Abstract
The chapter synthesizes the growing literature on macroprudential policy in particular countries with a dual banking system. In a dual banking system, both conventional and Islamic financial institutions operate side by side, but specific laws and regulations have been introduced for the Islamic financial institutions. Based on the analysis there is no “one size fits all”; different models might be effective depending on the country specifics. The choice among the different macroprudential models is mostly influenced by traditions, current institutional frameworks for other policies and political economy considerations. Furthermore, there is no differentiation of macroprudential policy framework between conventional and Islamic financial institutions that has been practiced by the authorities with dual banking system. The reason is to avoid regulatory arbitrage between these two financial institutions and the fact that Islamic financial institution is still largely based on mark-up or profit margin techniques in its operation.
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Yunus, N. S. M. (2012). Country experience with the use of macroprudential policies—Malaysia.
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Warjiyo, P. (2013). Indonesia’s Monetary Policy: Coping with Volatile Commodity Prices and Capital Flows. BIS Papers No.70.
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See Appendix 1 for details.
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Appendix 1
Appendix 1
Macroprudential Instruments in the GCC Countries
BAHRAIN | KUWAIT | OMAN | QATAR | SAUDI ARABIA | UAE | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Countercyclical capital requirements | No | No | No | No | SAMA has encouraged Saudi banks to increase their capital on a countercyclical basis. During the period 2003–2007, capital of the banking system increased 2.5 times; between 1992 and 1997, the capital of banks rose by 100 % | No |
General provisions | Discretionary provision requirement | Fixed level: 1 % of cash items & 0.5 % of non-cash items | Fixed level: 2 % of the outstanding performing “personal loans” and 1 % of outstanding performing “other loans” | Yes. 1.5 % | Fixed level: 1 % Banks have been directed to maintain NPL ratio of over 100 % during upcycle | Gradually being raised to 1.5 % of credit risk weighted assets that do not have a specific provision against them |
Dynamic provisioning | No | No | No | No | No | No |
Leverage ratios (capital to assets) | Yes. 5 % for retail banks and 10 % for wholesale banks | No | No | No | Yes [Deposit/(Capital + Reserve)] Not to exceed 15 times. In addition SAMA has introduced Basel leverage ratio since 2011 | No |
Reserve requirements on bank deposits | Yes. 5 % of total deposits | No | Yes. 5 % | Yes. 4.75 % | Yes. 7 % on demand deposits. 4 % on time and saving deposits | Yes. 14 % for demand deposits; 1 % for time deposits |
Limits on real estate exposure | Yes. 30 % cap on real estate lending of banks as share of total bank lending | No | Yes. 60 % of the bank net worth or 60 % of all time and savings deposits other than government and inter-bank deposits, whichever is higher | Yes. For conventional banks, real estate lending not to exceed 150 % of bank’s capital and reserves (Tier 1). For Islamic banks, investment in real estates should not exceed 25 % of the bank’s capital and reserves | No | Yes. 20 % of deposits. Current definition of real estate exposure: loans for the construction of commercial and residential buildings |
Limits on other sectoral exposure | No | Lending to shares should not exceed 10 % of total lending | Yes. Limits on personal loans: 40 % of total credit. Housing loans: 10 % of total credit. Non-residents: 5 % of Net worth. Aggregate non-resident exposure: 30 % of Net worth | Banks may not provide customers with any finance for the purposes of trading in securities | No | Regulation pending on large exposure limits for aggregate exposure to local governments and government-related entities |
Loan-to-value (LTVs) ratios | No limit (business practice is around 80 %) | For residential loans for vacant plots, 50 % of the cost of the property; the percentage would go up to 60 % if the property is an existing home, or 70 % if it is a new building to be constructed | No limit (business practice is around 80 %) | 70 % for individuals, 60 % for commercial companies | Yes. For real estate finance companies the regulations impose an LTV of 70 % | Regulation on differentiated LTVs for nationals and expatriates, as well as for first and second properties is pending |
Debt/Loan-to-income (DTI/LTIs) ratios | Yes. Maximum debt service ratio of 50 % of monthly salary | No | Yes. Credit to individuals capped at 50 % of monthly salary and allowances, not to exceed QR 2.5 million per person | Yes. Total monthly repayments (for both personal loans and credit cards) should not exceed 33 % of a borrower’s salary | Yes. Borrowing limits for personal loans: (1) 20 times of salary or monthly income; (2) loan tenor of 48 months (3) debt-service ratio of 50 % of the borrower’s monthly salary | |
Limits on loan-to-deposit ratios | Yes. A voluntary 60–65 % for most banks and 70–75 % for those without large investments outside loans | LTD ratio replaced by a maximum available funding, with the following limits: (1) Remaining maturity up to 3 months: 75 %; (2) remaining maturity from 3 months until 1 year: 90 %; and (3) remaining maturity more than 1 year: 100 % | Yes. 87.5 % | Yes. 90 % for credit ratio (loan-to-deposit ratio) | Yes. 85 % | Yes. Max 100 % for the advances to stable resources ratio |
Ceiling on credit or credit growth | No | No | No | No | No, but credit growth is an important indicator followed by SAMA on a monthly basis; especially credit to the private sector | No |
Liquidity requirements | Yes. 25 %, Liquid assets/total assets | Yes. 18 %, Liquid assets /domestic currency customer deposits | Yes | Yes. 100 %, Current assets / liabilities weighted by liquidity characteristics | Yes. 20 %, Liquid assets/deposits. In addition, SAMA has introduced Basel LCR and NSFR since January 2012 | Basel III-type regulation is pending |
Caps on foreign currency lending | No | FX loans can only be extended to borrowers with FX cash flows | Yes. Lending to non-residents in foreign currency abroad is limited to 5 % of net worth | FX loans can only be extended to borrowers with foreign currency cash flows | No | No |
Limits on foreign exchange positions | No | No | Yes | Foreign currency liabilities cannot exceed foreign currency assets | No | Up to banks’ internal risk management systems |
Limits on exposure concentration (individual large exposure, % of total capital) | Yes. 15 % of regulatory capital | Yes. 15 %, with aggregate large exposures limited to no more than 400 % | Yes 15 % | Yes. Max limit of credit facilities to a single borrowing group is 20 % of bank capital and reserves. Total credit facilities granted to all customers and their borrower groups, at 10 % or more of bank’s capital and reserves, must not exceed 600 % of bank’s capital and reserves Total credit facilities granted to related parties must not exceed 100 % of bank’s capital and reserves | Yes, the legal limit is 25 %. In practice, the limit is 15 % | Yes. 25 % for commercial public sector entities, 7 % for private sector and individuals |
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Zulkhibri, M., Naiya, I. (2016). Macroprudential Policy and Regulation in a Dual Banking System: An Exploratory Perspective. In: Zulkhibri, M., Ismail, A., Hidayat, S. (eds) Macroprudential Regulation and Policy for the Islamic Financial Industry. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30445-8_1
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