Abstract
I distinguish a predictive and a conceptual mode of reasoning with case studies. These broadly correspond with two different kinds of analogical inference, one relying on common and differing properties, the other on structural similarity. The problem of generalizing from case studies is discussed for both. Regarding the predictive mode, eliminative induction provides a natural framework. In the conceptual mode, general rules are largely lacking not least due to a number of epistemological challenges like Raphael Scholl’s underdetermination problem for HPS. In agreement with ideas of Richard Burian and Peter Galison, I argue that conceptual reasoning on the basis of case studies should not aim at grand universal schemes but rather at mesoscopic or middle-range theory. In the essay, I will repeatedly draw on insights from the social sciences, in which a much more extensive reflection on case study methodology exists compared with HPS.
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Notes
- 1.
The term is understood here in a very broad sense, e.g. a historical narrative could also constitute a data structure.
- 2.
A further distinction concerns the type of variation that occurs in a case study (e.g. Gerring 2007, p. 28).
- 3.
See Scholl and Räz , in press (this volume). In the social-science literature, similar classification schemes can be found, e.g. Gerring (2007, pp. 89–90) suggests nine different types of cases: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, crucial, pathway, most-similar, and most-different.
- 4.
The example was suggested by Raphael Scholl.
- 5.
The term ’eliminative induction’ for Mill’s methods has been used by several authors, in particular by Mill himself (1886, p. 256) and also by Mackie in his influential book The Cement of the Universe. Mackie writes: “In calling them eliminative methods Mill drew a rather forced analogy with the elimination of terms in an algebraic equation. But we can use this name in a different sense: all these methods work by eliminating rival candidates for the role of cause” (Mackie 1980, p. 297).
- 6.
Note that this need not be the case for all properties. For example, if the second man were ill, the probability for his death would presumably increase. This underlines not so much the heuristic nature of analogical inferences but the need for a two-dimensional framework as outlined below.
- 7.
Additional complications may arise in the case of plural causation.
- 8.
“The validity of [an argument by analogy] will depend, first, on the extent of the positive analogy compared with the negative [...] and, second, on the relation between the new property and the properties already known to be parts of the positive or negative analogy, respectively” (Hesse cited in Norton 2011, p. 9).
- 9.
- 10.
Galison argues for a “sited, not typical, history”, the aim of which is “to evoke the mesoscopic periods of laboratory history, not a universal method of experimentation” (Galison 1997, p. 63). I largely agree but would add that scientific method nevertheless possesses a universal logical core, which has to be contextualized when analyzing specific episodes.
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Acknowledgments
I am much grateful to the editors of this volume, Tilman Sauer and Raphael Scholl, for helpful comments on the manuscript and also for organizing the inspiring workshop in Bern and contributing so many interesting ideas to the subject themselves. I also thank Christian Joas, Désirée Schauz, and Elsbeth Bösl for helpful discussions as well as Karin Zachmann for pointing me to the insightful discussion by Peter Galison.
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Pietsch, W. (2016). Two Modes of Reasoning with Case Studies. In: Sauer, T., Scholl, R. (eds) The Philosophy of Historical Case Studies. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 319. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30229-4_4
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