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Counterfactuals in Logic Programming

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Programming Machine Ethics

Part of the book series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics ((SAPERE,volume 26))

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Abstract

Counterfactuals capture the process of reasoning about a past event that did not occur, namely what would have happened had this event occurred; or, vice-versa, to reason about an event that did occur but what if it had not. In this chapter, we innovatively make use of LP abduction and updating in an implemented procedure for evaluating counterfactuals, taking the established structural approach of Pearl as reference. Our approach concentrates on pure non-probabilistic counterfactual reasoning in LP, resorting to abduction and updating, in order to determine the logical validity of counterfactuals under the Well-Founded Semantics. Nevertheless, the approach is adaptable to other semantics, too. Even though the LP technique introduced in this chapter is relevant for modeling counterfactual moral reasoning, its use is general, not specific to morality.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Both the Well-Founded Semantics (WFS) and the Weak Completion Semantics (WCS) are 3-valued semantics that differ in dealing with close world assumption (CWA) and rules with positive loops (e.g., \(p\leftarrow p\)). WFS enforces CWA, i.e., atom a that has no rule is interpreted as false, whereas in WCS undefined. Nevertheless, they can be transformed one to another: adding rules \(a\leftarrow u\) and \(u\leftarrow not\ u\) for a reserved atom u renders a unknown in WFS; alternatively, adding \(a\leftarrow \bot \), where \(\bot \) is false, enforces CWA in WCS. In this book, positive loops are not needed and do not appear throughout examples we consider.

  2. 2.

    We assume that people are using counterfactuals to convey truly relevant information rather than to fabricate arbitrary subjunctive conditionals (e.g., “If I had been watching, then I would have seen the cheese on the moon melt during the eclipse”). Otherwise, implicit observations must simply be made explicit observations, to avoid natural language conundrums or ambiguities [10].

  3. 3.

    This interpretation is in line with the corresponding English construct, cf. [12], commonly known as third conditionals.

  4. 4.

    This replacement of abducible \(A\not \in {E}\) with \({\mathbf {\mathsf{{u}}}} \) in P and \(\mathcal {IC} \) is an alternative but equivalent to adding \({A}\leftarrow {{\mathbf {\mathsf{{u}}}}}\) into \(P\cup E\), as foreseen by Definition 4.15.

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Correspondence to Luís Moniz Pereira .

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Pereira, L.M., Saptawijaya, A. (2016). Counterfactuals in Logic Programming. In: Programming Machine Ethics. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 26. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29354-7_6

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