Abstract
In this opening chapter, we begin by outlining ways in which philosophers have sought to resolve the “free will problem”. That is to say, how can the apparent existence of individual free will be reconciled with evidence that suggests the universe (or elements within it) are predetermined? A variety of different models are introduced, including Libertarianism (which holds that life is not determined and we do have free will), Hard determinism (in which life is determined and free will is illusory) and Compatibilism (in which room must be made for the cohabitation of the existence of both free will and determinism). In the context of the rest of the book it is hard determinism, and particularly biological determinism, which presents the greatest challenge to the attribution of moral responsibility and legal recompense. If aspects of my genetics or my brain has determined a course of action, and I was not therefore at liberty to do otherwise, can I be held culpable for that behaviour? This is an issue we will unpack in later chapters.
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Notes
- 1.
Experimental philosophy is characterised by conducting fieldwork to endorse philosophical claims, in contrast to more traditional philosophy which is termed “armchair philosophy” by practitioners of the more empirical persuasion.
- 2.
The study is actually much richer and more nuanced than this bold statement implies. Nevertheless, none of their findings contradicts the observation noted here, which is sufficient to support the key point being addressed in this introductory statement.
- 3.
Strictly speaking Chrysippus sought to reconcile a version of ‘agent autonomy’ with a deterministic universe and made no reference to ‘free will’ per se. Nevertheless his reflections are held to be one of the earliest attempts at a ‘compatibilist’ solution to the conundrum.
- 4.
Of course there is a distinct, political, meaning of Libertarianism. The discussion here is limited to the metaphysical use of the term in the context of free will and moral responsibility.
- 5.
Note that these arguments effectively side-step the notion of free will, jumping instead to the connection between determinism and moral responsibility, the latter being the consequence which would have given relevance to free will itself.
- 6.
A criticism made of this model pictures the theoretical scenario in which an agent never faces a genuine SFA in their lives. Does this mean that they are without free will?
- 7.
i.e. the traditional criteria for free will which we have seen already in Sect. 1.1.
- 8.
Though they would more likely have labelled themselves as “necessitarians” than as determinists.
- 9.
In Sect. 3.2, I will however suggest that the very latest discoveries in biological disciplines are actually questioning once again the degree of determinism in human nature. The point in the current chapter is to rehearse the arguments used by hard determinists not, necessarily, to reflect the views of the present author.
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Willmott, C. (2016). Free Will and Determinism. In: Biological Determinism, Free Will and Moral Responsibility. SpringerBriefs in Ethics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30391-8_1
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