Abstract
Most of the existing works in dynamic spectrum sharing commonly assumed that the auctioned spectrum resource would be exclusively occupied by the winning spectrum buyers. Such assumption poses a dilemma for the licensed spectrum owners: either auction off unused spectrum bands and get auction revenue at the risk of sudden increases in demand from PUs, or reserve spectrum uneconomically. To address this issue, the idea of dynamic spectrum recall has been introduced [1, 2], by which PUs are granted with the highest spectrum access priority so that the auctioned spectrum bands can be recalled from the winning spectrum buyers if necessary.
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Yi, C., Cai, J. (2016). Recall-Based Spectrum Auction Mechanism. In: Market-Driven Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio. SpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29691-3_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29691-3_3
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