Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Role of Pragmatics in (Re)Constructing the Rational Law-Maker

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Pragmatics and Law

Part of the book series: Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology ((PEPRPHPS,volume 7))

Abstract

The recent debate on pragmatics and the law has found ways to circumvent an important distinction, originally drawn by Dascal and Wróblewski (1991), between the historical law-maker, the current law-maker and the ideal/rational law-maker. By insisting on the relationship between the rational law-maker and contextualism and textualism (see Manning 2005, 2006), I want to redress this fault in current discussions. In this paper, I start with general considerations on pragmatics, intentionality in ordinary conversation and intentionality in the context of judiciary proceedings and legal texts. I then move on to considerations on rationality as a prerequisite for understanding the law and on the rational law-maker, an ideal construct proposed by Dascal and Wróblewski (1991). I argue that contextualism (of the moderate kind) is the best way to carry out the program by Dascal and Wróblewski on interpretation and the rational law-maker (also see important considerations by Fish (2005); on contextualism see Dascal and Weizman 1987). I argue that bearing in mind the rational law-maker postulated by Dascal and Wróblewski is a guidance to interpretation of statutes whose texts create interpretative difficulties. I conclude by saying that the considerations on the rational law-maker constitute a compromise between Scalia’s (1997) textualism and contextualism (see Manning 2005, 2006 on the divide between textualism and contextualism).

I would like to give thanks to a number of friends for their feedback: Loise Cummings, Francesca Poggi, Jacob L. Mey, Marcelo Dascal, Istvan Kecskes, Paolo Leonardi, Dorota Zielinska, Yan Huang, Felice Cimatti. Thanks to John Benjamins for allowing me to republish this paper, originally appeared in Pragmatics and Cognition 2013.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For a good review of this debate, see Carston (2013). However, it is amazing that in this review there should be no discussion of the rational law-maker.

  2. 2.

    Another interesting Principle (especially from the point of view of the law) can be found in Capone (2006).

References

  • Allott, N. E. (2013). Relevance theory. In A. Capone, F. Lo Piparo, & M. Carapezza (Eds.), Perspectives on linguistic pragmatics (pp. 57–98). Heidelberg: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Bach, K. (2001). Semantically speaking. In I. Kenesei & R. M. Harnish (Eds.), Perspectives on semantics, pragmatics and discourse. A festschrift for Ferenc Kiefer (pp. 146–170). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bach, K. (2007). Regressions in pragmatics (and semantics). In N. Burton-Roberts (Ed.), Pragmatics (pp. 24–44). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Capone, A. (2001). Modal adverbs and discourse. Pisa: ETS.

    Google Scholar 

  • Capone, A. (2004). ‘I saw you’ (towards a theory of the pragmeme). RASK: International Journal of Language and Communication, 20, 27–44.

    Google Scholar 

  • Capone, A. (2006). On Grice’s circle. Journal of Pragmatics, 38, 645–669.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Capone, A. (2011). The attributive/referential distinction, pragmatics, modularity of mind and modularization. Australian Journal of Linguistics, 31(2), 153–186.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Capone, A. (2013). Consequences of the pragmatics of ‘de se’. In N. Feit & A. Capone (Eds.), Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, epistemology, metaphysics (pp. 235–269). Stanford: CSLI.

    Google Scholar 

  • Capone, A. (2016). What can pragmatics learn from the law? In A. Capone & J. L. Mey (Eds.), Pragmatics, culture and society (pp. 371–394). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carston, R. (2001). Thoughts and utterances. The pragmatics of explicit communication. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carston, R. (2013). Legal texts and canons of construction. A view from current pragmatic theory. In M. Freeman & F. Smith (Eds.), Law and language: Current legal issues (pp. 8–33). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Culpeper, J. (2011). Impoliteness: Using language to cause offence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Dascal, M. (2003). Interpretation and understanding. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Dascal, M., & Weizman, E. (1987). Contextual exploitation of interpretation clues in text understanding: An integrated model. In J. Verschueren & M. Bertuccelli-Papi (Eds.), The pragmatic perspective (pp. 31–46). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Dascal, M., & Wróblewski, J. (1991). The rational law-maker and the pragmatics of legal interpretation. Journal of Pragmatics, 15, 421–444.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Endicott, T. (1994). Putting interpretation in its place. Law and Philosophy, 13, 451–479.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Endicott, T. (2001). Law is necessarily vague. Legal Theory, 7(4), 379–385.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Endicott, T. (2013). The value of vagueness. In A. Marmor & S. Soames (Eds.), Language in the law (pp. 14–30). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Endicott, T. (2014a). Law and language. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2014 Ed), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/law-language/

  • Fish, S. (2005). There is no textualist position. San Diego Law Review, 42(2), 629–650.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (2006). Simulating minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Grice, P. H. (1989). Studies in the way of words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall, A. (2013). Relevance theory, semantic content and pragmatic enrichment. In A. Capone, F. Lo Piparo, & M. Carapezza (Eds.), Perspectives on linguistic pragmatics (pp. 99–130). Heidelberg: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Hart, H. L. A. (1958). Positivism and the separation of law and morals. Harvard Law Review, 71(4), 593–629.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kecskes, I. (2014). Intercultural pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leech, G. (1983). Principles of pragmatics. London/New York: Longman.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leonardi, P. (1992). Grice: Significare come atto. Lingua e Stile, 27(4), 487–503.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1974). Radical interpretation. Synthese, 27, 331–344.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lo Piparo, F. (2003). Cosa fa di una lingua una lingua. Bari: Laterza.

    Google Scholar 

  • Manning, J. (2005). Textualism and legislative intent. Virginia Law Review, 91(2), 419–450.

    Google Scholar 

  • Manning, J. (2006). What divides textualists from purposivists. Columbia Law Review, 106(1), 70–111.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marmor, A. (2011). Can law imply more than it says? On some pragmatic aspects of strategic speech. In A. Marmor & S. Soames (Eds.), Philosophical foundations of language in the law (pp. 83–104). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Mey, J. L. (2001). Pragmatics. An introduction. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perry, J. (2013). Textualism and the discovery of rights. In A. Marmor & S. Soames (Eds.), Language in the law (pp. 105–129). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Recanati, F. (2007). Perspectival thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Scalia, A. (1997). A matter of interpretation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (2012). Meaning and relevance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vershueren, J. (1999). Understanding pragmatics. London: Arnold.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Blackwell: Oxford, 1958 2nd ed.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wróblewski, J. (1985). Legal language and legal interpretation. Law and Philosophy, 4, 239–255.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Humanities, University of Messina, Messina, Italy

    Alessandro Capone

Authors
  1. Alessandro Capone
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Alessandro Capone .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Humanities, University of Messina, Messina, Italy

    Alessandro Capone

  2. Dept. "Cesare Beccaria", University of Milan, Milan, Italy

    Francesca Poggi

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Capone, A. (2016). The Role of Pragmatics in (Re)Constructing the Rational Law-Maker. In: Capone, A., Poggi, F. (eds) Pragmatics and Law. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30385-7_7

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30385-7_7

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-30383-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-30385-7

  • eBook Packages: Social SciencesSocial Sciences (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation