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Nudging in Swiss Contract Law?

An Analysis of Non-mandatory Default Rules from a Legal, Economic and Behavioural Perspective

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Nudging - Possibilities, Limitations and Applications in European Law and Economics

Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 3))

Abstract

This essay discusses various interpretations of the function of non-mandatory contract law and the ensuing requirements with regard to formulating its content adequately. After some preliminary remarks on non-mandatory contract law (Sect. 8.1) initially two theories are introduced: Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s theory based on the autonomy of contracting parties and the theory of Oskar Bülow and Rudolf Stammler focusing on heteronomous evaluations (Sect. 8.2.1). There follows a presentation of a classical economic perspective on contract law, which conceives of non-mandatory norms as means for reducing transaction costs and which upholds efficiency as the central standard (Sect. 8.2.2). Next, attention is turned on the behavioural economic analysis of non-mandatory contract law, and the fundamental possibility of using non-mandatory law as a nudging instrument to steer behaviour is introduced, making reference to two concrete examples of its application in labour law and in surety contract law. In conclusion, the most important findings are summarised (Sect. 8.3).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Gauch et al. 2008a, p. 59.

  2. 2.

    Schwenzer 2012, p. 171.

  3. 3.

    Decision of the Swiss Federal Court BGE 96 II (18), 20, E.1.

  4. 4.

    Cf. on the entire issue, Schwenzer 2012, 180–181, 249–257; Gauch et al. 2008a, pp. 122–152.

  5. 5.

    Schönenberger and Jäggi, marg. no. 84 to Art. 1 of the Swiss Code of Obligations.

  6. 6.

    Gauch et al. 2008a, p. 312.

  7. 7.

    Gauch et al. 2008a, p. 317.

  8. 8.

    Gauch et al. 2008a, pp. 330 et seqq..

  9. 9.

    Belser et al. 2000, p. 174.

  10. 10.

    Korobkin 1998, p. 609; Schäfer and Ott 2012, p. 455.

  11. 11.

    On the theoretically conceivable options for reacting to incomplete contracts in the event of disputes, see Cziupka 2010, p. 1 and for a brief comparative presentation on the treatment of loophole-closing instruments in civil law and common law systems, see ibid. pp. 59–63.

  12. 12.

    Gauch et al. 2008a, pp. 283 et seqq.; Schwenzer 2012, p. 269.

  13. 13.

    Gauch et al. 2008a, p. 287.

  14. 14.

    Gauch et al. 2008a, p. 285.

  15. 15.

    Gauch et al. 2008a, p. 286.

  16. 16.

    Gauch et al. 2008a, p. 284.

  17. 17.

    Also: dispositive law, ius dispositivum, voluntary law (under civil law).

  18. 18.

    For Swiss contract law: Huguenin 2012, p. 6; Gauch et al. 2008a, p. 283–285; Schwenzer 2012, p. 252.

  19. 19.

    Cf. Bucher 1977, p. 249.

  20. 20.

    Thus, Schäfer and Ott 2012, p. 455.

  21. 21.

    Schmid and Stöckli 2010, p. 11.

  22. 22.

    Cf. Cziupka 2010, p. 207.

  23. 23.

    On the “guiding principle” function of non-mandatory law, with further citations, Cziupka 2010, pp. 126 et seqq.

  24. 24.

    Cziupka 2010, p. 5.

  25. 25.

    Raiser 1935, p. 293.

  26. 26.

    On this, cf. citing Enneccerus et al. 1959, § 49; Cziupka 2010, p. 91.

  27. 27.

    There are numerous variations and modes of both theories. For the purposes of the present essay, it suffices to give a schematic presentation illustrating the fundamental field of tension between autonomous and heteronomous norming in non-mandatory contract law.

  28. 28.

    For a comprehensive presentation of these theories, see Cziupka 2010, pp. 66 et seqq.

  29. 29.

    Cziupka 2010, pp. 486 et seqq.

  30. 30.

    On this, see Cziupka 2010, p. 70.

  31. 31.

    Von Savigny 1840, p. 58.

  32. 32.

    Cziupka 2010, p. 67.

  33. 33.

    See von Savigny 1840, p. 59.

  34. 34.

    Cziupka 2010, p. 72.

  35. 35.

    Cziupka 2010, p. 72.

  36. 36.

    Cziupka 2010, p. 72.

  37. 37.

    Cziupka 2010, p. 72.

  38. 38.

    Windscheid 1887, pp. 263–264.

  39. 39.

    von Savigny 1840, p. 58.

  40. 40.

    Cziupka 2010, p. 73.

  41. 41.

    Laband 1888, p. 164.

  42. 42.

    Cziupka 2010, p. 81.

  43. 43.

    Cziupka 2010, p. 67.

  44. 44.

    Cziupka 2010, p. 78.

  45. 45.

    With further citations, Cziupka 2010, p. 91.

  46. 46.

    See also Huber 1933, p. 40: “There is no natural freedom to conclude a contract, but rather, there is a state-regulated institution of the free contract”.

  47. 47.

    See extensive discussion of this in Cziupka 2010, pp. 108–109, pp. 108-109; Stammler 1886, p. 24.

  48. 48.

    In this vein, Cziupka 2010, pp. 108–109.

  49. 49.

    With further citations, Cziupka 2010, p. 205.

  50. 50.

    Stammler 1886, p. 25.

  51. 51.

    Cziupka 2010, p. 67.

  52. 52.

    Stammler 1886, p. 24.

  53. 53.

    Bülow 1881, p. 108.

  54. 54.

    Enneccerus et al. 1959, §49 III.

  55. 55.

    Cziupka 2010, p. 111.

  56. 56.

    Cziupka 2010, p. 104.

  57. 57.

    Cziupka 2010, pp. 126 et seqq.

  58. 58.

    At this point, a further theory discussed in the economic analysis of law discourse can be mentioned: this theory describes the possibility of utilising non-mandatory contract norms as penalty default rules. The pivotal aspect of this is that non-mandatory norms that are disadvantageous for both parties compel them to find their own contractual provision. In the negotiation process the parties would then disclose information that they would otherwise have held back, had non-mandatory law already proposed a provision advantageous to them. Foundational, Ayres and Gertner 1989; critical in relation to the practical relevance of penalty default rules, Posner 2006; also critical of the whole matter, Kähler 2012, p. 149 et seqq.

  59. 59.

    Mathis 2009, pp. 7 et seqq.

  60. 60.

    Mathis 2009, pp. 31 et seqq.

  61. 61.

    Efficiency or efficient can mean – in a relative sense – that state of affairs A is preferable to state of affairs B or – in an absolute sense – that a certain state of affairs is the best possible and thus represents an optimal state. Mathis 2009, p. 32.

  62. 62.

    For an extensive presentation and critique, see Mathis 2009, pp. 35 et seqq.

  63. 63.

    For an extensive presentation and critique see Mathis 2009, pp. 42 et seqq.

  64. 64.

    Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 81 et seqq.

  65. 65.

    Mathis 2009, p. 14; comprehensively on homo oeconomicus, Kirchgässner 2008; on its application in legal science in particular, Lüdemann 2007.

  66. 66.

    Mathis 2009, pp. 7 et seqq.

  67. 67.

    Coase 1960.

  68. 68.

    For thorough treatment of the Coase theorem, see Mathis 2009, pp. 53 et seqq.

  69. 69.

    Coase 1960, p. 6.

  70. 70.

    For an enumerated list see Weigel 2003, p. 46 citing Alchian 1979.

  71. 71.

    Cf. on this, with further citations, Mathis 2009, pp. 61 et seqq.

  72. 72.

    Schäfer and Ott 2012, pp. 455–456; Kähler 2012, p. 140.

  73. 73.

    Cziupka 2010, pp. 296 et seqq.

  74. 74.

    With further citations, Unberath and Cziupka 2009, p. 49; and Cziupka 2010, p. 296.

  75. 75.

    Unberath and Cziupka 2009, p. 41.

  76. 76.

    Kähler 2012, pp. 148–149.

  77. 77.

    Unberath and Cziupka 2009, p. 74.

  78. 78.

    Korobkin 1998, pp. 613–617; 2000, with reference to the influence of standard form contracts pp. 123–125.

  79. 79.

    Kähler 2012, pp. 141–142.

  80. 80.

    On the practicability of the law in general, see Mathis and Anderhub 2009.

  81. 81.

    Unberath and Cziupka 2009, p. 60.

  82. 82.

    Kähler 2012, p. 142.

  83. 83.

    Unberath and Cziupka 2009, pp. 60 et seqq. The same applies to the reference to a hypothetical will of the parties, which relates to what bona fide parties in the contracting parties’ place would have agreed in good faith, cf. Schwenzer 2012, p. 270. This concept is likewise very abstract and, in the application of law, requires great concretisation by the courts.

  84. 84.

    Cziupka 2010, p. 410.

  85. 85.

    Unberath and Cziupka 2009, p. 62.

  86. 86.

    On this, see Cziupka, p. 415.

  87. 87.

    Unberath and Cziupka 2009, p. 48

  88. 88.

    Unberath and Cziupka 2009, p. 52. Here the additional assumption is made that the legislation costs and court costs for this variant are lower than for the two extreme variants. This is a plausible scenario under the assumption of rising marginal costs.

  89. 89.

    Cziupka 2010, p. 420.

  90. 90.

    Cziupka 2010, p. 417.

  91. 91.

    Schäfer and Ott 2012, pp. 457–458; Cziupka 2010, pp. 417–418.

  92. 92.

    Schmid and Stöckli 2010, pp. 5 et seqq.

  93. 93.

    Gauch et al. 2008a, p. 284, citing by way of a rationale the judge’s obligation to the statute (Art. 1 para. 1, Swiss Civil Code); for a contrasting opinion, see Schwenzer (2012, pp. 270–271), who cites the principle of freedom of contract as a basis for prioritising the hypothetical will of the parties.

  94. 94.

    Gauch et al. 2008a, pp. 284–285.

  95. 95.

    Gauch et al. 2008a, pp. 285–286.

  96. 96.

    Gauch et al. 2008a, pp. 285 et seqq.; Art. 1 para. 2 of the Swiss Civil Code.

  97. 97.

    Schäfer and Ott 2012, p. 456 citing Kötz 2003, pp. 209–214.

  98. 98.

    Schäfer and Ott 2012, p. 456 citing Kötz 2003, pp. 209–214; see also Belser 2000, pp. 184 et seqq.

  99. 99.

    Schnellenbach 2012, pp. 595–596, with further citations; see also the extensive discussion in Mathis and Diriwächter 2011 and Mathis and Steffen 2015. On constrained rationality in general, see also McFadden 1999.

  100. 100.

    Korobkin 1998, pp. 621–623.

  101. 101.

    Unberath and Cziupka 2009, p. 76.

  102. 102.

    Korobkin 1998, pp. 633–646; see also Listokin 2009.

  103. 103.

    Jolls 2009, pp. 77–78.

  104. 104.

    See DeJoy 1989.

  105. 105.

    With further citations, Kähler 2012, p. 169.

  106. 106.

    Kähler 2012, p. 169.

  107. 107.

    See Jolls et al. 1998, p. 1537.

  108. 108.

    Tversky and Kahneman 1974, p. 1127.

  109. 109.

    Kähler 2012, p. 170.

  110. 110.

    Kähler 2012, p. 170.

  111. 111.

    Foundational discussion, Laibson 1997.

  112. 112.

    Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 44.

  113. 113.

    Gruber 2002, p. 54–55.

  114. 114.

    Thaler Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 73, pp. 112–115.

  115. 115.

    See Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988.

  116. 116.

    Thaler and Sunstein 2008, pp. 187–188.

  117. 117.

    Cf. Korobkin 1998, pp. 630–633.

  118. 118.

    Cf. Kahneman et al. 1991.

  119. 119.

    Cf. Korobkin 1998, p. 656.

  120. 120.

    DiMatteo 2006, p. 897, citing Korobkin 1998).

  121. 121.

    With further references on the endowment effect in conjunction with non-mandatory law, see Kähler 2012, p. 180.

  122. 122.

    Unberath and Cziupka 2009, p. 72.

  123. 123.

    Kahneman and Tversky 1979.

  124. 124.

    Korobkin 1998, pp. 655–656.

  125. 125.

    With further citations, Kähler 2012, p. 182.

  126. 126.

    With further citations, Kähler 2012, p. 182.

  127. 127.

    On this, see Kähler 2012, p. 182.

  128. 128.

    Kähler 2012, p. 182.

  129. 129.

    With further citations, Kähler 2012, p. 182. For a thorough treatment of trust in the legal system, see Kähler 2010, pp. 441 et seqq.

  130. 130.

    Tversky and Kahneman 1974, p. 1128.

  131. 131.

    Tversky and Kahneman 1974, p. 1128 and Mathis and Diriwächter 2011, p. 61.

  132. 132.

    On the so-called anchor effect, see Tversky and Kahneman 1974, p. 1128.

  133. 133.

    Möslein 2010, p. 2864.

  134. 134.

    Sunstein and Thaler 2003, p. 1175.

  135. 135.

    Jolls et al. 1998, p. 1447.

  136. 136.

    Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 8.

  137. 137.

    Unberath and Cziupka 2009, p. 74.

  138. 138.

    Foundational, Sunstein and Thaler 2003; critique of their work, Horn 2013, p. 14 and Schnellenbach 2012, pp. 594 et. seqq.

  139. 139.

    Sunstein and Thaler 2003, p. 1162.

  140. 140.

    Sunstein and Thaler 2003, p. 1161.

  141. 141.

    Grundlegend Jolls and Sunstein 2006, pp. 199–241; see also Mathis and Diriwächter 2011, pp. 63 et seqq.

  142. 142.

    Jolls and Sunstein 2006, p. 208.

  143. 143.

    Jolls and Sunstein 2006, pp. 207 et seqq.

  144. 144.

    Jolls and Sunstein 2006, p. 207.

  145. 145.

    See, for example, Sunstein 2002, who supports assigning certain rights to employees in accordance with non-mandatory law.

  146. 146.

    On the whole issue, Dunand 2013, p. 93.

  147. 147.

    Cerrotini 2013, p. 370.

  148. 148.

    Unberath and Cziupka 2009, p. 73).

  149. 149.

    Willis 2013, pp. 1200 et seqq.

  150. 150.

    Cf. Sunstein and Thaler 2003, p. 1175.

  151. 151.

    Willis 2013, p. 1174.

  152. 152.

    Luth 2010, pp. 195 et seqq.

  153. 153.

    With further citations, Kuhn 2011, p. 695 et seqq.; Swiss Federal Gazette BBL 1939 841, p. 845.

  154. 154.

    Swiss Federal Gazette BBL (1939 841, p. 846) (emphasis added by authors).

  155. 155.

    Swiss Federal Gazette BBL (1939 841, p. 869) (emphasis added by authors).

  156. 156.

    Kuhn 2011, p. 687.

  157. 157.

    Kuhn 2011, p. 705.

  158. 158.

    Kuhn 2011, p. 707.

  159. 159.

    Kuhn 2011, p. 698.

  160. 160.

    Kuhn 2011, pp. 707–708.

  161. 161.

    Kuhn 2011, p. 679 citing Decision of the Swiss Federal Court BGE 129 III 702 E.2.3 and Gutzwiller 1984, p. 127. Another alternative, because functionally related, is the joint assumption of liability, Kuhn 2011, p. 678.

  162. 162.

    On the concept and outward forms of the contract of guarantee, Gauch et al. 2008b, p. 334–335.

  163. 163.

    Gauch et al. 2008 b, p. 337.

  164. 164.

    Cf. Kuhn 2011, pp. 694, 730 et seqq. and pp. 734 et seqq.

  165. 165.

    Kuhn 2011, p. 678; if the surety is a natural person, the surety declaration is required to be in writing (Art. 493 para. 1 Swiss Code of Obligations) and, for amounts over CHF 2,000, drawn up as a public deed. For the contract of guarantee, the principle of freedom from compliance with any particular form pursuant to Art. 11 para. 1 Swiss Code of Obligations applies; moreover, surety contract law overall is characterised by rules for the protection of the surety , Kuhn, p. 69.

  166. 166.

    Decision of the Swiss Federal Court BGE 113 II 438 E.2. Likewise, the distinction between the surety contract and the joint assumption of liability is a matter of great uncertainty in practice; alongside the said presumption, various additional criteria are referred to, see only Kuhn 2011, pp. 678 et seqq.

  167. 167.

    Kuhn 2011, p. 679.

  168. 168.

    Decision of the Swiss Federal Court BGE 129 III 702 E.2.3.

  169. 169.

    Kuhn 2011, p. 683 citing court rulings.

  170. 170.

    Kuhn 2011, p. 684 citing court rulings.

  171. 171.

    Kuhn 2011, p. 696.

  172. 172.

    On slippery defaults, see remarks above and Willis 2013, p. 1174.

  173. 173.

    One only need think of the positive account of the readiness for self-sacrifice and loyalty between friends in Friedrich Schiller’s “Die Bürgschaft” (The Hostage), on which see Bergenthal 1947, pp. 45 et. seqq.

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Acknowledgement

We are grateful to Kilian T. Keller, BLaw, for his critical review of the manuscript.

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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Lucerne, Frohburgstrasse 3, 6002, Lucerne, Switzerland

    Klaus Mathis & Philipp Anton Burri

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  1. Klaus Mathis
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Correspondence to Klaus Mathis .

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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Lucerne, Lucerne, Switzerland

    Klaus Mathis

  2. Notre Dame Law School, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, USA

    Avishalom Tor

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Mathis, K., Burri, P.A. (2016). Nudging in Swiss Contract Law?. In: Mathis, K., Tor, A. (eds) Nudging - Possibilities, Limitations and Applications in European Law and Economics. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29562-6_8

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