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Evolutionary Oligopoly Models of Commercial Fishing with Heterogeneities

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Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games

Part of the book series: Springer Series in Game Theory ((SSGT))

Abstract

In this paper we provide an overview of some recent dynamic models of commercial fisheries. Our starting points are the papers by Okuguchi (Keio Econ Stud 35:9–17, 1998) and Okuguchi and Szidarovszky (Seoul J Econ 11(3):321–330, 1998) and Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Seoul J Econ 13:471–476, 2000) on oligopoly competition in international fisheries, which are based on the assumptions of homogeneous fish population, homogeneous space and continuous time. Following also insightful hints given in Okuguchi (Keio Econ Stud 21:37–44, 1984) and Erjaee and Okuguchi (Keio Econ Stud 41:61–71, 2006), we describe how some heterogeneities can be introduced in fishery models. The examples provided in this paper include bioeconomic models of fisheries with several species and with different time scales, ranging from continuous-time to discrete-time dynamic models and also addressing hybrid models, where some variables evolve in continuous time whereas other ones change in (event-driven) discrete time. Fishery models where the aquatic environment is subdivided into adjacent patches, characterized by different fishing policies including, as a particular case, Marine Protected Areas, are also described. Finally, we describe a fishery models with cooperators and defectors and punishment policies to encourage cooperation. All the models described in this overview include an evolutionary mechanism, based on imitative behavior, through which fishers are allowed to change their harvesting strategy over time. Some of these models have been motivated by projects or management experiences performed in the Adriatic Sea by Italian fishing authorities.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In the context we are considering, we disregard the case \(\sigma <0\), related to varieties that are demand complementary.

  2. 2.

    A comparison of models with endogenous switching among different regimes and with different time-scales is carried out in Bischi et al. (2014). A related hybrid evolutionary model for the adoption of technologies with different efficiency and environmental impact is considered in Lamantia and Radi (2015).

  3. 3.

    A non-evolutionary version of this model has been addressed in Lamantia and Sbragia (2006).

  4. 4.

    See Bischi and Lamantia (2005) for the topological definition and for an overview on nonlinear dynamical models in discrete time.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Society, Politics, University of Urbino, Urbino, Italy

    Gian Italo Bischi

Authors
  1. Gian Italo Bischi
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  2. Fabio Lamantia
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  3. Elena Viganò
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Correspondence to Gian Italo Bischi .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands

    Pierre von Mouche

  2. University Federico II of Naples, Naples, Italy

    Federico Quartieri

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Bischi, G.I., Lamantia, F., Viganò, E. (2016). Evolutionary Oligopoly Models of Commercial Fishing with Heterogeneities. In: von Mouche, P., Quartieri, F. (eds) Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games. Springer Series in Game Theory. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_13

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