Abstract
To date, border carbon adjustment measures in the form of emissions allowance requirements (EAR) under the U.S. proposed cap-and-trade regime are the most concrete unilateral trade measure put forward to level the carbon playing field, and the U.S. EAR clearly targets major emerging economies, such as China. If improperly implemented, such measures could disturb the world trade order and trigger a trade war. Because of these potentially far-reaching impacts, this paper analyzes trade policy implications of the proposed EAR, and China’s responses. Scrutinizing the U.S. EAR against WTO provisions and case laws, the paper recommends what is to be done on the side of the U.S. to minimize the potential conflicts with WTO provisions in designing its BCA measures, and provides suggestions for China on how to effectively deal them to its advantage while being targeted by such proposed measures. The paper has argued that there is a clear need within a climate regime to define comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation to discipline the use of unilateral trade measures at the international level, and shows that defining the comparability of climate efforts can be to China’s advantage, and questions China’s same stance on this issue as India’s.
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Notes
- 1.
See Reinaud (2008) for a review of practical issues involved in implementing unilateral EAR.
- 2.
This is in line with the IBEW/AEP proposal, which requires U.S. importers to submit allowances to cover the emissions produced during the manufacturing of those goods 2 years after U.S. starts its cap-and-trade program (McBroom 2008).
- 3.
To be consistent with the WTO provisions, foreign producers could arguably demand the same proportion of free allowances as U.S. domestic producers in case they are subject to border carbon adjustments.
- 4.
In a second-best setting with pre-existing distortionary taxes, if allowances are auctioned, the revenues generated can then be used to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes, thus generating overall efficiency gains. Parry et al. (1999), for example, show that the costs of reducing U.S. carbon emissions by 10 % in a second-best setting with pre-existing labor taxes are five times more costly under a grandfathered carbon permits case than under an auctioned case. This is because the policy where the permits are auctioned raises revenues for the government that can be used to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes. By contrast, in the former case, no revenue-recycling effect occurs, since no revenues are raised for the government. However, the policy produces the same tax-interaction effect as under the latter case, which tends to reduce employment and investment and thus exacerbates the distortionary effects of pre-existing taxes (Zhang 1999).
- 5.
As part of its comprehensive strategy to control CO2 emissions and increase energy efficiency, a carbon/energy tax had been proposed by the CEC. The CEC proposal was that member states introduce a carbon/energy tax of US$ 3 per barrel oil equivalent in 1993, rising in real terms by US$ 1 a year to US$ 10 per barrel in 2000. After the year 2000 the tax rate would remain at US$ 10 per barrel at 1993 prices. The tax rates were allocated across fuels, with 50 % based on carbon content and 50 % on energy content (Zhang 1998a).
- 6.
See Genasci (2008) for discussion on complicating issues related to how to rebate exports under a cap-and-trade regime.
- 7.
President Obama was quoted as saying that “At a time when the economy worldwide is still deep in recession and we’ve seen a significant drop in global trade, I think we have to be very careful about sending any protectionist signals out there. I think there may be other ways of doing it than with a tariff approach.” (Broder 2009).
- 8.
China’s stance on carbon tariffs is in conflict with its statement for importers being responsible for China’s carbon emissions embodied in trade (Zhang 2012a). Being the workshop of the world and having the export-driven economy have led to a chunk of China’s carbon emissions embedded in trade (e.g., Davis and Caldeira 2010; Peters et al. 2011). China certainly wants importers to cover some, if not all, of the costs of that. However, if this consumption-based accounting of CO2 emissions, either implicitly or explicitly, is to indicate that the responsibility for the CO2 emissions from the production of traded goods and services lies with the consumers in importing countries, it can then be argued that the final responsibility for regulating those CO2 emissions lies with the governments of importing countries. Given that most carbon-intensive industries in the U.S. run a substantial trade deficit, this proposed EAR clearly aims to level the carbon playing field for domestic producers and importers.
- 9.
In 2012, China produced 2.16 billion tons of cement, accounting for 58 % of the total world cement production, and the India, the second largest producer, was far behind with 7 % of the world production (ICR 2013).
- 10.
Xie Zhenghua, Vice Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission and head of China’s delegation of international climate change negotiations, indicated in a press conference on 14 July 2014, Berlin, that China could present plans for an emissions cap as early as in the first half of the year 2015 (Xinhua 2014).
- 11.
UNDESA (2009) projects that China’s population would peak at 1462.5 millions around 2030, while India’s population would be projected to be at 1484.6 millions in 2030 and further grow to 1613.8 millions in 2050.
- 12.
As long as China’s pledges are in the form of carbon intensity, the reliability of both emissions and GDP data matters. See Zhang (2010a, 2011a) for discussions on the reliability and revisions of China’s statistical data on energy and GDP, and their implications for meeting China’s energy-saving goal in 2010 and its proposed carbon intensity target in 2020.
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Acknowledgments
This paper is a revised and expanded version of my article “The U.S. Proposed Carbon Tariffs, WTO Scrutiny and China’s Responses” appearing in International Economics and Economic Policy, Vol. 7, Nos. 2/3, 2010, pp. 203–225.
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Zhang, Z. (2016). The U.S. Proposed Carbon Tariffs, WTO Scrutiny and China’s Responses. In: Park, DY. (eds) Legal Issues on Climate Change and International Trade Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29322-6_3
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