Abstract
In this Introduction to the Festschrift we identify a game structure that is commonly analyzed in many—albeit not all—works of Prof. Okuguchi. We define the games characterized by this structure as Cournotian games and we show that the archetypical Cournot model of oligopolistic competition and other models of economic interest are special instances of these games. We then pass to a brief summary of the contributions collected in this volume that are related to Cournotian games.
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Notes
- 1.
See the next contribution in this Festschrift.
- 2.
Although this formula is correct for homogeneous Cournot oligopolies, for related games like rent-seeking games the formula may need a modification at the boundary of S.
- 3.
Indeed—denoting by s the price vector, by D i the demand at s and by C i the average cost—one can put g i s = D i s − C i and h i = 0, thus obtaining a Bertrand model of competition with differentiated products.
- 4.
See Okuguchi (1995) in the list of references in the next contribution.
- 5.
Instead of ‘replacement function (or correspondence)’ other terminology like ‘backward reply function (correspondence)’ is used in the literature.
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© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
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von Mouche, P., Quartieri, F. (2016). Introduction. In: von Mouche, P., Quartieri, F. (eds) Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games. Springer Series in Game Theory. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_1
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