Abstract
With the widespread development of biometrics, concerns about security and privacy are increasing. In biometrics, template protection technology aims to protect the confidentiality of biometric templates (i.e., enrolled biometric data) by certain conversion. The fuzzy commitment scheme gives a practical way to protect biometric templates using a conventional error-correcting code. The scheme has both concealing and binding of templates, but it has some privacy problems. Specifically, in case of successful matching, stored biometric templates can be revealed. To address such problems, we improve the scheme. Our improvement is to coat with two error-correcting codes. In particular, our scheme can conceal stored biometric templates even in successful matching. Our improved scheme requires just conventional error-correcting codes as in the original scheme, and hence it gives a practical solution for both template security and privacy of biometric templates.
A part of this research was done when the first author belonged to Fujitsu Laboratories Ltd.
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Notes
- 1.
Homomorphic encryption is encryption with additional property that it can support operations on encrypted data (without decryption). In other words, this encryption enables certain meaningful operations while preserving the confidentiality of data.
- 2.
The original fuzzy commitment is vulnerable against statistical attack (e.g., see [21] for iris-biometric case) since biometric feature vectors are non-uniform in general. Then we need to consider the security of our scheme in case that biometric feature vectors are non-uniform. But we do not discuss this here due to space restriction.
- 3.
In the e-sketch protocol, templates can be revoked by changing keys for encryption and decryption. On the other hand, both the original fuzzy commitment scheme and ours require no keys for authentication. Therefore it is possible for an attacker to recover biometric data by generating biometric data similar to stored templates permanently.
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Yasuda, M., Shimoyama, T., Abe, N., Yamada, S., Shinzaki, T., Koshiba, T. (2016). Privacy-Preserving Fuzzy Commitment for Biometrics via Layered Error-Correcting Codes. In: Garcia-Alfaro, J., Kranakis, E., Bonfante, G. (eds) Foundations and Practice of Security. FPS 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9482. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30303-1_8
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