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Towards Safety Analysis of ERTMS/ETCS Level 2 in Real-Time Maude

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Formal Techniques for Safety-Critical Systems (FTSCS 2015)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 596))

Abstract

ERTMS/ETCS is a European signalling, control and train protection system. In this paper, we model and analyse this complex system of systems, including its hybrid elements, on the design level in Real-Time Maude. Our modelling allows us to formulate safety properties in physical rather than in logical terms. We systematically validate our model by simulation and error injection. Using the Real-Time Maude model-checker, we effectively verify a number of small rail systems.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We focus here on one ERTMS/ETCS system controlling a single, geographic region.

  2. 2.

    It is a design decision whether a topological route appears in the control table. The routes in the table are those available for use by trains.

  3. 3.

    At this point, there should be maximally one route available that matches a particular train. This is ensured by the requests from the controller and also the ability of the interlocking to deny requests for conflicting routes.

  4. 4.

    The models are available at: http://www.cs.swan.ac.uk/%7Ecsmarkus/ProcessesAndData/Models.

  5. 5.

    Compared to the given control table, we add RouteName4 to cover the exit track.

  6. 6.

    Using a PC running Xubuntu 14.04.2 with an i7 4790 @3.60 Ghz and 32 GB RAM.

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Acknowledgement

The authors would like to thank Simon Chadwick, Siemens Rail Automation, UK, for his continued support and many helpful discussions. We also appreciate the helpful advice from Peter Ölveczky on Real-Time Maude and the constructive comments given by three anonymous referees. Finally, we thank Erwin R. Catesbeiana (Jr.) for timely hints on how to stay on track.

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Correspondence to Monika Seisenberger .

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James, P., Lawrence, A., Roggenbach, M., Seisenberger, M. (2016). Towards Safety Analysis of ERTMS/ETCS Level 2 in Real-Time Maude. In: Artho, C., Ölveczky, P. (eds) Formal Techniques for Safety-Critical Systems. FTSCS 2015. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 596. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29510-7_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29510-7_6

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