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Hybrid Publicly Verifiable Computation

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Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2016 (CT-RSA 2016)

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Abstract

Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation (PVC) allows weak devices to delegate computations to more powerful servers, and to verify the correctness of results. Delegation and verification rely only on public parameters, and thus PVC lends itself to large multi-user systems where entities need not be registered. In such settings, individual user requirements may be diverse and cannot be realised with current PVC solutions. In this paper, we introduce Hybrid PVC (HPVC) which, with a single setup stage, provides a flexible solution to outsourced computation supporting multiple modes: (i) standard PVC, (ii) PVC with cryptographically enforced access control policies restricting the servers that may perform a given computation, and (iii) a reversed model of PVC which we call Verifiable Delegable Computation (VDC) where data is held remotely by servers. Entities may dynamically play the role of delegators or servers as required.

J. Alderman—Partial funding by the European Commission under project H2020-644024 “CLARUS”, and support from BAE Systems Advanced Technology Centre is gratefully acknowledged.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    These descriptive labels (e.g. field names in a database) allow delegators to select data points to be used in a computation without knowing the data values.

  2. 2.

    We do not consider input privacy here, but note that a revocable dual-policy predicate encryption scheme, if found, could easily replace our ABE scheme in Sect. 4.3. Security against vindictive servers and managers can also be adapted from [3].

  3. 3.

    This restriction was also used in [6] for revocable KP-ABE, and could be removed if an adaptive, indirectly revocable ABE scheme is found.

  4. 4.

    In contrast to prior modes where X was a single data point, F now takes |X| inputs.

  5. 5.

    Either by defining a large enough \(\mathcal {U}_x\) or by hashing strings to elements of the attribute group. Unlike prior schemes [3, 20], we include an identifier of the data X (based on the label \(l({x_{i,j}})\)) in the attribute mapping to specify the data items to be used; alternatively, \(D_i\) could be a long bitstring formed by concatenating each data point, and the labels should identify the attributes corresponding to each data point.

  6. 6.

    Our KDC will act as the trusted KeyGen authority already inherent in ABE schemes.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, UK

    James Alderman, Christian Janson, Carlos Cid & Jason Crampton

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  1. James Alderman
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  2. Christian Janson
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  3. Carlos Cid
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  4. Jason Crampton
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Correspondence to James Alderman .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. NEC Cloud Systems Research Laboratories, Kawasaki, Japan

    Kazue Sako

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Alderman, J., Janson, C., Cid, C., Crampton, J. (2016). Hybrid Publicly Verifiable Computation. In: Sako, K. (eds) Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2016. CT-RSA 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9610. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_9

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