Abstract
We all grow and develop and must do so ‘where we are planted,’ in the time and era in which we live, among and with our contemporaries. Aristotelian hylomorphism, although perhaps a bit simple in its original form in light of contemporary biology, nonetheless provides a set of useful concepts and distinctions, ones that can acknowledge our deeply situated character without giving up a commitment to fundamental structures common to all human beings. Key to Aristotle’s account is the distinction between form and matter, or the formal and material principles. The first refers to the general pattern of development—e.g., the general developmental pattern characteristic of human beings in contrast to baboons or Arabian horses—while the latter refers to the conditions under which the development occurs. This distinction allows Aristotle to affirm that all members of one species can genuinely be said to share something significant and yet also so obviously and truly differ. All of us, according to Aristotle, share the same type of form—or principle of growth and development—and yet also differ in ways that are not insignificant. These differences are due to our differing material conditions, including not simply our differing physical matter but also our different cultural, social, historical, and linguistic influences as well as our choices and previously habituated patterns.
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- 1.
In claiming that Aristotelian biology—and thus Aristotelian hylomorphism insofar as it relies on that biology—needs to be updated, I am not making a claim about Aristotle’s scientific method or his more general biological claims. I am not taking a strong stand on precisely how much would need to be preserved. For a defense of aspects of Aristotle’s scientific method and general scientific claims regarding substances and essences, see Baruch A. Brody’s “Towards an Aristotelian Theory of Scientific Explanation,” Philosophy of Science 39, no. 1 (March 1972): 20–31 and “Why Settle for Anything Less than Good Old-Fashioned Aristotelian Essentialism,” Noûs 7, no. 4 (November 1973): 351–365, as well as Richard J. Connell’s Substance and Modern Science (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1988).
- 2.
Some, such as John Duns Scotus and Edith Stein, would strongly disagree with this claim that Aristotle preserves the significance of our individuality, and thus Scotus and Stein—albeit in quite different ways—posit formal principles of individuality. I do not yet see, however, that it is necessary to follow the Scotist and Steinian lines, so long as one has a sufficiently charitable read of how our material conditions and freedom are involved in our individuality. For more on this, see my Thine Own Self: Individuality in Edith Stein’s Later Writings (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2009).
- 3.
I think that both philosophical developments, especially Kantian and phenomenological developments, and scientific developments, especially in evolutionary theory and genetics, need to be addressed and incorporated. Work has been done in both of these areas, including, to name two among many, Edith Stein’s writings, especially Finite and Eternal Being, and Bernard Lonergan’s, especially Insight.
- 4.
Some qualified hylomorphists —for example, Thomas Aquinas —claim that, insofar as we are fully human, form and matter are inseparable. But temporary separation is possible. Thomas understands our form as responsible for more than formation of the body. It has, in addition, higher, non-bodily powers (e.g., mathematical and abstract reasoning) in virtue of which the soul can survive the death of the body. Our form or soul, however, longs to be re-united to a body in the resurrection of the body, and we are not fully human in the absence of our bodies. For more on the significance of the distinction between more pure and qualified hylomorphist , see Chap. 3.
- 5.
Substance is not, as Locke mocks it, that which ‘we know not what,’ underlying various qualities. Nor, contra Descartes, that which exists by itself. It is, for Aristotle, that which exists in itself, in contrast to accidents. ‘In itself’ here does not refer to the kind of self-sufficient autonomy characteristic of Descartes’s account of substance but, rather, the center of identity over time continuing through various types of (accidental) change .
- 6.
We should add the qualification that this is true only for what it means to be the form of a corporeal being. The case would be a bit different if there are pure forms—if, for example, there are divinities or angels who are developmental in some sense and lack matter, including any kind of ‘spiritual matter.’
- 7.
Unless there are angels or divinities of some type, although one would not ‘go on a search’ for an angel in the same way one searches for a shoe or other sensible object.
- 8.
Fr. Norris Clarke makes the point: “The impression given by Aristotle and some textbook presentations of the doctrine is that every composition of form/matter is between a form exactly identical in every detail to every other in the species, united directly to pure formless primary matter with no intermediary levels. That is too simple a picture. In fact, though there is definitely one major, central organizing form that operates as the one fully autonomous and operative essential form, it organizes and controls lower levels of organized elements—cells, molecules, atoms, subatomic particles. These already have a certain formal structure of their own taken over and controlled by the central form to make them part of a higher whole; they are not purely indeterminate formless matter lacking any formal structure at all. They are rather subordinate levels of formal organization taken over and controlled or used by the higher central form for the goals of the organism as a whole, hence no longer operating autonomously” (The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001], 99). Fr. Clarke—in both his writings and conversation—has significantly influenced my understanding of the Aristotelian tradition.
- 9.
The question of the status of genetic material is a particularly interesting one and clearly not one Aristotle explicitly addresses. On one hand, genetic material seems to offer something more formal than material insofar as it offers prescriptions for our growth and development, determining eye and skin color, blood type, other physical attributes, and possibly contributing to the shaping of psychological traits as well. On the other hand, however, having a particular genotype does not, in all cases, require a particular phenotype. Nor does genetic material well account for elements critical to form: unity over time, a center of identity and unity of experience, etc. My leaning is to understand genetic material as heavily formed matter , but nonetheless material. We can then recognize how certain chromosomal patterns, for example, provide matter fit for human development, while other combinations are unfit for human development (accounting, for example, for some miscarriages). Although I am inclined to place genetic material on the material rather than formal side, the success of this general position does not depend on agreement with my leaning.
- 10.
For a very short summary of the debate, see Clarke, The One and the Many, pp. 143–145. For a more extended discussion of the history of the debate, see Daniel A. Callus, “The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form” in The Dignity of Science: Studies in the Philosophy of Science presented to William Humbert Kane, O.P., ed. James A. Weisheipl (Washington, DC: The Thomist Press, 1961), 121–149, and the more brief discussion in Emily Michael’s “Descartes and Gassendi on Matter and Mind: From Aristotelian Pluralism to Early Modern Dualism” in Meeting of the Minds: The Relations between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy, ed. Stephen F. Brown (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), 141–161. For discussion of a contemporary version of the debate, see John O’Callaghan’s “The Plurality of Forms: Now and Then,” The Review of Metaphysics 62, no. 1 (September 2008): 3–41.
- 11.
Thomas sees it as critical that there is only one substantial form , although there are many formal dimensions to the individual. But without a single substantial form , there is no single, unified entity. And for Thomas, we can go no higher than organisms such as chipmunks, baboons, and human beings. No political group or company, for example, would be a higher level individual of which each person would be the matter, nor are physical events the matter composing God, as Whitehead argues. Thomas is not a process thinker. Nonetheless, below the level of substantial form , we can recognize various other form-matter composites. Thus, matter can be said analogously of anything with the flexibility and plasticity to enter into further formation.
- 12.
Thomas discusses the nature of mixtures, positing that the forms of the elements exist “virtually (by their power) [virtute]” in mixed bodies. See De mixtione elementorum, especially 15–18, in Joseph Bobik’s Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements: A Translation and Interpretation of the de Principiis Naturae and the De Mixtione Elementorum of St. Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998). See also Christopher Decaen’s “Elemental Virtual Presence in St. Thomas,” The Thomist 64 (2000): 271–300, for further discussion of the text. Steven Baldner summarizes Aquinas’s position: “The elements are present by their powers in compounds. What does this mean? I think that Thomas means that the substantial forms of the elements corrupt when elements are made into compounds. When, in Thomas’ terms, flesh and blood are made out of water, water actually ceases to exist and part of a human body begins to exist. He does not mean to say that the substantial form remains in any way in the compound. On the other hand, he does mean to say that the power or quality of the element does remain in the compound. … the original power or quality of the element comes to exist in some altered way in the compound. … but the exact nature of that character or quality is now determined by the new substantial form . Further, it is possible to extract the element from the compound, and when that happens, the element will retain its primitive qualities” (“An Argument for Substantial Form,” The Saint Anselm Journal 5, no. 1 [Fall 2007]: 8–9, http://www.anselm.edu/library/saj/pdf/51Baldner.pdf [accessed January 28, 2009]).
- 13.
See, for example, Generation of Animals 4.1.766a15-25.
- 14.
Aristotle also discusses the elements in Metaphysics 5.3; On Generation and Corruption 2.1-8; and On the Heavens 3.3-8.
- 15.
It is not clear, however, that all biological matter ought to be thought of on the model of pizza. DNA and our various organs (heart, lungs, etc.) are not ‘taken in’ like food either.
- 16.
I originally referred to this matter simply as ‘cultural matter,’ but Deborah Savage and Mary Lemmons objected to this choice as too misleading (University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN, October 23, 2008). I am grateful for their alternative suggestion of environmental matter.
- 17.
For an alternative account of ‘formed matter ,’ see Lonergan’s discussion of conjugate forms and Allen ’s appropriation of that to questions of gender in Chap. 2 of her forthcoming Volume III of The Concept of Woman.
- 18.
I am grateful to Brendan Palla for taking the time, during his celebration of his former housemate’s wedding reception, to make this critique.
- 19.
They may significantly shape our identity, but they are not essential to us qua human.
- 20.
Politics 1.4.1253b2626-30.
- 21.
I am grateful to Alasdair MacIntyre for pointing this out and referring me to relevant texts.
- 22.
Although relevant, by and large, I will not be discussing Aristotle’s account of our faculties or their relations. For a few very brief comments on the relevance of such a faculty psychology, see Chap. 3 below.
- 23.
The notion of a potency strikes me as broader than that of a capacity. All capacities are potencies of a being, but not all potencies need be capacities. I take a potency to refer to something possible for some being but without requiring (as in the case of capacities) a positive goal-directed-ness. It is possible, for example, for beagles to be bowled over by boulders. The beagle need not have any positive ability to be so acted upon, but it is nonetheless a potency of beagles. We could contrast such a potency with the logical possibility that a beagle could sprout wings and fly over the boulder. Such a thing is not logically impossible, but it does not reflect any genuine potency of the beagle. Thus, a potency is not a mere logical possibility but is, rather, based in the structure of the being. Capacities, however, require the further element of being positively oriented toward their own full development and thus are distinctly teleological.
- 24.
These material differences should be understood broadly and may include chromosomal patterns, hormone levels, available food, social influences and role models, etc.
- 25.
- 26.
A more interesting case would be the male pregnancy advertised by “RYT Hospital-Dwayne Medical Center” (see www.malepregnancy.com [accessed January 28, 2009]). The site advertises a medical center that has, they claim, successfully begun a pregnancy in a man without a female reproductive system. Although a striking website, it is no more than that yet. Were pregnancy in a male with an exclusively male reproductive system to become possible, significant medical intervention would be necessary.
- 27.
There is a temptation, given the risks, to think that we ought not to make such judgments at all. Why call anything ‘defective,’ ‘abnormal,’ or ‘unhealthy’? Why not simply understand variations as ‘differently healthed,’ etc.? And yet this approach itself is already making judgments calls about what is appropriate or fit, and what is not; it is, after all, claiming that certain judgments are inappropriate to make, etc. It strikes me as impossible to get away from making such judgments, and the very attempt to do so is itself a variant of such a judgment. But further and perhaps more importantly, without some criteria regarding human nature, we would significantly hinder our development. We would have little way of judging that we should eat this but not that, do that but not this, etc. Our understanding of human nature and the human capacities may need to be much more nuanced and complex, articulated more in terms of ranges and spectrums, than has been traditionally done, but such changes would not involve getting rid of a concept of human nature or human capacities, but of improving on our understanding of it.
- 28.
In Metaphysics 11.8, Aristotle writes: “We say that everything either is always and of necessity …, or is for the most part, or is neither for the most part, nor always and of necessity, but merely as it chances….Now we have said what the accidental is, and it is obvious why there is no science of such a thing; for all science is of that which is always or for the most part, but the accidental is in neither of these classes” (1064b31-1065a5). Aristotle here claims that there can be a science of the ‘for the most part.’
There are several ways in which study of the human form could be a science of the ‘for the most part.’ On the one hand, we could argue that, even if all of the capacities are necessarily a part of the species-form , they would nonetheless only be properly expressed ‘for the most part.’ Thus, study of human capacities is interested in what is necessary, but that is found only in ‘for the most part’ expressions. On the other hand, we might think that the capacities themselves are only present ‘for the most part,’ and thus argue that the essence or form is that which is within some statistical range of a certain pattern, accommodating evolutionary theory. Regardless, either version would require some degree of shift in our understanding of definitions away from Aristotle’s emphasis on necessity and universality in his logical works to a ‘for the most part’ account, closer to that mentioned in the Metaphysics .
- 29.
For a brief discussion of such challenges, see Generation of Animals 3.10.
- 30.
A number of feminist critics, including Luce Irigaray, have criticized Aristotle for beginning his studies with endoxa [received or expert opinion], all of which was male (and upper class). Freeland notes: “I can’t recall a single case of a woman expert being cited in any Aristotelian survey of endoxa” (“On Irigaray on Aristotle,” 78–79). Although beginning with an analysis of expert opinion and historically accepted positions strikes me as laudable, critics are surely right that Aristotle’s beginning points were likely limited, at least for the analysis of certain topics.
- 31.
I should qualify this slightly. There is debate about how to interpret certain sections of Aristotle, for example, his discussion in Nicomachean Ethics 10.7 and the discussion in the Metaphysics of primary ousia. I will not, however, be following lines of interpretation that understand substance as a non-composite form.
- 32.
Nussbaum provides an example of the former type of reading, while Thomas Aquinas leans toward the latter.
- 33.
See Beatriz Vollmer de Marcellus ’s On the Ontological Differentiation of Human Gender: A Critique of the Philosophical Literature between 1965 and 1995 (Ph.D. dissertation, Pontificae Universitas Gregoriana, 2004), 13. See Prudence Allen ’s The Concept of Woman: The Aristotelian Revolution, 750 B.C. – A.D. 1250 (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1997), xx, citing Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy of Sex’” in Towards an Anthropology of Women, ed. Rayna R. Reiter (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 157–210 and Sandra Harding, “Is Gender a Variable in Conceptions of Rationality? A Survey of Issues” in Beyond Domination: New Perspectives on Women and Philosophy, ed. Carol C. Gould (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), 43–63.
- 34.
See Allen ’s discussion of this point on page xx of the above cited text.
- 35.
This element is the basis of many criticisms of our sexual divisions, including, for example, Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble.
- 36.
Allen understands the term ‘gender’ to include the notion of ‘sex,’ and thus she makes a distinction between the two insofar as ‘gender’ is a broader term than ‘sex’ (conversation, University of Notre Dame, February 14, 2009).
- 37.
This does not, of course, answer the question of which biological matter determines sex. For a brief statement affirming this understanding of the role of matter in sex, see Aristotle’s Metaphysics 10.9.1058b21-25.
- 38.
Our sex will be determined by our biological matter , but this does not mean that our sexual classification will be so determined. In most cultures, only two sexes are distinguished: female and male. We do not, however, have to distinguish only two sexes. We might, instead, distinguish three: female, male, and intersex. Or perhaps, following Anne Fausto-Sterling ’s perhaps less-than-serious suggestion, five. See “The Five Sexes: Why male and female are not enough,” The Sciences (May/April 1993): 20–24 and “The Five Sexes, revisited,” The Sciences 40, no. 4 (2000): 18–23. See also Fausto-Sterling ’s more considered position in Chap. 4 of Sexing the Body. My only claim here is that sex is determined by biological matter , not that any particular sexual classification system need be so determined.
- 39.
Marilyn J. Boxer, in a review essay on the state of women’s studies, claims that “the social creation of gender is a basic assumption of women’s studies” (“For and About Women: The Theory and Practice of Women’s Studies in the United States,” Signs 7, no. 3 [Spring 1982]: 687). As far as I can tell, this is still a dominant assumption nearly three decades later. There are, however, many things that “the social creation of gender” could mean, but it is often used to mean a largely arbitrary creation. I will agree that gender is a social creation, if what is meant is that gender is part of our social lives and arising because of our social interactions. It is unlikely that a purely private individual—i.e., one never encountering, referring to, or having any kind of relation with another person—would have a gender. But I am not sure gender is all such a person would lack, could she ever exist. But to claim that gender is an arbitrary social creation is, I believe, incorrect (even if I will grant that there is a great deal of flexibility in our understanding and cultivation of gender).
- 40.
Although gender too may be ‘natural’ in Aristotle’s sense of cultivating or developing our nature.
- 41.
This does not mean that it is thereby unchangeable, as sex-change operations reveal, nor that there is no development involved in our sex. It is simply to claim that, insofar as our chromosomal structure is relevant to sex, it is given quite a bit earlier than any gender formation.
- 42.
In no place in this text do I take a strong stand on the content of femininity and masculinity . It may be possible to articulate such content. But insofar as this text is interested in exploring the foundations of gender and not the content thereof, I have avoided making a strong commitment to any particular content.
- 43.
Thus, I do not think that gender is well modeled on race.
- 44.
What does this mean for gender ideals and symbols of femininity and masculinity ? I am not yet sure. My inclination is to encourage the development of healthy gender symbols, images, and ideals. First, it is not clear to me that such ideals, symbols, and images can be eliminated. We are, after all, essentially material beings, working through the concrete and yet working toward something. On the other hand, I do not want women (or men) to be limited to just a few ideals (e.g., the Madonna or the whore). Thus, it will likely be critical to encourage the development of lots of differing feminine and masculine symbols and icons, rather than just a few. Providing a whole range of images of femininity and masculinity allows women and men to identify with those more relevant to their own situation and condition, and it acknowledges the flexibility (which is nonetheless not unlimited) of gender.
- 45.
Insofar as our goal is the development of all of the human capacities and not simply a few, such encouragement may often be desirable. See further discussion of this point and the import of sexed bodies even as fully actualized human beings in Chap. 3.
- 46.
Contemporary U.S. society can rarely be accused of this failing, but we do not need to dig too far into our own history, or look too far from U.S. shores, to see examples, with varying degrees of seriousness, of this error.
- 47.
What is involved in such domestic work varies widely. There have been great changes in our societies regarding the ways in which political and societal power are distributed, the relation between home and work (the private and the public), and thus what is involved in limiting oneself to a “domestic sphere.” See, for example, Christopher Lasch, “The Sexual Division of Labor, the Decline of Civic Culture, and the Rise of the Suburbs” in Women and the Common Life, ed. Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997), 93–120 and Alison Jagger’s brief discussion at the beginning of Feminist Politics and Human Nature.
- 48.
For example, Nussbaum—although Aristotelian in certain respects—shies away from discussion of the import of differing biology in part because of this concern. See further discussion of both this critique and Nussbaum’s form of ‘Aristotelian feminism ’ in Chap. 1 above.
- 49.
“Classical philosophy lacks the exigent tone of modern intellectual work; its mode is one of patient reflection on and discussion of aims prior to action and change. Unlike modern philosophy, which makes human willing and choosing primary without being able to specify what it is best to will and choose and what the limits of human choice must be, classical philosophy recognizes human nature to have certain basic capacities—such as reason—with natural ends and excellences, and that the achievement of these ends is either helped or hindered by political circumstances. The intent of classical philosophizing, as I see it, is to speak about what would be the harmony of freedom and natural limitation, emotion and intelligence, equality and necessary hierarchy, desire and restraint, practice and theory, the subject and that which grounds the subject, male and female, as all of these manifest themselves in human life. A complete theory of human nature, expanded and fully inclusive of women, would ground the commonalities of men and women in such a way as to permit differences in masculine or feminine style or position to be acknowledged without the imminent risk of devaluing or overvaluing one or the other, and thus dislodging one or the other from the realm of the fully human. A fuller account of male and female commonalities would also subdue the antagonism between the sexes, although, due to some ineliminable differences, there inevitably are elements of tension—and mystery—between women and men” (Tress , “Feminists and Their Discontents,” 307).
- 50.
By and large I will present the position in a more metaphysical rather than a hermeneutical form, but one of the aspects brought out by the more hermeneutic formulation is that, although one can distinguish biological and environmental matter, they are not sharply separable. It is not as if we have an unmediated encounter with our biology. We understand our bodies through the language, practices, emphases, etc., of our culture and environment. Acknowledging such a point in no way reduces the biological to simply environmental or cultural forces. But it acknowledges that we make the distinction on the field of our experience—interpreted, mediated (but not thereby untrue) experience.
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Borden Sharkey, S. (2016). An Aristotelian Account of Sex and Gender. In: An Aristotelian Feminism. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29847-4_2
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