Abstract
This paper deals with deep interpretive disagreements (DID): very profound divergences that may occur in legal interpretation (on single cases, or on similar cases) among judges and jurists. These divergences involve alternative interpretations of certain expressions or phrases (for instance, “human person”, “dignity”, “personal autonomy”, “life”, “health”) and may lead, under certain conditions, to incompatible interpretations of the legal sentences that incorporate these expressions. The most important examples of this kind of legal sentences are constitutional provisions that express principles asserting legal rights. The main thesis of this paper is that DID represent genuine, faultless and unsolvable disagreements, and share many important features with other kinds of disagreement much discussed today in contemporary philosophy of language. In particular, after inquiring into the properties of these kinds of disagreements, and exploring their implications in law (also through the discussion of two Italian legal cases, the famous cases Englaro and Welby), the author examines two very important questions that may be raised about these disagreements: a meta-ethical question (“In what ways can we justify or settle or even solve these disagreements?), and an epistemological question (“How to explain disagreements?”) and offers an original answer to both.
Keywords
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
- 2.
On alternative interpretations of constitutional provisions, see Celano 2013: 103–105.
- 3.
On this point I disagree with Brian Leiter (2012: 79 ff., 85–87), according to whom interpretive disagreements do not constitute a key phenomenon in our rule of law systems, either in quantitative, or in qualitative terms.
- 4.
- 5.
These expressions could be inserted in the general category of natural language’ terms that today philosophy of languages calls interpretation sensitive terms (cf. Cappelen 2008b: 23–46).
- 6.
On the background assumptions as presuppositions of communication, see Searle (1980: 221–232).
- 7.
Moreso builds on an essay by Stalnaker (2002: 701–721) on the same matter. But it seems to me that for Stalnaker, too, common ground is the point of departure, and not of arrival, of a discussion among dissenting speakers.
- 8.
- 9.
On the notion of propositional contentfulness see Brandom (1994: 79–83).
- 10.
For a relativistic interpretation of Dworkin’s right answer thesis, see Moore (1991–1992: 2424–2533).
- 11.
An interesting question, which I cannot concern myself with in the space of this essay, is if a judge, in his interpretive activity, can legitimatelly use arguments drawn from the sacredness’ dimension.
- 12.
For a detailed critical analysis of this perspective see my (1984: chapter IV).
- 13.
For a position that in legal philosophy shares this kind of dichotomy, see Leiter (2007: 238 ff.).
- 14.
It is the idea that Crispin Wright labels as “investigation independence thesis” and that criticizes adopting the wittgensteinian rule following argument (Wright 1987: 148–149).
- 15.
For this view of scientific research programs see Lakatos (1978: 48–51).
- 16.
For the meaning of “conceptual definition” I refer to my (2004, 18–20).
- 17.
For a good example of a very strong version of metaethical objectivism, see Moore (1991–1992: 2425–2533).
- 18.
- 19.
It is Kölbel (2002: 91) who speaks of sharing of different perspectives, in order to explain his thesis about the relativity of truth. Here I use the notion to characterize the crucial element in the contexts of interpretation.
- 20.
- 21.
In these cases Wittgenstein (1953: §217) would say that “if I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned”.
- 22.
- 23.
This is also the opinion of our scholar of criminal law, Giovanni Fiandaca, in his very stimulating essay (2011: 383–414).
- 24.
For a good analysis of the contextualist approach in philosophy of language, see Bianchi (2001).
- 25.
- 26.
- 27.
These critical observations resemble, to some extent, those addressed by Toulmin (1972: 105–129) to the kuhnian notion of paradigm.
References
Alexy, R. (1998). Teoria dell’argomentazione giuridica, it. trans., Giuffré: Milano.
Atienza, M. (2012). Diritto come argomentazione. Concezioni dell’argomentazione, it. trans. Napoli: ESI.
Ayer, A. J. (1952). Language, truth and logic. New York: Dover Books (first edition 1936).
Baldassarre, A. (1991). Costituzione e teoria dei valori. Politica del diritto, 639–658.
Besson, S. (2005). The morality of conflict. Reasonable disagreement and the law. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Bianchi, C. (2001). La dipendenza contestuale, Per una teoria pragmatica del significato. Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane.
Bin, R. (1992). Diritti e argomenti. Milano: Giuffrè.
Brandom, R. B. (1994). Making it explicit, representing and discursive commitments. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Cappelen, H. (2008a). Content relativism and semantic blindness. In M. Garcia Carpintero & M. Kölbel (Eds.), Relative truth (pp. 265–286). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cappelen, H. (2008b). The creative interpreter: Content relativism and assertion. Philosophical Perspectives, 22(1), 23–46.
Carston, R. (1982). Thoughts and utterances. The pragmatics of explicit communication. Oxford: Blackwell.
Celano, B. (2013). I diritti nello stato costituzionale. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Chiassoni, P. (2009). Tre esercizi per una critica dell’oggettivismo morale. Analisi e diritto. 61–88.
Chiassoni, P. (2012). Conceptos toxicos en la filosofia moral: desacuerdo etico objectivism style. In P. Luque Sanchez & G. B. Ratti (Eds.), Acordes y desacuerdos. Como y por qué los juriustas discrepan (pp. 241–257). Madrid: Marcial Pons.
Dworkin, R. (1985). A matter of principle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Dworkin, R. (1986). Law’s empire. London: Fontana Press.
Dworkin, R. (1996). Freedom’s law. The moral reading of the American constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dworkin, R. (2011). Justice for Hedgehogs. Harvard: Belknap.
Fiandaca, G. (2011). I temi eticamente sensibili fra ragione pubblica e ragione punitiva. Rivista italiana di diritto e procedura penale, LIV(4), 1383–1414.
Gallie, W. B. (1955–1956). Essentially contested concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LXI, 167–198.
Gargani, A. (1985). Lo stupore e il caso. Laterza: Bari.
Gaus, G. F. (1996). Justificatory liberalism. An essay on epistemology and political theory. London: Routledge.
Gowans, C. W. (Ed.). (2000). Moral disagreements. Classic and contemporary readings. London: Routledge.
Guastini, R. (1990). La “costituzionalizzazione” dell’ordinamento italiano. Ragion Pratica, 11, 185–206.
Guastini, R. (2011). Interpretare e argomentare. Milano: Giuffrè.
Guastini, R. (2012). Para una taxonomia de las controversia entre juristas. In P. Luque Sanchez & G. B. Ratti (Eds.), Acordes y desacuerdos. Cómo y por qué los juristas discrepan (pp. 61–72). Madrid: Marcial Pons.
Harman, G. (2000). Explaining value and other essays in moral philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon.
Kelsen, H. (1945). General theory of law and state. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kölbel, M. (2002). Truth without objectivity. London: Routledge.
Kristan, A. (2013). I revirements giurisprudenziali: una sfida per i contestualisti. Nota critica sul nuovo libro di Vittorio Villa. Diritto e questioni pubbliche, 13, 143–200.
Kristan, A., & Pravato, G. (2014). Faultless disagreements in matters of law. Paper held at XXI Seminario Hispano–Franco–Italiano de Teoria del Derecho, Alicante, 12–13 June 2015.
Lakatos, I. (1978). The methodology of scientific research programmes, philosophical papers (Vol. I). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Larmore, C. (1996). The morals of modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Leiter, B. (2007). Naturalising jurisprudence. Essays on American legal realism and naturalism in legal philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Leiter, B. (2012). Cómo explicar los desacuerdos entre juristas. In P. Luque Sanchez & G. B. Ratti (Eds.), Acordes y desacuerdos. Como y por qué los juriustas discrepan (pp. 75–109). Madrid: Marcial Pons.
Luciani, M. (1991). Corte costituzionale e unità nel nome dei valori. In P. Romboli (Ed.), La giustizia costituzionale a una svolta. Torino: Giappichelli, 170 ff.
Luque Sanchez, P. (2012). Los desacuerdos juridicos. Una mapa conceptual. In P. Luque Sanchez & G. B. Ratti (Eds.), Acordes y desacuerdos. Como y por qué los juriustas discrepan (pp. 23–59). Madrid: Marcial Pons.
Macedo, S. (1999). Deliberative politics. Essays on democracy and disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MacFarlane, J. (2014). Assessment sensitivity. Relative truth and its applications. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
McDowell, J. (1981). Non-cognitivism and rule following. In S. Holzmann & C. Leich (Eds.), Wittgenstein: To follow a rule (pp. 141–162). London: Routledge & Kegan.
Moore, M. (1991–1992). Moral reality revisited. Michigan Law Review. 90, 2424–2533.
Moreso, J. J. (2012). Iuspositivismo y desacuerdos juridicos. In P. Luque Sanchez & G. B. Ratti (Eds.), Acordes y desacuerdos., Como y por qué los juriustas discrepan (pp. 229–240). Madrid: Marcial Pons.
O’Grady, P. (2010). Disaccordi legittimi. In V. Villa et al. (Eds.), Il relativismo. Temi e prospettive (pp. 203–226). Roma: Aracne.
Papayannis, D. M., & Ramirez Ludena, L. (2012). Una respuesta pluralista al problema de los desacuerdos juridicos. In P. Luque Sanchez & G. B. Ratti (Eds.), Acordes y desacuerdos. Como y por qué los juriustas discrepan (pp. 203–225). Madrid: Marcial Pons.
Pino, G. (2010). Diritti e interpretazione. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Pino, G. (2014). Positivism, legal validity, and the separation of law and morals. Ratio Juris, 27(2), 190–217.
Pino, G. (2015). Tre concezioni della Costituzione, to be published in “Rivista di teoria e critica della regolazione sociale”.
Poggi, F. (2012). Contextualism, but not enough. A brief note on Villa’s theory of legal interpretation. Revus, 17, 55–65.
Ratti, G. B. (2013). Studi sulla logica e sulla scienza giuridica. Madrid: Marcial Pons.
Rawls, J. (2005). Political liberalism (Expanded Ed.). New York: Columbia University Press.
Recanati, F. (2004). Literal meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rodriguez Blanco, V. (2001). ‘Genuine’ disagreements: A realist reinterpretation of Dworkin. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 21, 649–671.
Ruggeri, A. (1998). Giurisprudenza costituzionale e valori. Diritto pubblico. 1–3.
Scarpelli, U. (1976). Introduzione: la filosofia. La filosofia dell’etica. La filosofia di indirizzo analitico in Italia. In U. Scarpelli (Ed.), Diritto e analisi del linguaggio (pp. 7–35). Milano: Edizioni di Comunità.
Searle, J. (1979). Expression and meaning. Studies in the theory of speech (pp. 117–131). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J. (1980). The background of meaning. In J. Searle, F. Kiefer, & M. Bierwish (Eds.), Speech act theory and semantics (pp. 221–232). Dordrecht: Springer.
Stalnaker, R. (2002). Common ground. Linguistics and Philosophy, 25, 701–721.
Toulmin, S. (1972). Human understanding. Oxford: Clarendon.
Travis, C. (1989). Pragmatics. In B. Hale & C. Wright (Eds.), A companion to the philosophy of language (pp. 87–107). Oxford: Blackwell.
Vignolo, M. (2012). A relativistic note on Villa’s pragmatically oriented theory of legal interpretation. Revus, 17, 67–75.
Villa, V. (1984). Teorie della scienza giuridica e teorie delle scienze naturali. Modelli e analogie. Milano: Giuffrè.
Villa, V. (1990). La metagiurisprudenza analitica e la dicotomia descrittivo/prescrittivo. In A.A.V.V. (Ed.), Studi in memoria di Giovanni Tarello. Volume II. Saggi teorico-giuridici (pp. 617–665). Milano: Giuffrè.
Villa, V. (1999). Costruttivismo e teorie del diritto. Torino: Giappichelli.
Villa, V. (2004). Il positivismo giuridico. Metodi, teorie e giudizi di valore. Torino: Giappichelli.
Villa, V. (2010). Relativism. A conceptual analysis. Eidos, 13, 166–191.
Villa, V. (2012a). Una teoria pragmaticamente orientata dell’interpretazione giuridica. Torino: Giappichelli.
Villa, V. (2012b). Theory of legal interpretation and contextualism. Replies to Kristan, Poggi and Vignolo. Revus, 18, 151–178.
Villa, V. (2013). Contestualismo e teorie dell’interpretazione. Risposte ai miei critici. Diritto e questioni pubbliche, 13, 303–363.
Waldron, J. (1999). Law and disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, B. (2006). Ethics and the limits of philosophy. London: Routledge (first edition 1985).
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations (2nd ed. 1958). Oxford: Blackwell.
Wright, C. (1981). Rule following, objectivity and the theory of meaning. In S. Holzmann & C. Leich (Eds.), Wittgenstein: To follow a rule (pp. 99–117). London: Routledge & Kegan.
Wright, C. (1987). Realism, meaning and truth. London: Blackwell.
Wright, C. (1992). Truth and objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wright, C. (2006). Intuitionism, realism, relativism and rhubarb. In P. Greenough & M. P. Lynch (Eds.), Truth and realism (pp. 38–60). Oxford: Clarendon.
Wright, C. (2008). Relativism about itself. Haphazard thoughts about the very idea. In M. Garcia Carpintero & M. Kölbel (Eds.), Relative truth (pp. 157–185). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Villa, V. (2016). Deep Interpretive Disagreements and Theory of Legal Interpretation. In: Capone, A., Poggi, F. (eds) Pragmatics and Law. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30385-7_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30385-7_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-30383-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-30385-7
eBook Packages: Social SciencesSocial Sciences (R0)