Recall-Based Spectrum Auction Mechanism

  • Changyan Yi
  • Jun Cai
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering book series (BRIEFSELECTRIC)


Most of the existing works in dynamic spectrum sharing commonly assumed that the auctioned spectrum resource would be exclusively occupied by the winning spectrum buyers. Such assumption poses a dilemma for the licensed spectrum owners: either auction off unused spectrum bands and get auction revenue at the risk of sudden increases in demand from PUs, or reserve spectrum uneconomically. To address this issue, the idea of dynamic spectrum recall has been introduced [1, 2], by which PUs are granted with the highest spectrum access priority so that the auctioned spectrum bands can be recalled from the winning spectrum buyers if necessary.


Auction Revenue Spectrum Recall Callback Channel Spectrum Demand Private Value Function 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Changyan Yi
    • 1
  • Jun Cai
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringUniversity of ManitobaWinnipegCanada

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