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Analyzing 4 Million Real-World Personal Knowledge Questions (Short Paper)

  • Maximilian GollaEmail author
  • Markus Dürmuth
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9551)

Abstract

Personal Knowledge Questions are widely used for fallback authentication, i.e., recovering access to an account when the primary authenticator is lost. It is well known that the answers only have low-entropy and are sometimes derivable from public data sources, but ease-of-use and supposedly good memorability seem to outweigh this drawback for some applications.

Recently, a database dump of an online dating website was leaked, including 3.9 million plain text answers to personal knowledge questions, making it the largest publicly available list. We analyzed this list of answers and were able to confirm previous findings that were obtained on non-public lists (WWW 2015), in particular we found that some users don’t answer truthfully, which may actually reduce the answer’s entropy.

Keywords

Fallback authentication Personal knowledge question Password recovery Password reset Challenge question 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Horst Görtz Institute for IT-SecurityRuhr-University BochumBochumGermany

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