Abstract
The notion of an “Aristotelian feminism,” although by no means a dominant approach in feminism, exists in several forms—the most significant of which is Martha Nussbaum’s “capabilities approach.” Nussbaum presents a compelling and important form of feminism, drawing significant inspiration from aspects of Aristotle’s thought. The version I would like to advocate has different foci and goes beyond that of Nussbaum by incorporating more fully Aristotle’s metaphysics. But I think that Nussbaum is right that feminism ought to focus on human capabilities, or capacities, and the various conditions relevant to the development of those capacities. Women historically have had, and continue to have, fewer opportunities to both develop and use the full range of their capacities. And the form of Aristotelian feminism advocated here agrees with Nussbaum that our attention ought to be turned not simply to rights, or equality in terms of job opportunities or distribution of particular resources (as important as these may be), but to capabilities and the full set of conditions relevant to the development and full use of these capacities.
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Notes
- 1.
In calling Nussbaum’s ‘capabilities approach ’ the most significant form of Aristotelian feminism , I simply mean that it is the best-known and therefore influential version in the English-speaking academic world. There are, however, other positions that could also be described as ‘Aristotelian feminism,’ including Sybil Schwarzenbach’s work in political philosophy, especially On Civic Friendship (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009) and Prudence Allen ’s analysis of the history of women in philosophy, particularly volume III of The Concept of Woman (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, forthcoming).
- 2.
Nussbaum uses the term ‘capability’ most frequently; I prefer the term ‘capacity.’ There are some differences between our uses of these terms (as may become clear in Chap. 2), but for the purposes of this chapter, they can be understood to be interchangeable.
- 3.
See, for example, Avery Kolers’s syllabus for PHIL 505/605/SCHG 500, Special Topics: Global Justice (http://louisville.edu/~ahkole01/505syll.htm, accessed November 6, 2008). See also Nussbaum’s description in “Aristotle, Feminism, and Needs for Functioning” in Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle ed. Cynthia A. Freeland (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1998): 248–259. Lisa Sowle Cahill refers to Nussbaum’s position as a “feminist Aristotelianism” in Sex, Gender, and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55.
- 4.
Women and Human Development : The Capabilities Approach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), hereafter WHD. Nussbaum lays out the way in which she roots her position in Aristotle’s texts in, particularly, “Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume I (1988): 145–84.
- 5.
WHD xiii. For a particularly clear cross-disciplinary summary of the ‘capabilities approach ’ and relevant literature, see Ingrid Robeyns, “The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey” in Journal of Human Development, 6, no. 1 (March 2005): 93–114.
- 6.
See, for example, WHD 5. She fills out this vision: “My central project is to work out the grouding [sic] for basic political principles to which all nations should be held by their citizens; but an ancillary and related project is to map out the space within which comparisons of quality of life across nations can most revealingly be made” (WHD 116).
- 7.
It is, after all, always a question how the resources are actually distributed, how much our expressed satisfaction reflects our real conditions, or how the resources actually function to improve people’s lives.
- 8.
She summarizes the key concern: “The central question asked by the capabilities approach is not, ‘How satisfied is Vasanti?’ or even ‘How much in the way of resources is she able to command?’ It is, instead, ‘What is Vasanti actually able to do and to be?’ Taking a stand for political purposes on a working list of functions that would appear to be of central importance in human life, we ask: Is the person capable of this, or not? We ask not only about the person’s satisfaction with what she does, but about what she does, and what she is in a position to do (what her opportunities and liberties are)” (WHD 71).
- 9.
In Sex and Social Justice , Nussbaum summarizes the import of looking at capabilities: “people have varying needs for resources ….They also have different abilities to convert resources into functioning. … Unlike the type of liberal approach that focuses only on the distribution of resources, the capability approach maintains that resources have no value in themselves, apart from their role in promoting human functioning” (Sex and Social Justice [New York: Oxford University Press, 1999], 34).
- 10.
See, for example, her discussion on page 43 of Sex and Social Justice.
- 11.
Nussbaum dedicates a tremendous amount of her work to defending the universality of these characteristically human capabilities. In addition to the arguments in WHD, see also “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics” in World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, ed. J.E.J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 86–131; “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism” in Political Theory 20, no. 2 (May 1992): 202–246; and “Public Philosophy and International Feminism” in Ethics 108 (July 1998): 770–804.
- 12.
Although I agree with the broad strokes of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach , I am not taking a stand on a list of capabilities.
- 13.
See WHD 78–80. See also the same list presented in Sex and Social Justice , 41–42. Nussbaum presents a slightly different list in her 1992 “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism,” 216–223 and her 1995 “Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings” in Women, Culture, and Development ed. Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 61–104. For discussion of the significance of which capabilities one lists and how one lists these capabilities, see Chap. 3.
- 14.
E.g., “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism,” 216.
- 15.
WHD 78.
- 16.
WHD 79. Nussbaum’s account of practical reason places emphasis on liberal concerns for autonomy in understanding and choosing a life we take to be good. Although certainly focusing on choice, Aristotle places quite a bit of emphasis on the role of practical reason in becoming virtuous, making right judgments, cultivating habits enabling a moral life, etc. It is not clear to me that Nussbaum’s and Aristotle’s emphases are sharply opposed, but Aristotle’s tie between practical reason and a particular set of moral virtues (and a particular kind of good life, understood relatively comprehensively) differs at least from Nussbaum’s emphases, if not commitments.
- 17.
Nussbaum expands on this, claiming that this would also involve “[h]aving the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others” (WHD 79).
- 18.
WHD 82.
- 19.
See Nussbaum’s arguments in “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics.”
- 20.
Many of the Desert Fathers moved outside of the cities, in part, in order to defend those cities against demons and demonic forces, that is, the bringers of disease of various sorts, including physical disease. I am grateful to Sarah Spangler for pointing out this feature of these ascetic motivations.
- 21.
See Nussbaum’s “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics” for an interpretation of Aristotle that places these two at the crux of Aristotle’s account of human nature.
- 22.
We might think here of a state with excellent educational resources, which nonetheless allows female genital mutilation.
- 23.
We might think here of a Western nation with a great health care system but an excessive emphasis on work or a problematic relation to the environment.
- 24.
For example, Lisa Cahill suggests adding, as distinct capabilities, both kinship and religion. See Sex, Gender, and Christian Ethics, 59–61.
- 25.
Nussbaum further states that the list is open to revision. See WHD 76–77. These features of Nussbaum’s list, although important for her political goals, may indicate corresponding weaknesses. She does not tell us which of these ten capabilities, beyond practical reason and affiliation, are most central, which ought to be prioritized, which to pursue when all are beyond some basic threshold, etc. In cases of limited resources, which should be de-emphasized in favor of more central capabilities? Or should something else, not on the list, be prioritized? Insofar as practical reason and affiliation ‘organize and suffuse’ the others, they appear to take pride of place; Nussbaum does not, however, state the implications of this explicitly, nor is it clear that she could (or should), given her emphasis on political consensus rather than a more metaphysical account of human nature.
- 26.
Self-limiting at too low of a level will significantly hinder the development of the other capabilities. But none of us can develop equally all of our capabilities to their fullest possible extent; time and energy are limited. Thus, self-limitation in some form is necessary, even if holistic development of some kind and to some degree is also necessary in order to use any of the capabilities well.
- 27.
See, for example, Sex and Social Justice , 44. This distinction between capability and functioning is useful and important, and it can be made, to some degree, as Nussbaum’s examples show. It is not clear, however, that it can be very finely made. Insofar as capabilities are developed by using them, one cannot have capabilities ready for use without functioning. Nussbaum acknowledges this in a number of places. But given the significance of functioning for the having of a capability at least ready for use, and given the role of our social relations for the development of all of our capabilities, I am not sure that these distinctions do not become so problematic that something closer to a full metaphysic of the person is necessary in order to maintain these distinctions. For a different version of this critique, see Phillip McReynolds, “Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach: A Pragmatist Critique” in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16, no. 2 (2002): 142–150.
- 28.
This raises the question of whether it ought to be part of the ideal of non-governing groups. Perhaps governments ought not to have functioning (rather than capabilities) as part of the ideal. Should, however, a private school, the YMCA, an activist group, relief agency, or non-governing political party have such an aim?
- 29.
See “Aristotle, Politics , and Human Capabilities: A Response to Antony, Arneson, Charlesworth, and Mulgan” in Ethics 111 (October 2000): 124. See the same article, pages 108–109 for a summary of some of her points of departure from Aristotle.
- 30.
WHD 92.
- 31.
Nussbaum distinguishes among, what she calls, basic capabilities, internal capabilities, and combined capabilities. See WHD 83–85 and Sex and Social Justice , 44. She claims that “[t]he aim of public policy is the production of combined capabilities” ( Sex and Social Justice , 44).
- 32.
- 33.
This feature has been criticized as well. See, for example, L.H.M. Ling, “Hegemonic Liberalism : Martha Nussbaum, Jörg Haider, and the Struggle for Late Modernity,” conference proceedings, International Studies Association, 41st Annual Convention (March 14–18, 2000), available at http://www.ciaonet.org.isa/li101/, accessed April 1, 2009, and Karin Van Marle, “‘The Capabilities Approach’, ‘The Imaginary Domain’, and ‘Asymmetrical Reciprocity’: Feminist Perspectives on Equality and Justice” in Feminist Legal Studies, 11 (2003): 255–278.
- 34.
She says, for example, “I believe, however, that the human personality has a structure that is at least to some extent independent of culture, powerfully though culture shapes it at every stage” and that personality is “not thoroughly the creation of power” (WHD 155). See also WHD 6. Nussbaum makes a detailed defense of universalism in general. See especially WHD 31ff.
- 35.
WHD 7.
- 36.
In an earlier article, she describes her account of capabilities as a “thick vague theory of the good”; it is vague because “it admits of much multiple specification in accordance with varied local and personal conceptions” (“Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism,” 214 and 215).
- 37.
She says, for example: “I am convinced that this wholesale assault on theory is deeply mistaken, and that the systematic arguments of theory have an important practical function to play in sorting out our confused thoughts, criticizing unjust social realities, and preventing the sort of self-deceptive rationalizing that frequently makes us collaborators with injustice” (WHD 36).
- 38.
Exemplifying it better, in many ways, than Aristotle’s own style of writing—at least in the texts we now have.
- 39.
Nussbaum’s style reflects a general Aristotelian epistemology . I will leave aside whether it would do so given a more detailed analysis of Aristotle’s theory of knowledge.
- 40.
Sex and Social Justice , 10.
- 41.
Sex and Social Justice , 62.
- 42.
What Aristotle does not argue, however, is that women and ‘natural slaves ’ are equally able as free males to flourish as human beings but, nonetheless, still ought to be subordinated. It seems to me plausible to read Aristotle as being willing to organize the state for the good of free males because, he thinks, only free males are truly able to enjoy such goods. Women and ‘natural slaves’ can enjoy lesser goods corresponding to their lesser abilities, and thus they are rightly, on Aristotle’s view, accorded a lesser place, but a place where they can nevertheless flourish as the types of beings that they are. It is not clear to me, however, that, if Aristotle had changed his mind regarding the inferiority of women and ‘natural slaves,’ he would have continued to maintain his account of the overall organization of society. See also Nussbaum’s “Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume I (1988), especially 171–172.
- 43.
And it may not be a part of Aristotle’s understanding of the common good at all, as suggested in the previous footnote.
- 44.
In History of Animals , Aristotle writes: “Social creatures are such as have some one common object in view …. Such social creatures are man, the bee, the wasp, the ant, and the crane” (1.1.488b8-9). See also Politics 1.1 and the discussion of ‘civic friendship’ in Eudemian Ethics. Nussbaum has a beautiful discussion of this dimension of Aristotle’s thought in “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics,” especially sections II and III.
- 45.
This is not meant to deny the reality that many (and perhaps even all) traditions, communities, and social relations have been hindering, deeply damaging, and severely limiting of autonomy and independence in various ways. The claim is not that communities are always good but, rather, that—because we are fundamentally social beings—we cannot develop our capabilities, become independent, or cultivate autonomy outside of all social relations. The constraints and hindrances need to be seen on the backdrop of our social nature. See Nussbaum’s discussion in “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism,” esp. 225–226.
- 46.
She writes: “We see the person as having activity, goals, and projects—as somehow awe-inspiringly above the mechanical workings of nature, and yet in need of support for the fulfillment of many central projects” (WHD 73). Her comments about the family (at, for example, WHD 251ff) may, however, be in some tension with these commitments.
- 47.
It is certainly true that Nussbaum prioritizes these more highly than other, non-liberal Aristotelians (e.g., Alasdair MacIntyre ). See also footnote 16 above. The point here is not to deny the significance of liberalism for Nussbaum’s position, but to note the ways in which it differs from classic liberalism in its adoption of some, fairly substantive version of the common good .
- 48.
WHD 1–2. The Human Development Reports—in contrast to other forms of measure—were developed with an eye, at least in part, to capabilities.
- 49.
WHD 4.
- 50.
Although positioned as originating in suburban housewife experience, Friedan’s great work may not be best understood as arising from middle-class concerns. See Daniel Horowitz, Betty Friedan and the Making of the Feminine Mystique : The American Left, The Cold War, and Modern Feminism (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998).
- 51.
This has been developed both through global feminism and various forms of third-wave feminism, focusing on the intersection of particular cultural, racial, and class features with sex.
- 52.
WHD 267.
- 53.
WHD 264. For another discussion of these concerns, see “Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings,” section 8.
- 54.
Nussbaum likely has other reasons for leaving aside these questions. She writes in “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism”: “There is much disagreement, of course, about how much of human experience is rooted in the body . Here, religion and metaphysics enter the picture in a nontrivial way” (217). Nussbaum repeatedly makes clear in WHD that her project is not metaphysical and that she is working for a political goal and thus aiming for the greatest consensus. I assume that at least part of why she hesitates to answer these questions is that doing so would engage her in more explicitly metaphysical projects and thereby compromise the more political goals.
- 55.
Sex and Social Justice , 52. The position she is criticizing at this point in the text is a significantly stronger one than I will defend at any point—i.e., one claiming that there are innate differences of capacities.
- 56.
This hesitation to embrace any strong notion of the significance of biological difference is a relatively common and understandable one in contemporary feminist discussions. For example, in her highly influential and widely read Justice, Gender, and the Family, Susan Moller Okin similarly downplays the significance of biological differences , claiming that “the rejection of biological determinism and the corresponding emphasis on gender as a social construction characterize most current feminist scholarship” and “the new meaning of the word [gender] reflects the fact that so much of what has traditionally been thought of as sexual difference is now considered by many to be largely socially produced” (Justice, Gender, and the Family, 6). Nussbaum and Okin both downplay the significance of biology for gender. It would be a mistake to claim that they simply deny any significance to our differing biologies, but such differences are made inessential to the account. (This tendency to emphasize the social dimensions relevant to gender over any biological features continues to be a dominant one, as can be seen by looking at the Spring 2009 websites of women’s studies programs at, for example, Smith College, Dartmouth College, University of California-Irvine, University of Notre Dame, Emory University, DePaul University, Fordham University, and Duke University.)
- 57.
Wendy W. Williams , “The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism,” Women’s Rights Law Reporter, 7, no. 3 (Spring 1982): 175–200.
- 58.
And thus, even if I am correct about differences, we might want to accept William’s suggestions for the particular examples she discusses.
- 59.
I will, however, give one example of where this model could be used to understand educational institutions in Chap. 6.
- 60.
See WHD 253.
- 61.
For more on the history of women lawyers in Illinois, see Meg Gorecki’s “Legal Pioneers: Four of Illinois’ First Women Lawyers” in Illinois Bar Journal (October 1990): 510–515, found at http://womenslegalhistory.stanford.edu/articles/legalpioneers.pdf (accessed May 2, 2009).
- 62.
Aristotle can certainly be cited as a case in point. For Nussbaum’s articulation of this fear, see Sex and Social Justice , 51–52.
- 63.
See, for example, Marcella Bombardieri’s “Summers’ Remarks on Women draw Fire” in The Boston Globe, January 17, 2005, at http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2005/01/17/summers_remarks_on_women_draw_fire/, accessed May 12, 2009.
- 64.
Two nearly classic texts from the 1980s arguing this point are Anne Fausto-Sterling , Myths of Gender: Biological Theories about Women and Men (New York: Basic Books, 1985) and Ruth Bleier, Science and Gender: A Critique of Biology and its Theories on Women (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984).
- 65.
See Fausto-Sterling , Myths of Gender. In her more recent Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality, Fausto-Sterling returns to some of the same concerns. The themes of Sexing the Body are a bit broader than her earlier book, but she includes discussion of the development of gender and supposed differences between girls’ and boys’ brains, as well as extensive discussion of intersexuality.
- 66.
These are among the differences Edward O. Wilson points to in his On Human Nature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 127.
- 67.
See Fausto-Sterling , Myths of Gender, 214.
- 68.
Fausto-Sterling , 218–219.
- 69.
See Fausto-Sterling , 216, citing a 1974 article in the journal Women Sports. We might also ask how much cultural factors play into our assumptions about what it means to be un-athletic for women and for men.
- 70.
Ibid., 217.
- 71.
Ibid., 215.
- 72.
Fausto-Sterling notes: “The physical structure of the adult brain—its size, number of cells, and most importantly its neuronal pathways—establishes itself in intimate interaction with the environment of the developing individual. Nutrition, exercise, physical contact with other humans, exposure to varying sorts of visual and cognitive stimuli, all these and more influence brain structure” (Myths of Gender, 74).
- 73.
Ruth Bleier makes the point quite strongly: “But, most importantly, it is not possible to tease apart genetic and other biological factors from environmental and learning factors in human development. That is, in fact, a meaningless way to view the problem, since, from conception the relationships between the actions of genes and the environment of fetus are inextricable. The very structure and functioning of the brain, the organ of mind and mediator of behavior, are influenced by environmental input both before and after birth. Thus, whatever the genetic and hormonal influences are on the development of our fetal and newborn brains, they are inextricable from the influences of the environmental milieu, from sensory input and learning. In addition, in its structure and function, the human brain is qualitatively and quantitatively different from the brain of other animals. Its capacity for learning, consciousness, memory and intent, motivation, intelligence, innovativeness, and flexibility frees us from predetermined and stereotypic behavior patterns, and it also has created cultures of staggering complexity and sophistication that affect our behaviors from the time of birth. No science or discipline can peel off layers of culture and learning and find an untouched core of biological nature. Rather than biology acting to constrain and limit our potentialities, it is, in fact, the supreme irony that our magnificent brains, with their nearly limitless structural and functional potentiality for learning, flexibility, and choice-making, have produced cultures that constrain and limit those potentialities” (Science and Gender, 6–7).
- 74.
Methodological questions are, thus, I think best addressed from within and by the disciplines most relevant to particular questions posed. This is not to deny that more interdisciplinary work is necessary, nor that certain traditional divisions may need to be re-thought. But the particular method appropriate to answering any specific question regarding the influence of biological matter on gender formation depends upon the specific question asked, the particular capacity considered, etc.
- 75.
See the discussion of university education in the sixth chapter.
- 76.
I can imagine some very, very limited situations where such roles might allow the fullest possible (given the overall circumstances) opportunity for capabilities development for both women and men. Such cases would, however, be exceedingly rare. Thus, I agree with Nussbaum that positions advocating such different and exclusive roles should be treated with extreme caution, if not outright rejected. See section VIII (“Women and Men: Two Norms or One?”) in “Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings” in Women, Culture, and Development ed. Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
- 77.
Firestone attributes significant economic, social, and cultural (including the very notion of culture) differences to our biological differences . Thus, biology on her account has played a profound role in the whole history of inequality. For a brief summary of the critical biological differences , see Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex : The Case for Feminist Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1970), 9.
- 78.
She says, for example: “The reproduction of the species by one sex for the benefit of both would be replaced by (at least the option of) artificial reproduction: children would be born to both sexes equally, or independently of either, however one chooses to look at it; the dependence of the child on the mother (and vice versa) would give way to a greatly shortened dependence on a small group of others in general, and any remaining inferiority to adults in physical strength would be compensated for culturally. The division of labour would be ended by the elimination of labour altogether (through cybernetics). The tyranny of the biological family would be broken” ( The Dialectic of Sex , 11). See also Chap. 10 of The Dialectic of Sex for Firestone’s development of these alternatives.
- 79.
Aristotle himself saw the form as being superior to matter. See, for example, The Generation of Animals 732a5-10. And when this is coupled with his association of the female with matter and the male with form, his denigration of women is furthered. Although form is in some sense superior to matter, matter clearly has some kind of significant dignity in the Aristotelian account, and Aristotle’s explicit comments critical of matter does not lead him into the kind of denigration of matter present in most dualist accounts (and certainly important to Plato ’s dualism , especially as articulated in the Phaedo). Furthermore, we can dispute Aristotle’s problematic association of women with matter (see Chap. 5) without thereby rejecting the general Aristotelian hylomorphism.
- 80.
Firestone’s radical solution, though provocative in many important and good ways, raises a number of further questions. First, it is not obvious that all differences need be oppressive. Certainly, most human cultures have treated some differences, at certain points, in ways that are problematic; but all cultures have also celebrated certain differences. Differences can, but need not, be treated in ways that are oppressive. Thus, differences per se are not obviously problematic. Second, it is not clear that we ought to devote so many resources to such radical changes in our biological structures rather than dedicating those resources to something else (e.g., eliminating hunger, funding AIDS research, better care for elderly, fighting sex slave trade, etc.). I am not convinced that our resources are best used for the projects Firestone recommends. And, finally, Firestone’s solution suggests that she takes the root problem to be something best addressed by a technical solution, rather than a problem that is fundamentally relational or moral. Although there will surely be technical dimensions to both the problem and best solutions, I am not convinced that a technicist rather than a moral (and social) solution will ultimately be most successful.
- 81.
See Chap. 2 for further discussion of the relation of form and matter.
- 82.
It is in this sense that matter serves form.
- 83.
Or one might make a different claim, arguing that individuals may only be molded in incremental ways, but—over the long run—some group (e.g., women) can be molded in nearly limitless ways. Each of these claims is slightly different.
- 84.
This is not only, however, the tendency of broadly liberal feminists. Insofar as Nancy Chodorow, for example, focuses on our parenting practices and not more biologically based features as accounting for the psychological sources of gender, she too downplays the role of the biological.
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Borden Sharkey, S. (2016). Nussbaum, Capabilities, and Biology. In: An Aristotelian Feminism. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29847-4_1
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