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Macroprudential Policy and Regulation in a Dual Banking System: An Exploratory Perspective

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Abstract

The chapter synthesizes the growing literature on macroprudential policy in particular countries with a dual banking system. In a dual banking system, both conventional and Islamic financial institutions operate side by side, but specific laws and regulations have been introduced for the Islamic financial institutions. Based on the analysis there is no “one size fits all”; different models might be effective depending on the country specifics. The choice among the different macroprudential models is mostly influenced by traditions, current institutional frameworks for other policies and political economy considerations. Furthermore, there is no differentiation of macroprudential policy framework between conventional and Islamic financial institutions that has been practiced by the authorities with dual banking system. The reason is to avoid regulatory arbitrage between these two financial institutions and the fact that Islamic financial institution is still largely based on mark-up or profit margin techniques in its operation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Yunus, N. S. M. (2012). Country experience with the use of macroprudential policies—Malaysia.

  2. 2.

    Warjiyo, P. (2013). Indonesia’s Monetary Policy: Coping with Volatile Commodity Prices and Capital Flows. BIS Papers No.70.

  3. 3.

    See Appendix 1 for details.

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Correspondence to Muhamed Zulkhibri .

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Appendix 1

Appendix 1

Macroprudential Instruments in the GCC Countries

 

BAHRAIN

KUWAIT

OMAN

QATAR

SAUDI ARABIA

UAE

Countercyclical capital requirements

No

No

No

No

SAMA has encouraged Saudi banks to increase their capital on a countercyclical basis. During the period 2003–2007, capital of the banking system increased 2.5 times; between 1992 and 1997, the capital of banks rose by 100 %

No

General provisions

Discretionary provision requirement

Fixed level: 1 % of cash items & 0.5 % of non-cash items

Fixed level: 2 % of the outstanding performing “personal loans” and 1 % of outstanding performing “other loans”

Yes. 1.5 %

Fixed level: 1 %

Banks have been directed to maintain NPL ratio of over 100 % during upcycle

Gradually being raised to 1.5 % of credit risk weighted assets that do not have a specific provision against them

Dynamic provisioning

No

No

No

No

No

No

Leverage ratios (capital to assets)

Yes. 5 % for retail banks and 10 % for wholesale banks

No

No

No

Yes [Deposit/(Capital + Reserve)]

Not to exceed 15 times. In addition SAMA has introduced Basel leverage ratio since 2011

No

Reserve requirements on bank deposits

Yes. 5 % of total deposits

No

Yes. 5 %

Yes. 4.75 %

Yes. 7 % on demand deposits. 4 % on time and saving deposits

Yes. 14 % for demand deposits; 1 % for time deposits

Limits on real estate exposure

Yes. 30 % cap on real estate lending of banks as share of total bank lending

No

Yes. 60 % of the bank net worth or 60 % of all time and savings deposits other than government and inter-bank deposits, whichever is higher

Yes. For conventional banks, real estate lending not to exceed 150 % of bank’s capital and reserves (Tier 1). For Islamic banks, investment in real estates should not exceed 25 % of the bank’s capital and reserves

No

Yes. 20 % of deposits. Current definition of real estate exposure: loans for the construction of commercial and residential buildings

Limits on other sectoral exposure

No

Lending to shares should not exceed 10 % of total lending

Yes. Limits on personal loans: 40 % of total credit. Housing loans: 10 % of total credit. Non-residents: 5 % of Net worth. Aggregate non-resident exposure: 30 % of Net worth

Banks may not provide customers with any finance for the purposes of trading in securities

No

Regulation pending on large exposure limits for aggregate exposure to local governments and government-related entities

Loan-to-value (LTVs) ratios

No limit (business practice is around 80 %)

For residential loans for vacant plots, 50 % of the cost of the property; the percentage would go up to 60 % if the property is an existing home, or 70 % if it is a new building to be constructed

No limit (business practice is around 80 %)

70 % for individuals, 60 % for commercial companies

Yes. For real estate finance companies the regulations impose an LTV of 70 %

Regulation on differentiated LTVs for nationals and expatriates, as well as for first and second properties is pending

Debt/Loan-to-income (DTI/LTIs) ratios

Yes. Maximum debt service ratio of 50 % of monthly salary

 

No

Yes. Credit to individuals capped at 50 % of monthly salary and allowances, not to exceed QR 2.5 million per person

Yes. Total monthly repayments (for both personal loans and credit cards) should not exceed 33 % of a borrower’s salary

Yes. Borrowing limits for personal loans: (1) 20 times of salary or monthly income; (2) loan tenor of 48 months (3) debt-service ratio of 50 % of the borrower’s monthly salary

Limits on loan-to-deposit ratios

Yes. A voluntary 60–65 % for most banks and 70–75 % for those without large investments outside loans

LTD ratio replaced by a maximum available funding, with the following limits: (1) Remaining maturity up to 3 months: 75 %; (2) remaining maturity from 3 months until 1 year: 90 %; and (3) remaining maturity more than 1 year: 100 %

Yes. 87.5 %

Yes. 90 % for credit ratio (loan-to-deposit ratio)

Yes. 85 %

Yes. Max 100 % for the advances to stable resources ratio

Ceiling on credit or credit growth

No

No

No

No

No, but credit growth is an important indicator followed by SAMA on a monthly basis; especially credit to the private sector

No

Liquidity requirements

Yes. 25 %, Liquid assets/total assets

Yes. 18 %, Liquid assets /domestic currency customer deposits

Yes

Yes. 100 %, Current assets / liabilities weighted by liquidity characteristics

Yes. 20 %, Liquid assets/deposits. In addition, SAMA has introduced Basel LCR and NSFR since January 2012

Basel III-type regulation is pending

Caps on foreign currency lending

No

FX loans can only be extended to borrowers with FX cash flows

Yes. Lending to non-residents in foreign currency abroad is limited to 5 % of net worth

FX loans can only be extended to borrowers with foreign currency cash flows

No

No

Limits on foreign exchange positions

No

No

Yes

Foreign currency liabilities cannot exceed foreign currency assets

No

Up to banks’ internal risk management systems

Limits on exposure concentration (individual large exposure, % of total capital)

Yes. 15 % of regulatory capital

Yes. 15 %, with aggregate large exposures limited to no more than 400 %

Yes 15 %

Yes. Max limit of credit facilities to a single borrowing group is 20 % of bank capital and reserves. Total credit facilities granted to all customers and their borrower groups, at 10 % or more of bank’s capital and reserves, must not exceed 600 % of bank’s capital and reserves

Total credit facilities granted to related parties must not exceed 100 % of bank’s capital and reserves

Yes, the legal limit is 25 %. In practice, the limit is 15 %

Yes. 25 % for commercial public sector entities, 7 % for private sector and individuals

  1. Source: Macroprudential Policy in the GCC Countries, IMF (2014)

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Zulkhibri, M., Naiya, I. (2016). Macroprudential Policy and Regulation in a Dual Banking System: An Exploratory Perspective. In: Zulkhibri, M., Ismail, A., Hidayat, S. (eds) Macroprudential Regulation and Policy for the Islamic Financial Industry. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30445-8_1

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