Abstract
One of the most challenging aspects in computer-supported voting is to combine the apparently conflicting requirements of privacy and verifiability. In this paper, some of the definitions related to the electoral procedure are introduced, different mechanisms for identification and authentication of voters are discussed, and then a protocol is proposed which breaks the link between identity of the voter and the vote itself very early in the electoral process, enabling both privacy and verifiability. The protocol is best suited for a system where votes are casted in polling stations, but recommendations for use in a remote voting scheme are also given.
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Acknowledgments
The author would like to acknowledge the valuable comments and suggestions on the form of this paper from Professor Desimir Vucic.
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Majstorović, D. (2016). Proposition of a Protocol for E-voting Systems that Breaks the Link Between the Voter and His Vote. In: Abraham, A., Wegrzyn-Wolska, K., Hassanien, A., Snasel, V., Alimi, A. (eds) Proceedings of the Second International Afro-European Conference for Industrial Advancement AECIA 2015. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 427. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29504-6_27
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29504-6_27
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