgundian. Rather he is what has emerged from the cauldron in which, presided over by the Kings of France, the most diverse elements have together been simmering … A Englishman is … neither the Briton of Julius Caesar’s time, the Anglo-Saxon of Hengist’s time, nor the Dane of Canut’s time, nor the Norman of William the Conqueror’s time, it is rather the result of all these … Is German an exception? … That is a complete illusion. The whole of the South was once Gallic; the whole of the east … Slavic … .what is the defining features of these states? It is the fusion of their component populations.” (See Oberschall A (2007) Conflict and peace building in divided societies: Responses to ethnic violence. Routledge, p. 4.)
- 3.
For a rich literature review of the topic, see Inkeles A (2014) National character: A psycho-social perspective. Transaction Publishers.
- 4.
This statement is made, knowing all too well that the political sovereignty of the Iranian state had been broken by Russian annexations in the early nineteenth century. However, since the present study emphasis is on the contemporary period, the twentieth century onward, the issue is excluded, but not ignored.
- 5.
For instance, like many capitals of compatible countries, Tehran suffers from population extreme density, which has led to similar dire circumstances such as degradation of environment including quality of potable water and air, extreme pressure on municipality services, rapid deterioration of public services and goods, etc. And yet, and to the best of my knowledge, there is not a single plan to neither reverse, nor stop the phenomenon (except the proposal to move the capital elsewhere). Worse, the trend shows no signs of slowing down as permits for constructions continue to be issued. This sort of issues, I argue, is utterly related to cultural qualities.
- 6.
Mill JS (1906) A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive: Boeing a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation. Accessed 12 Nov 2014 at The Project Gutenberg, Ebook 27942, p. 1066.
- 7.
Carr EH (1961) What is history? Vintage Books, pp. 36–37
- 8.
Emile Durkheim, in relation to suicide, coined the word anomie to denote the individual isolation from his society, but also underlined that suicide should be viewed as a means of independent social condition. There are also other studies that show a human society is an Empathic society where people show great affection and caring for each other. In fact, Jeremy Rifkin used various developmental psychologists to prove this point: “infants as young as 1 or 2 days old are able to identify the cries of other newborns and will cry in return, in what is called rudimentary empathic distress … But the real sense of empathic extension doesn’t begin to appear until the age of 18 months to two and half years … when the infant is able to understand that someone else exist [sense of others] as a separate being from himself that he is able to experience the others’ condition as if it were himself and respond with the appropriate comfort.” (See Rifkin J (2009) The empathic civilization: The race to global consciousness in a world in crisis. Penguin, pp. 8–9.)
- 9.
“The Stanford prison experiment (SPE) was a study of the psychological effects of becoming a prisoner or prison guard. The experiment was conducted at Stanford University on August 14–20, 1971, by a team of researchers led by psychology professor Philip Zimbardo. It was funded by the U.S. Office of Naval Research and was of interest to both the US Navy and Marine Corps as an investigation into the causes of conflict between military guards and prisoners. The experiment is a classic study on the psychology of imprisonment and is a topic covered in most introductory psychology textbooks. The participants adapted to their roles well beyond Zimbardo’s expectations, as the guards enforced authoritarian measures and ultimately subjected some of the prisoners to psychological torture. Many of the prisoners passively accepted psychological abuse and, at the request of the guards, readily harassed other prisoners who attempted to prevent it. The experiment even affected Zimbardo himself, who, in his role as the superintendent, permitted the abuse to continue. Two of the prisoners quit the experiment early, and the entire experiment was abruptly stopped after only 6 days, to an extent because of the objections of Christina Maslach. Certain portions of the experiment were filmed, and excerpts of footage are publicly available.” (See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanford_prison_experiment.)
- 10.
Dalton G (1974) Economic systems and society: capitalism, communism and the Third World (Vol. 2). Penguin books, p. 21.
- 11.
Lynd RS, Lynd HM (1956) Middletown: A Study in Modern American Culture. 1929. Reprint. Harcourt Brace, New York, p. 87.
- 12.
Ibid.
- 13.
Lawrence S (1974) Origins of German National Traits: Historic Roots of National Peculiarities. The New International XIII(1), January 1947. Accessed 15 May 2015 at: https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/ni/issue3.htm.
- 14.
Published originally as ‘Xin minzhu zhuyide zhengzhi yu xin minzhu zhuyide wenhua’ (‘The politics and culture of New Democracy’), Zhongguo wenhua (Chinese Culture) 1 (January 1940). An English translation is available in Mao TT, Mao Z (1977) Selected Works of Mao Tsetung: Vol II. Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, pp. 380–381. See also Carr B, Mahalingam I (eds) (2002) Companion encyclopedia of Asian philosophy. Routledge, p. 541.
- 15.
Zedong M (1938) Lun xin jieduan (On the new stage). Speech to the Enlarged Plenary Session of the Sixty Central Committee (12–14 October 1938). In Minoru T(ed) (1976) Mao Zedong ji: Collected Works of Mao Zedong. PoWen Book Co., vol. 6, pp. 260–261. See also Carr B, Mahalingam I (eds) (2002) Companion encyclopedia of Asian philosophy. Routledge, p. 541.
- 16.
Heidenheimer AJ, Adams CT, Heclo H (1975) Comparative public policy: the politics of social choice in Europe and America. St. Martin’s Press, New York.
- 17.
Bevir M (ed) (2010) The SAGE handbook of governance. Sage, p. 702.
- 18.
Porter ME (1990) The competitive advantage of nations. Free Press, New York, p. 735.
- 19.
Kohn H (1961) The idea of nationalism: A study in its origins and background. Transaction Publishers, p. 28.
- 20.
As Clark explained, “There are few scattered allusion in the plays of Shakespeare to the ancient Persian race, who were united with the Medes by Cyrus, the conqueror of Babylon and founder of the Medo-Persian Empire. The poet obtained his knowledge of these early civilizations in Mesopotamia from the Bible.” (See Clark C (1932) Shakespeare and national character: a study of Shakespeare’s knowledge and dramatic and literary use of the distinctive racial characteristics of the different peoples of the world (No. 24). Haskell House Pub Ltd, p. 289.)
- 21.
The direct Weber quote is, “ALL rationalized harmonic music rests upon the octave (vibration ratio of 1:2) and its division into the fifth (2:3) and fourth (3:4) and the successive subdivisions in terms of the formula n/(n + 1) for all intervals smaller than the fifth. If one ascends or descends from a tonic in circles first in the octave followed by fifths, fourths, or other successively determined relations, the powers of these divisions can never meet on one ‘and the same tone no matter how long the procedure be continued. The twelfth perfect fifth (2/3) 12 is larger by the Pythagorean comma than the seventh octave equaling (1/2) 7. This unalterable state of affairs together with the further fact that the octave is successively divisible only into two unequal intervals, forms the fundamental core of facts for all musical rationalizations.” (See Weber M (1958) The Rational and Social Foundations of Music. Translated and Edited by Don Martindale, Johannes Riedel and Gertrude Neuwirth. Southern Illinois UP, Carbondale, p. 3.)
- 22.
Nettl B (2013) Becoming an Ethnomusicologist: A Miscellany of Influences. Scarecrow Press, p. 116.
- 23.
- 24.
Malcolm N (1908) Five years in a Persian town. John Murray, pp. 185–186.
- 25.
Ferrier RW (1996) A journey to Persia: Jean Chardin’s portrait of a seventeenth-century empire. New Age International, p. 112. The same appears in de Secondat C, baron de Montesquieu, Kahn A (2008) Persian letters. (trans: Mauldon M). Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 238.
- 26.
The essay first appeared in a not well-known magazine Masa’el-e Iran (Iran’s Problem) in 1965 (1344), and later published as a book.
- 27.
But, he also made an attempt by reminding his reader about virtues of the Iranian culture, and hence evoked we should not be dismayed and anxious about the future since “Iranian people are endowed with talent and civility, affectionate and caring about others” to which others often admired and revered.
- 28.
Jamalzadeh MA (1966) Our Iranian Character Traits. Sharg Publisher (Fravardin 1345), p. 10. The terms “yesterday” and “a day before yesterday,” we learned in the next paragraph, are references to the time frame that goes far back as Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon, all others who wrote about Iranians and their attributes.
- 29.
Ibid., p. 11.
- 30.
Ibid., p. 66.
- 31.
Ibid., p. 27.
- 32.
Ibid., p. 24.
- 33.
Ibid.
- 34.
Ibid.
- 35.
Iranian literature , as Claus V. Pedersen described, “is often inspired by and reflects abstract philosophies, and in addition, expresses man’s experiences of life and his interpretations thereof. By doing so, literature bridge the gap between theory and practice, conceptions and experience in a way that most other texts do not.” (See Pedersen CV (2002) World View in Pre-Revolutionary Iran: Literary Analysis of Five Iranian Authors in the Context of the History of Ideas (Vol. 10). Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, p. viii.)
- 36.
Lewisohn L (Ed) (2010) Hafiz and the Religion of Love in Classical Persian Poetry (Vol. 25). IB Tauris, p. 165. In another story told by Aṭṭār, “a drunkard finds fault with the conduct of another drunk, counselling him to drink fewer glasses of wine, so that ‘you will be able to walk in a straight line like me without following anyone else’. The first drunkard, meanwhile, is unaware that he himself is blind drunk and being carried in a sack on the back of his mate. From the tale, ‘Aṭṭār draws the moral that this type of cavilling arises from not being a lover, for the lover always sees all the Beloved’s blemishes as indicative of her beauty and virtue.” (Ibid.)
- 37.
Lewisohn L (Ed) (2010) Hafiz and the Religion of Love in Classical Persian Poetry (Vol. 25). IB Tauris, p. 163. Lewisohn also elaborates on this note and points out, “Writing in Shīrāz a century before Ḥāfiẓ, Sa‛dī [another renowned poet] relates the story of an ascetic who was invited to be the guest of a prince. At the royal banqueting table he ate less than was his custom, and after the meal he recited public prayers longer than was his habit at home. Upon returning home, the ‘ascetic’ asked his son to bring him something to eat ‘I had supposed you had eaten to satiety already at the King’s table’, the boy wondered aloud. ‘Well, it seemed more to my benefit to curb my appetite there’, his father prevaricated. Discerning that his father’s hypocritical pretence to abstention had eradicated all his claim to ascetic virtue, the lad quipped: ‘Then recite your prayers over again as well for your good works up to now have also reaped no benefit for you.’” (Ibid.).
- 38.
Lewisohn L (Ed) (2010) Hafiz and the Religion of Love in Classical Persian Poetry (Vol. 25). IB Tauris, p. 164.
- 39.
According to Lloyd Ridgeon, Farsi equivalent of the term “futuwwat” is Jawanmardi which has been an integral part of our folklore literature like Shahnameh by Ferdowsi and “in the hagiographies and legends of the Shi’ite Imam [Ali] and in Sufi poetry and prose.” (See Ridgeon L (2010) Morals and mysticism in Persian sufism: a history of Sufi-futuwwat in Iran. Routledge, p. 1.) Literally it could be translated “manliness”; some scholars have suggested “chivalry” or “Islamic chivalry” as translations. Both of those get at some of the aspects of this term, but hardly explain it. To put it briefly (see Cahen C, Taeschner F (1965) Futuwwa. Encyclopedia of Islam, 961-969), the concept of futuwwat embodies a social ethic and set of practices informed by a rigorous morality, Sufic ascetic and mystical concepts and practices, and ideas on appropriate social behavior. See https://thicketandthorp.wordpress.com/2012/08/25/a-beginners-guide-to-futuwwat/.
- 40.
Jamalzadeh MA (1966) Our Iranian Character Traits. Sharg Publisher (Fravardin 1345), p. 26.
- 41.
It is a multilingual inscription located on Mount Behistun in the Kermanshah Province of Iran, near the city of Kermanshah in western Iran.
- 42.
See line 55 (4.36-40), at: http://realhistoryww.com/world_history/ancient/Misc/Elam/Darius_beh.htm. Emphasis origin. It is noteworthy that all earlier studies of inscriptions had been conducted by non-Iranian. For more information, see http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bisotun-iii.
- 43.
Jamalzadeh MA (1966) Our Iranian Character Traits. Sharg Publisher (Fravardin 1345), p 34.
- 44.
Christian theologian St. Augustine (354–430) taught that lying was always wrong, but accepted that this would be very difficult to live up to and that in real life people needed a get-out clause. According to St Augustine, God gave human beings speech so that they could make their thoughts known to each other; therefore, using speech to deceive people is a sin, because it’s using speech to do the opposite of what God intended. The true sin of lying is contained in the desire to deceive. Augustine believed that some lies could be pardoned, and that there were in fact occasions when lying would be the right thing to do. He grouped lies into eight classes, depending on how difficult it was to pardon them. Here’s his list, with the least forgivable is: (1) Lies told in teaching religion; (2) Lies which hurt someone and help nobody; (3) Lies which hurt someone but benefit someone else; (4) Lies told for the pleasure of deceiving someone; (5) Lies told to please others in conversation; (6) Lies which hurt nobody and benefit someone; (7) Lies which hurt nobody and benefit someone by keeping open the possibility of their repentance; and (8) Lies which hurt nobody and protect a person from physical “defilement”. See “Lying and Truth Telling” at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/lying/lying_1.shtml.
- 45.
Isenberg A (1988) Aesthetics and the theory of criticism: Selected essays of Arnold Isenberg. University of Chicago Press, p. 248.
- 46.
Primoratz I (1984) Lying and the “Methods of Ethics.” International Studies in Philosophy. 16(3):35–57, p. 54, see footnote 2 in Chap. 1.
- 47.
de Montaigne M, Cohen JM (1993) Essays. Translated with an introduction by JM Cohen. Penguin Books, London, p. 7.
- 48.
Nietzsche FW, Kaufmann, WA, Hollingdale RJ (1968) The Will to Power [by] Friedrich Nietzsche. A New Translation by Walter Kaufmann and RJ Hollingdale. Edited, with Commentary, by Walter Kaufmann, with Fascism of the Original Manuscript. Random House, New York, p. 446. Emphasis origin.
- 49.
Kant I (2009) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. (trans: Gregor M). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 183.
- 50.
Ibid.
- 51.
See Szabados B, Soifer E (2004) Hypocrisy: ethical investigations. Broadview Press, p. 133.
- 52.
Kant I (2008) Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. HarperOne, p. 37.
- 53.
Levine TR (ed) (2014) Encyclopedia of Deception. SAGE Publications, pp. 596–597.
- 54.
Bok S (2011) Lying: Moral choice in public and private life. Vintage, p. 8.
- 55.
For instance, James Morier’s Hajji Baba provides many precedents of a false person among Iranians. Although the book is a creation of Englishman, it has been translated and a well-known work in Iran to the extent that Muhammad Ali Jamalzadeh called it a master piece and Professor Menavi called it “must read book in Persian literature.” (see Nateg H (1975) Aaz Ma-st ki Bar Ma-st. Aghah Publisher, p. 95). Another example is Bijian Mofid’s City of Tales, which was the most popular play ever written in Persian.
- 56.
In a standard tradition, the element of language and context cannot be assigned fixed relationships to each other and hence a speaker has no choice of alternative possibilities in speech, and hence bounded to his contextual environment. For instance, a fixed response to a question of “Where are you?” is either “here” or “there” and not “here and there.” (See Beeman WO (1986) Language, status, and power in Iran. Indiana University Press, pp. 2–3).
- 57.
Beeman WO (1986) Language, status, and power in Iran. Indiana University Press, p. 6.
- 58.
It should be noted that Beemans’ Language, Status, and Power in Iran (Advances in Semiotics) has been subject of intense scrutiny and criticism to which I feel obliged to reiterate. One of the contemporary brilliant scholars of Iranian study who has earned my most respect is Hamid Dabashi. Dabashi in Corpus Anarchicum expressed his view on Beeman’s work and stated, “This [Beemans’ book] analytical ludicrous, thinly disguised racist reading of Iranian architectural practices of biruni/anadaruni, which are also linked to the Islamic mystical notions of zahar and batan, inevitably distorts the untheorized historical practices into substanding old-fashion Oriental reading of the Oriental as insidious, beguiling, and corrupt.” (See Dabashi H (2012) Corpus anarchicum: political protest, suicidal violence, and the making of the posthuman body. Palgrave Macmillan, p. 98.) And yet, none of these derogatory adjectives undermined Beemans’ observation, in that “It is the birun or biruni, the public reception areas of the household where strangers may be entertained without endangering the private space of the family. The ændærun and birun of the household are, to a degree, portable.” (See Beeman WO (1986) Language, status, and power in Iran. Indiana University Press, p. 11.)
- 59.
Beeman WO (1986) Language, status, and power in Iran. Indiana University Press, p. 27 and 66 respectively.
- 60.
Curzon GNC (1892) Persia and the Persian question (Vol. 2). Longmans, Green & Co, p. 15.
- 61.
Goffman E (1969) Strategic interaction. University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 9.
- 62.
Others, however, believed that the tendency to lie in Iran should be viewed in terms of insecurity and vulnerability that has been imposed on people through enduring history. In his pioneer and highly enlightening study of the Iranian political elite, Marvin Zonis’s cites numerous Western writers, who point out the pervasive, manifest insecurity of the Iranian citizenry. See Zonis M (2015) Political Elite of Iran. Princeton University Press, pp. 268–283, 295–298, and 272–279.
- 63.
Baldwin GB (1967) Planning and development in Iran. John Hopkins University, p. 18.
- 64.
In fact, it has been suggested that many political developments in the contemporary Iran are caused by personal rivalries, animosities, and power ambitions. For instance, see Hunter S (2010) Iran’s foreign policy in the post-Soviet era: resisting the new international order. ABC-CLIO, p. 28.
- 65.
Taysi T, Preston T (2001) The personality and leadership style of President Khatami: Implications for the future of Iranian political reform. In: Feldman O, Valenty LO (ed) (2001). Profiling political leaders: A cross-cultural studies of personality and behavior. Praeger, pp. 57–77, p. 72. See also Dal Seung Yu (2002) The Role of Political Culture in Iranian Political Development. Ashgate Publishing Group.
- 66.
Binder L (1962) Iran: political development in a changing society. Univ of California Press, p. 152.
- 67.
Beeman WO (1986) Language, status, and power in Iran. Indiana University Press, p. 1.
- 68.
Kenneth Dyson underlined the concept of nation-state and wrote, “One major product of the late eighteenth-and nineteenth-century concern with the sense of community and solidarity was the conception of the nation-state. This idea was the result of marrying a new culture concept of the nation to an older legal and political concept of the state: the nation referred to a unity of culture that was based typically on common language and literature and a feeling of loyalty for a common land, the state to a unity of legal and political authority … The modern sense of nation was unleashed by the French Revolution and by the intense awareness that Revolution produced of the need to base the state on a more closely knit sense of community … In France the state was concerned to shape a nation out of an extraordinarily diverse society. Conversely, in Germany and Italy a particularistic, patchwork structure of states appeared to stand in sharp contrast to an emerging consciousness of a share culture based above all on language.” (Dyson K (2010) The state tradition in Western Europe. ECPR Press, pp. 129–130).
- 69.
A distinction is made here between government and state to which the latter conveys no substantial significance in Iran. Without getting involved in more detailed analysis of both notions, it is sufficient to underline their differences by stating the State has four elements like population, territory, government, and sovereignty. Government is rather a narrow concept, as an element of the State. In short, the State is an organic concept in which the government is a part. W. W. Willoughby writes: “By the term ‘Government’ is designated the organization of the State—the machinery through which is its purposes are formulated and executed.” (see Willoughby WW (1896) An Examination of the Nature of the State: A Study in Political Philosophy. Macmillan and Company, p. 8). In this respect, Government is an agent of the State.
- 70.
In respect to linguistic and ethnic diversity, “Iran is ranked sixteenth in the world with 24 % similarity, where Tanzania is ranked first, with 7 % similarity and North and South Korea have 100 % similarity.” While Persian speakers compromised of 60 % of the population in Iran, there are six major ethnic groups within the national boundary of Iran. They are: Turks, Kurds, Lurs, Baluchis, Arabs, and Turkmen. There are also others tribes (sometimes refer to as nomads) in Iran such as Qashqai, Bakhitiari, and Haft Lang. (See Madadi AA (2015) The Relationship between Ethnicity and National Security in Iran. Journal of Political & Social Sciences 2(4):73–81).
- 71.
In fact, Reza Shah undertook a massive social-engineering project to turn Iran into a united Persian state, as he closed down minority schools and printing presses, outlawed traditional ethnic clothing, etc.
- 72.
Simmel G (1964). Conflict: Translated by Kurt H. Wolff. The Web of Group-affiliations. Translated by Reinhard Bendix. Free Press, p. 43–44.
- 73.
Pye LW (1966) Aspects of political development. Little Brown and Co., p. 100.
- 74.
Having said that, one must admit that the absence of collectiveness (togetherness) among Iranians is rather a surprising development given the strength of Islam in the country. As Lucian Pye explained, “The collectivist ideals of the Islamic ‘brotherhood,’ which compel both reformists and orthodox to value a sense of togetherness, produces an inescapable tension for those who would stand out as leaders.” (See Pye LW (1985) Asian Power and Politics. The Cultural Dimensions of Authority. Harvard University Press, pp. 273–274.)
- 75.
One can also find the similar parity in Islam, in which “social hierarchies existed, and disparity of wealth was considerable, but, apart from a limited internal autonomy enjoyed by the whole body of the Prophet’s kin, the ‘Alids’ and ‘Abbasids,’ the Law did not recognize any legal privilege on the part of any individuals or groups; theoretically, all individuals were equal, and between them and the community as a whole the only body to be interposed was that of the family, as a result of which, by a kind of compensation, there was often a strong though unorganized feeling of solidarity between believers (and, where relevant, between members of the same tribe) which the historian Ibn Khaldun was to study under the name of ‘asabiyya.’” (See Cahen C (1970) Economy, society, institutions. In: Holt PM, Lambton AKS, Lewis B (eds) (2000) The Cambridge History of Islam, volume 2B. Cambridge University Press, p. 515. Emphasis added.)
- 76.
Debord G (1983) The society of the spectacle. Black and Red, Detroit, note no. 29.
- 77.
This observation is in direct contrast to today’s populist political views of people like Charles Merriam, Robert Dahl, and Samuel Huntington who perceived power as a universal phenomenon, operating under the same laws from ancient Greece to today’s system of states.
- 78.
This order was so important to Persians that when Alexander conquered Persia, he reassured the Persian that: “if Dara [Darius III] is no more, I am here and Iran will remain the same as it has always been since it beginning.” (Mojtahed-Zadeh P (2007) Boundary Politics and International Boundaries of Iran: A Study of the Origin, Evolution, and Implications of the Boundaries of Modern Iran. Universal-Publishers, p. 15). Emphasis origin.
- 79.
Haas WS (1946) Iran. Columbia University Press, pp. 10–11.
- 80.
This inclination was not particular to Persia as Karl Jasper stated, “In China the small States and cities had achieved sovereign life under the powerless imperial rulers of the Chou dynasty; the political process consisted of the enlargement of small units through the subjection of other small units. In Hellas and the Near East small territorial units even, to some extent, those subjected by Persia enjoyed an independent existence.” (See Jaspers K (1965) The origin and goal of history. Yale University Press, p. 4.)
- 81.
However, gradually Islam, as a political phenomenon, was associated with the sultans and local rulers, some of whom in time became partners of the British and Dutch in a system of indirect rule. With remarkable ease, such rulers sought out their assigned niches in the hierarchies of Europe’s aristocratic rankings. As individuals, the sultans, nizams, and princes took on a form of upper class Westernization which suggested that they, but not their subjects people, were “modernists,” fitting comfortably into Europe’s class-ridden society.
- 82.
Mortimer E (1982) Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam. Random House, p. 37.
- 83.
Pye LW (1985) Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimension of Authority. Harvard University Press, p. 273. Emphasis origin.
- 84.
Keddie NR (2013) Iran: Religion, Politics and Society: Collected Essays. Rutledge, pp. 140–141.
- 85.
According to Encyclopaedia Iranica, “There is no agreement, even today, on the precise criteria to define tribes and distinguish them from other groups. The effort to find a definition began long ago. One of the first thinkers to discuss the social characteristics of bedouin was the historian Ebn Ḵaldūn (732/1332-808/1406). In his analysis, they are ‘people who make their living by rearing animals … and are obliged to move and roam in search of pastures … and water.’ The cement which holds such people together in a tribe is the ʿaṣabīya (communal pride) which springs from shared ancestry (elteḥām) and affinity (ṣela-ye raḥem) and finds expression in confederacy (walāʾ) or alliance (ḥelf). Consequently these peoples, unlike sedentary peoples, attach more importance to descent than to domicile.” (See http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/asayer-tribes. Also see Tapper R (1991) The tribes in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Iran. In: Avery P, Hambly G, Melville C (eds.) The Cambridge History of Iran Vol. 7. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). Nevertheless, it has been suggested that one-sixth to one-fourth of the Iranian population in 1950 were members of tribes. (See Murray J (1950) Iran today. An economic and descriptive survey. Teheran, 57-60, p. 29.)
- 86.
Arasteh AR (1964) Man and society in Iran. Brill Archive, p. 12.
- 87.
Ibid., p. 13.
- 88.
Jamalzadeh MA 1333 (1954) Sar va Tahe yek Karbas.
- 89.
Haas WS (1946) Iran. Columbia University Press, p. 55.
- 90.
Cottam RW (1979) Nationalism in Iran. University of Pittsburgh Press, p. 53.
- 91.
Issawi C (ed) (1971) The Economic History on Iran 1800–1914. University of Chicago Press, p. 4.
- 92.
Schacht J (2000) Law and Justice. In: Holt PM, Lambton AKS, Lewis B (eds) (2000) The Cambridge History of Islam, volume 2B. Cambridge University Press, p. 555.
- 93.
According to Schacht, “The qadi was not any more the legal secretary of the governor [like the Umayyads’ era]; he was normally appointed by the caliph, and until relieved of his office, he must apply nothing but the sacred law, without interference from the government. But theoretically independent though they were, the qadis had to rely on the political authorities for the execution of their judgments, and being bound by the formal rules of the Islamic law of evidence, their inability to deal with criminal cases became apparent. (Under the Umayyads, they or the governors themselves had exercised whatever criminal justice came within their competence.) Therefore the administration of the greater part of criminal justice was taken over by the police, and it remained outside the sphere of practical application of Islamic law.”(Schacht J (2000) Law and Justice. In: Holt PM, Lambton AKS, Lewis B (eds) (2000) The Cambridge History of Islam, volume 2B. Cambridge University Press, p 556). In term of “the adoption of the Sasanian ‘investigation of complaints’ by Islamic law” see Ibid., p. 558.
- 94.
See Schacht J (2000) Law and Justice. In: Holt PM, Lambton AKS, Lewis B (eds) (2000) The Cambridge History of Islam, volume 2B. Cambridge University Press, p. 558.
- 95.
Others provided a different perspective. For instance, Homa Katouzian suggests that Muluk Al Tawaif could be described as, “any multiethnic or multi-national state or empire, although the decentralized character of the Arscid state may have something to do with it.” (Katouzian H (2006) State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajar and the Emergence of the Pahlavis. I. B. Tauris, p. 16).
- 96.
Siddiqi AH (1942) Caliphate and kingship in mediaeval Persia. Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, p. 30. Siddiqi elaborated on this point and stated, when Yaqub was asked by Muhammad b. Tahir [a messenger of the Abbasid Caliphate] for a deed of investiture from the Caliph at the time of his conquest of Khurasan, Yaqub drew his sword under his prayer mat and told the messenger that was his deed and authority. (Ibid., p. 32).
- 97.
For instance, see Wasserstein D (1985) The Rise and Fall of the Party Kings. Princeton.
- 98.
Schacht J (2008) Law and Justice. In: Holt PM, Lambton AKS, Lewis B (eds) The Cambridge History of Islam, volume 2B. Digital Edition. Cambridge University Press, p. 558.
- 99.
Lambton AKS (1954) Islamic Society in Persia: An Inaugural Lecture delivered on 9 March 1954. University of London, London, p. 6.
- 100.
Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar, the founder of Qajar dynasty, followed this recipe down to its smallest details. As an eldest son of the Qajar chieftain, Muhammad Husain Khan, Agha Muhammad came under protection of the Lur chieftain, Karim Khan Zand, founder of Zand dynasty who married Agha Muhammad’s aunt. As rumors of Lur chief death spread, Agha Muhammad fled to his tribal grounds, where he assembled an army of his kinsmen. He killed his own half-brother and then went on to take control of the vicinity provinces and soon ascended the throne.
- 101.
Ferrier RW (1996) A Journey to Persia: Jean Chardin’s portrait of a Seventeenth-Century Empire. I. B. Tauris, p. 113.
- 102.
See Marlow L (2009) Surveying Recent Literature on the Arabic and Persian Mirrors for Princes Genre. History Compass 7(2):523–538. An ample example of such literature is the eleventh century Qabus Nama (Qabus’s treatise) of Kai Ka’us Ibn Iskandar, who was a prince of the Ziyarid dynasty in the South Caspian provinces. In the preface, the author has begun with a fatherly advice with these words: “...Be quick of understanding therefore, my son to appreciate the value of your birth and not to disgrace it...Know then that this world is ploughland; as you sow, be it good or ill, you reap … Now in this present world virtuous men are imbued with the spirit lions, whereas wicked men have the spirit of dogs, for while the dog consumes his prey where he sizes it the lion takes it elsewhere. Your hunting-ground is this fleeting world and your quarry is knowledge and virtuous conduct. Carry through your pursuit to the end here, so that when the time comes for enjoyment in the Everlasting Abode it may be with the greatest degree of pleasure.” (See Arasteh AR (1964) Man and society in Iran. Brill Archive, p. 17.)
- 103.
Mazarei A 1348 (1969) Economic and Social History of Iran and Iranian: From beginning to Safavi. Dehkhoda Publisher, p. 289.
- 104.
Nader Shah is a controversial figure in contemporary Iranian history. It has been suggested that he was a mere bandit who took control of the country. Nevertheless, as observed, “The mere fact that the dynasty he founded and the country managed to survive into the twentieth century free of official colonial status say something of his ability.” (See Ghani C (2000) Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah; From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Rule. I. B. Tauris, p. 2.)
- 105.
Potts DT (2014) Nomadism in Iran: From Antiquity to the Modern Era. Oxford University Press, p. 256. Also see Hanway J (1753) An historical account of the British trade over the Caspian Sea: With a journal of travels from London through Russia into Persia; and back again through Russia, Germany, and Holland. To which are added, The revolutions of Persia during the present century, with the particular history of the great usurper Nadir Kouli. London. Another example is Karim Khan Zand, of Zand Dynasty, “who was able to weld together an army from the different Iranian pastoral tribes of the Zagros.” See http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/zand-dynasty.
- 106.
Adamiyat F 1351(1970) Andish-ye taraqqi va hokumat-e qanun: Asar’i Sepahsala (The Politics of Reform in Iran 1858–1880). Karazme publication, p. 13. Translation by the author.
- 107.
Hobsbawm E, Ranger T (Eds) (2012) The invention of tradition. Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–14.
- 108.
Ben-Amos D, Weissberg L (Eds) (1999) Cultural memory and the construction of identity. Wayne State University Press, p. 9. It should also be noted that when Fredrick II ascended to the throne of Brandenburg-Prussia in 1740, he immediately announced that every subject might now “seek his salvation after own fashion,” lifted all censorship of newspapers in Berlin, and recalled Christian Wolf from exile. (See Jones D (2015) Censorship: A world encyclopedia. Routledge, p. 1084.)
- 109.
In this study, I am mainly pointing to autobiography (zendeginameh in Farsi), rather than other types of ethnography writings like travel accounts (safarnameh), chronicles (vaqayehnameh), or written documents based on scholarly trends such as Abu Reihan Biruni’s studies of India and Iran, which is dated back to the eleventh century. For an excellent and informative study of ethnography writings in Iran and self-knowledge aspect of such writings, see Fazel N (2006) Politics of Culture in Iran: Anthropology, politics and society in the twentieth century. Routledge.
- 110.
Fazel N (2006) Politics of Culture in Iran: Anthropology, politics and society in the twentieth century. Routledge, p. 116.
- 111.
Tocqueville AD (1990) Democracy în America: vol. 2. Vintage Books, p. 67. Prior to that, Tocqueville explained, “The principle of self-interest rightly understood produces no great acts of self-sacrifice, but it suggests daily small acts of self-denial. By itself it cannot suffice to make a man virtuous; but it disciplines a number of persons in habits of regularity, temperance, moderation, foresight, self-command; and if it does not lead men straight to virtue by the will, it gradually draws them in that direction by their habits. If the principle of interest rightly understood were to sway the whole moral world, extraordinary virtues would doubtless be more rare; but I think that gross depravity would then also be less common. The principle of interest rightly understood perhaps prevents men from rising far above the level of mankind, but a great number of other men, who were falling far below it, are caught and restrained by it. Observe some few individuals, they are lowered by it; survey mankind, they are raised.” The page that contained both passages is accessible at: http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/ch2_08.htm.
- 112.
My position is that the term Oriental is pseudo-concept that was popularized by European discourse (e.g., traveler accounts) about “the East” especially those concerned with such sweeping concepts as “oriental despotism,” and hence did not respond to a desire to understand East. They were mainly concerned with European issues and debates, i.e., the monarchy of France under Louis XIV. Nevertheless, I am also convinced that a sheer belief that these impulses were formed for purpose within a purely European domestic context does not necessarily discredit various explanations and analyses as long as they convey issues that are compatible to those in the East. In fact, by assessing, for instance the way travel accounts, helped transform the concept from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, of which I argue that oriental despotism is rather a compelling tool for interpreting information gathered about the orient, one which served a common intellectual purpose, despite important differences of opinion in Europe, about the nature of royal power and the way in which it had transformed into a decadent order in the East.
- 113.
Grosrichard A (1998) The Sultan’s court: European fantasies of the east. Verso, p. 3.
- 114.
For French perceptions of the Ottoman Empire as the realm of Oriental despotism and for the use of this image in French Politics of the Period, see Kaiser T (2006) The Evil Empire? The Debate on Turkish Despotism in Eighteenth-Century French Political Culture, in Early Modern Europe: Issues and Interpretations. In: J. B. Collins and K. L. Taylor (eds). Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford. Moreover, Jansenism was a Catholic theological movement, founded by Dutch theologian Cornelius Jansen. It primarily prevailed in France and emphasized on original sin, human depravity, the necessity of divine grace, and predestination.
- 115.
de Secondat C, baron de Montesquieu (2011) The Spirit of the Laws. (trans: Nugent T). Cosimo Classics, pp. 66, 70.
- 116.
Royle N (2003) The Uncanny. Manchester University Press, p. 41.
- 117.
de Secondat C baron de Montesquieu (2011) The Spirit of the Laws. (Trans: Thomas Nugent). Cosimo Classics, pp. 30–35. See also http://www.constitution.org/cm/sol_03.htm.
- 118.
According to Encyclopaedia Iranica, a class of Iranian nobility called Azad, which rooted back to the “Aryan conquerors, who adapted the term to distinguish themselves from the indigenous population. The Fourfold division of the nobility is attested in inscriptions from the Sasanian period, which show that in Sasanian times the āzāds constituted the fourth and last rank of nobles. They were preceded by the šahryārs (Mid. Pers. šhrdʾr, Parth. hštrdr) ‘kings’ or ‘dynasts,’ the wispuhrs (BRBYTA[n]) ‘princes of the royal blood, members of the great families,’ and the wuzurgs (LBA[n], RBA[n], Mid. Pers. plur. obl. also wclkʾn) ‘grandees’ (qq. v).” (See http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/azad-older-azat).
- 119.
For instance, by the eighteenth century, the new position of prime minister in England began to assume greater power while the monarchy represented by the most influential European aristocrat, Queen Victoria, sank into a largely ceremonial role. (Chilcoat L, Acciano R (2005) Western Europe. Lonely Planet, p. 132).
- 120.
For instance, the Great Council of Venice, a political organ of the Republic of Venice between 1172 and 1797, was anything, but a primitive institution composed of the prince on the one side and the people on the other. Its members “were each of them the assembly of a privileged class, an assembly in which every member of that class had a right to a place, an assembly which might be called popular as far as the privileged class was concerned though rigidity oligarchic as regarded the excluded classes … The nobility which thus formed at Venice is very model of a civic nobility, a nobility which is also an aristocracy.” (See The Britannica E (1890) A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and Miscellaneous Literature Vol. 17. R. S. Peale & Company, p. 528.)
- 121.
Mackinnon J (1902) The growth and decline of the French monarchy. Longmans, Green, and Company. New York and Bombay, p. 705.
- 122.
Janowski M (2001) Polish Liberal Thought. Central European University Press, p. 3.
- 123.
Schroeder PW (1996) The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848. Oxford University Press, p. 84; Ludwikowski RR (1997) Constitution-Making in the Region of Former Soviet Dominance. Duke University Press, p. 34; Sanford G (2002) Democratic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics Since 1989. Palgrave, p. 11.
- 124.
Gella A (1998) Development of Class Structure in Eastern Europe: Poland and Her Southern Neighbors. SUNY Press, p. 13.
- 125.
de Secondat C baron de Montesquieu (2011) The Spirit of the Laws. (Trans: Thomas Nugent). Cosimo Classics, pp. 125–226. The quotation can also be access at: http://www.constitution.org/cm/sol_08.htm.
- 126.
de Secondat C, baron de Montesquieu, Kahn A (2008) Persian letters. (trans: Mauldon M). Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 238. The similar quote appears in Ferrier RW (1996) A journey to Persia: Jean Chardin’s portrait of a seventeenth-century empire. New Age International, p. 70.
- 127.
Rubiés JP (2005) Oriental despotism and European Orientalism: Botero to Montesquieu. Journal of Early Modern History: Contacts, Comparisons. Contrasts 9(1-2), p. 109.
- 128.
Ram H (2006) The Imperial Sublime: A Russian Poetics of Empire. University of Wisconsin Press, p. 103.
- 129.
Mackinnon J (1902) The Growth and Decline of the French Monarchy. Longman, Green & Company, p. 711.
- 130.
Another example that outlined the difference between these two of system has been noted by X. DE Planhol: “The system of state ownership [in oriental system] was accompanied by the organization of the land into iqta’ [a practice of tax farming], concessions granted to soldier-officials in return for military service. The peculiarity of the iqta’ is that the grant is practically detached from the land, which owes no duty in service or labour, but merely a fixed payment determined by the central authority. Thus the possessor has no real interest in the improvement of the working of the soil; the Oriental system of lordship displays hardly any of those personal bonds which constitute the better feature of the Western feudal system, the lord’s interest in his vassal, and use of him as a worker and not simply as a payer of taxes. On the other hand, the system of inheritance does not recognize primogeniture, another guarantee against state absolutism.” (See de Planhol X (2000) The Geographical Setting [of Islamic Society and Civilization]. In: Holt PM, Lambton AKS, Lewis B (eds) (2000) The Cambridge History of Islam, volume 2B. Cambridge University Press, p. 460).
- 131.
Grosrichard A (1998) The Sultan’s court: European fantasies of the east. Verso, p. 76.
- 132.
Ferrier RW (1996) A journey to Persia: Jean Chardin’s portrait of a seventeenth-century empire. New Age International, p. 113.
- 133.
Lewis B (2001) The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Oxford University Press, p. 41.
- 134.
Montesquieu reiterating Jean Chardin’s comment. (See de Secondat C, baron de Montesquieu, Kahn A (2008) Persian letters. (trans: Mauldon M). Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 238.)
- 135.
Grosrichard A (1998) The Sultan’s court: European fantasies of the east. Verso, p. 68.
- 136.
Ibid.
- 137.
See Rubiés JP (2005) Oriental despotism and European Orientalism: Botero to Montesquieu. Journal of Early Modern History: Contacts, Comparisons. Contrasts 9(1-2), p. 113.
- 138.
Haas WS (1946) Iran. Columbia University Press, p. 1.
- 139.
De Groot J (2000) Religion, culture and politics in Iran: From the Qajars to Khomeini. IB Tauris, p. 141.
- 140.
Perhaps this may provide a reason that some of us deal with our past history through what Svetlana Boym calls restorative nostalgia, in which “stresses nostos (home) and attempts a transhistorical reconstruction of the lost home … [It] does not think of itself as nostalgia, but rather as truth and tradition.” (Boym S (2001) The future of nostalgia Basic Books. New York, p. xviii).
- 141.
It should be noted that a lack of resistance against occupation also prevails in other countries. For instance, “In highly nationalistic France, resistance to the German occupation [during the WWII] developed late, grew slowly, and was never a threat to German aims. French patriots voluntarily led Vichy France into collaboration with Germany … Collaboration with Germany was widely supported by French elites and passively accommodated by the mass of nationalistic Frenchmen.” (Kocher MA, Lawrence A, Monteiro NP (2013). The Rabbit in the Hat: Nationalism and Resistance to Foreign Occupation. APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper). The difference between us and majority of others, however, appears when one intends to open the discussion of the topic!
- 142.
Another example of a nationwide lack of response was during the last year of occupation of the country by the Soviet Union and Britain, in which the Soviet provided support to the autonomists Democratic Party of Azerbaijan and helped to create the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan in 1945. However, the episode ended as the Soviet conceded the United Nations Security Council demand, and pulled its troops out on May 6, 1946. On the similar note, Shahrokh Meskoob claimed that “after the World War II ended, even before the allies armies exited Iran, several provinces and eras declared their independence. Khuzestan, Kurdistan, Luristan, Azerbaijan, Khorasan and Baluchistan declared their independence. At every opportunity, Bakhtiaris and Qashqais moved toward Isfahan and Shiraz and Nuyib Hussian in Kashan begun looting and slaughter. Near Tehran in Zargandeh and Qholhak the national government had no power, Russian embassy and British Embassy has appointed their own personal in order to take care of daily work and no one have security over his lives or properties.” (See Meskoob S 1386 (2007) Tales of Literature and Destiny of Culture. Farzon Publisher, p. 7. Translated by the author.)
- 143.
I borrowed the phrase from Louis Francis Salzman. (See Salzman LF (1901) The History of the Parish of Hailsham: The Abbey of Otham and the Priory of Michlham. Farncombe, p. 9.)
- 144.
Browne EG (1910) The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. xx.
- 145.
Thompson EF (2013) Justice Interrupted. Harvard University Press, p. 79.
- 146.
According to Reza Arasteh, the members of Majlis in 1906–1907 comprised merchant guild, aristocrats, landlords, and clerics. It is noteworthy that many in the first Majlis affixed titles like Haji or Sayyad to their name, which indicated their religiosity and social distinction. In direct contrast, many delegates of the national assembly in 1947–1948 were designated the title Doctor, which illustrates they were most likely the product of Western higher education. (See Arasteh AR (1962) Education and Social Awakening in Iran: 1850–1960. E. J. Brill, p. 32.)
- 147.
For an informative and a critical review of the 1907 Constitution, see Baktiari B (1996) Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran: The Institutionalization of Factional Politics. University Press of Florida, Chapter one. For an excellent comparative discussion of the 1907 Constitution, see Afary J (2013) The place of Shi’i clerics in the first Iranian Constitution. Critical Research on Religion 1(3):327–346, December 2013.
- 148.
Of course this contradiction was not hidden from those who campaigned for secular reforms. The paper Sur-i Israfil instigated a major scandal by suggesting that the “ulama” should keep their hands out of politics and by satirizing the mullas as “money grabers” who concealed their slimy interests with sublime sermons. “This was the first anticlerical article to be published in Iran, but it was not to be the last. Habl alMalin [newspaper published in Calcutta, Tehran and Rast] ridiculed the authors of the constitution for having instituted a supreme committee to judge the religious legitimacy of all bills introduced into the National Assembly: “This makes as little sense as having a supreme committee of five merchants to scrutinize the commercial validity of all laws deliberated by the people’s representatives.” The same paper started uproar when it placed the whole blame for the decline of the Middle East on clerical ignorance, superstitions, petty-mindedness, obscurantism, dogmatism, and insistent meddling in politics.” (See Abrahamian E (1982) Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton University Press, p. 92.)
- 149.
Browne EG (1910) The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. Cambridge University Press, p. 372.
- 150.
Here is the entire Article 2, “At no time must any legal enactment of the Sacred National Consultative Assembly, established by the favour and assistance of His Holiness the Imam of the Age [the Messiah] (may God hasten his glad Advent!), the favour of His Majesty the Shahinshah of Islam (may God immortalize his reign!), the care of the Proofs of Islam (may God multiply the like of them!), and the whole people of the Persian nation, be at variance with the sacred principles of Islam or the laws established by His Holiness the Best of Mankind (on whom and on whose household be the Blessing of God and His Peace!) It is hereby declared that it is for the learned doctors of theology (the ‘ulama’)—may God prolong the blessing of their existence!—to determine whether such laws as may be proposed are or are not conformable to the principles of Islam; and it is therefore officially enacted that there shall at all times exist a Committee composed of not less than five mujtahids or other devout theologians, cognizant also of the requirements of the age, [which committee shall be elected] in this manner. The ulama and Proofs of Islam shall present to the National Consultative Assembly the names of twenty of the ‘ulama’ possessing the attributes mentioned above; and the Members of the National Consultative Assembly shall, either by unanimous acclamation, or by vote, designate five or more of these, according to the exigencies of the time, and recognize these as Members, so that they may carefully discuss and consider all matters proposed in the Assembly, and reject and repudiate, wholly or in part, any such proposal which is at variance with the Sacred Laws of Islam, so that it shall not obtain the title of legality. In such matters the decision of this Ecclesiastical Committee shall be followed and obeyed, and this article shall continue unchanged until the appearance of His Holiness the Proof of the Age (may God hasten his glad Advent!).” Ibid., pp. 372-373.
- 151.
For instance, the article 46 of supplementary laws stated, “The appointment and dismissal of Minister is effected by virtue of the Royal Decree of the King,” and subsequent articles granted the king the right to grant “military rank, decoration and other honorary distinction” (Art. 47), “the choice of officials as heads of various government department, whether internal or foreign” (Art. 48), “The supreme command of all the forces” (Art. 50).
- 152.
Bayat M (1991) Iran’s first revolution: Shi’ism and the constitutional revolution of 1905–1909. Oxford University Press, p. 5.
- 153.
A system of alliances is a term proposed by Gramsci for a coalition with an aim to mobilize masses against the ruling state (capitalism and the bourgeois state). In Gramsci, thoughts such a coalition succeeds in gaining consent of the broad masses of who might have been adversaries and have conflicting interests but joined forces to dispose of the despotic establishment.
- 154.
In this study, an ideology is perceived as a doctrine with two dimensions: (a) objectives: how society should be organized and (b) methods: the most appropriate way to obtain such objectives.
- 155.
Domination, in this study, perceived both as a process and an idea—as one of the most intrinsic attributes of human nature, and hence conveys no negative insinuation to it.
- 156.
This, however, should not be viewed as a patronage of the incumbent government in a sense that supports were aimed at Islamization rather than democratization of the Iranian society.
- 157.
Some may dispute such a high approval rate; nevertheless, for those who lived in Iran during that time this rate seems still low!
- 158.
By “tribal pledges”, I mean to imply, for instance, that Safavi Dynasty kept the country intact not as a result of their Iranianness attributes but rather as an imperative to retain its power over the territory.
- 159.
It is extremely important to note that the adherent of Islam, among Arabs, is usually designated by the corresponding adjective Muslim (of which Moslem is a Western adaptation). The Iranians adopted a different adjective Musalman, which is derived from the Anglo-Indian Mussulman and French Musulman. (See Gibb HAR (1970) Mohammedanism. Oxford University Press).
- 160.
Holliday SJ (2013) Defining Iran: politics of resistance. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., p. 54 and 79. Relevant to the issue of identity, Holliday points to the prevailing confusion among contemporary Iranian intellectuals like Al-e Ahmad in which he, on the one hand, described Alexander as the Great, who represents the manifestation of occidentosis that razed Persepolis and on the other hand accused Muhammad Reza Shah, who often perceived as modern patron of Iranian historically identity of the similar misdeed (Ibid., p. 57). Of course, bewildering of contemporary Iranian intellectuals does not end here, which I will come back to when it is required throughout this book.
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Pirzadeh, A. (2016). Rethinking Iranian National Character. In: Iran Revisited. Arts, Research, Innovation and Society. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30485-4_2
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