The Logic and Limits of the Party’s Social Management Approach in Maintaining Stability: Lessons from Bismarck

Abstract

Following the leadership transition in Autumn 2012, Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Qishan recommended party members to read the book The Old Regime and the Revolution by Alexis de Tocqueville.¹ Reflecting on the causes of the French Revolution, Tocqueville argued in his seminal work that a social revolution was more likely when living conditions are improving and dissatisfaction with the old regime is rising. Chinese academic He Qinglian has argued that ‘[Wang Qishan] meant to warn the ruling clique that, according to the Tocqueville Law, reform might not be fun, “the most dangerous time for a bad regime is not when it is most evil, but is when it begins to reform”, the so-called “reform” is no different from seeking death.’² He Qinglian further stated that ‘from this we could guess that for the next five (or even ten) years, China's political direction would be maintaining the status quo, making minor repairs here and there, insisting not to go back to the old path (Mao's path) or walk down the evil path (democratization)’. If He’s analysis is correct, and Wang Qishan was indeed interested in upholding the status quo, he could have also recommended cadres to learn more about another European country in the 19th century, namely Otto von Bismarck’s German Empire. Known for his balance-of-power realpolitik, Bismarck unified the country in 1871 and laid the foundations for the modern German welfare state. In this chapter I will argue that Bismarck’s rule could provide a useful historical analogy to discuss China’s socio-political trajectory, past, present, and future. I concur with Roxann Prazniak that ‘[the] histories of Europe and China offer rich opportunities for exploring aspects of the diversity and common experience of human history’³ and that ‘[the] history of Western Europe illuminates facets of the historical experience that often remained in the shadows or side currents of the Chinese experience. Conversely, Chinese historical patterns have often developed possibilities that remained untapped or dormant in the European context’.⁴

Andreas Fulda is lecturer at the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies and senior fellow at the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham. He is also coordinator of the School's Centre for Contemporary Chinese Politics (CCCP). The author would like to thank Bernhard Fulda, Gerhard Fulda, Steve Tsang, Niv Horesh, Jeremy Taylor, Baojiang Han, Sun Yingchun, Wang Lifeng, and Zhao Lei for comments and suggestions for revision of this research paper.