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Human Rights and International Economic Law

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European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2016

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EUROYEAR,volume 7))

Abstract

Ostensibly, international human rights law and international economic law (incorporating international trade law and international investment law) seek to achieve similar outcomes, namely the protection of certain rights so as to promote human flourishing. However, compatibility between international economic law and human rights law cannot be presumed. While restrictions on, for example, protectionism can undoubtedly have positive human rights effects, there are significant areas of divergence. For example, international trade law is widely acknowledged as being biased against poorer countries, and swift trade liberalisation may in fact undermine a State’s ability to implement its obligations regarding economic social and cultural rights. Direct conflicts between the regimes may arise with regard to the implementation of the agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). A number of arbitrations under bilateral investment treaties have posed possible threats to a State’s capacity to fulfil human rights. Finally, a chilling impact on human rights implementation may arise from the loss of policy space which flows from international economic law. Ultimately, international economic law focuses on the rights of a privileged few, namely foreign traders and investors, which may lead to the inevitable prioritisation of their rights when they clash with or otherwise detract from the human rights of others. Such a prioritisation is unfortunate if it adds to the capacity for powerful entities to override the interests of the powerless and marginalised.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Much of the following commentary is adapted from Joseph (2011) and Joseph (2013), pp. 841–870.

  2. 2.

    The following commentary is adapted from Joseph (2010), pp. 89–90.

  3. 3.

    See also Davidson (2004), p. 2.

  4. 4.

    Articles 6–8 cover, respectively, the rights to work, to just and favourable conditions of work, and to join trade unions.

  5. 5.

    Alston and Goodman (2013), p. 286.

  6. 6.

    Harrison (2007), p. 26 (noting but not agreeing with the argument). See, eg, Human Rights Survey, The Economist (5 December 1998), p. 9, suggesting that economic social and cultural rights are issues that “should be left to politics and the market”.

  7. 7.

    See, eg., Marceau (2002), pp. 786–789; Alvarez (2001), p. 10.

  8. 8.

    See Langford (2008), pp. 3–4.

  9. 9.

    The Optional Protocol came into force on 5 May 2013, after its tenth ratification. At the time of writing, it had 19 States parties.

  10. 10.

    Howse and Teitel (2009), p. 40.

  11. 11.

    Regional human rights courts are stronger, as they are empowered to make legally binding decisions.

  12. 12.

    See Alston (2012), p. 833; Vázquez (2003), p. 803–804.

  13. 13.

    Salomon (2007), p. 155.

  14. 14.

    The issue of the actual hierarchy in law between the two sets of norms is beyond the scope of this paper. See Joseph (2011), pp. 46–50.

  15. 15.

    Oxfam International (2002) Rigged Rules and Double Standards, p. 62.

  16. 16.

    World Bank (2006) World Development Report 2006, p. 212.

  17. 17.

    See, eg, WTO, Poverty reduction: sectoral initiative in favour of cotton, WTO Committee on Agriculture, WTO doc. TN/AG/Gen.4 (16 May 2003). For an update, see Lazzeri T, Western Cotton Subsidies Endanger African Farmers, Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network, http://www.aefjn.org/index.php/352/articles/western-cotton-subsidies-endanger-african-farmers.html (last accessed 16 March 2015). There are strong arguments that a State, such as the US, owes human rights obligations to people in other countries, such as cotton growers in Africa, in certain circumstances. See Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, a set of principles adopted by international experts in 2010, http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/library/maastricht-principles/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23 (last accessed 26 March 2015).

  18. 18.

    Joseph (2011), p. 119.

  19. 19.

    Lamy P, It’s Time for a new “Geneva Consensus” on making trade work for development, Emile Noel Lecture New York University Law School, New York, 30 October 2006, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl45_e.htm (last accessed 15 March 2015).

  20. 20.

    Chang (2008), p. 13.

  21. 21.

    Stiglitz and Charlton (2005), p. 47.

  22. 22.

    See Oxfam International (2002) Rigged Rules and Double Standards, pp. 102–103.

  23. 23.

    Vandenhole (2007), p. 73.

  24. 24.

    Joseph (2011), pp. 164–169.

  25. 25.

    The International Monetary Fund has estimated that, between 1980 and 2005, less than 30 % of lost tariff revenue was recovered by developing States through other means: Baunsgaard and Keen, Trade Revenue and (or?) Trade Liberalisation, IMF Working Paper No. 05/112 (2005).

  26. 26.

    Chang (2008), p. 47.

  27. 27.

    See Rodrik (2007), p. 1.

  28. 28.

    Stiglitz and Charlton (2005), p. 6, 26 and 194.

  29. 29.

    Lang (2007), p. 545.

  30. 30.

    Ruggie (1982), pp. 393–398, famously suggested the pre-WTO GATT regime was based on a premise of ‘embedded liberalism’, whereby GATT members agreed to reduce protectionist measures, whilst simultaneously promulgating domestic welfare policies to provide safety nets for the losers from liberalised trade.

  31. 31.

    See, eg., Gathii (2001), pp. 152–153; Stiglitz (2010), p. 220.

  32. 32.

    Chang (2008), pp. 176.

  33. 33.

    Gathii (2001), pp. 168–169.

  34. 34.

    Gathii (2001), pp. 167–168.

  35. 35.

    Garcia (2003), pp. 17.

  36. 36.

    Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12: The right to adequate food (Art. 11), UN doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (12 May 1999), para 6.

  37. 37.

    De Schutter O (2009) International Trade in Agriculture and the Right to Food, Dialogue on Globalization Occasional Paper No. 46, pp. 10–11.

  38. 38.

    Murphy, Concentrated Market Power and Agricultural Trade, Ecofair Trade Dialogue Discussion Paper No. 1 (English Version), August 2006, p. 27.

  39. 39.

    Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, De Schutter, Building resilience: a human rights framework for world food and nutrition security, UN doc. A/HRC/9/23 (8 September 2008), para 28.

  40. 40.

    Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Ziegler, UN doc. E/CN.4/2005/47 (24 January 2005), para 23; Annex 2, para 10.

  41. 41.

    UN Millennium Project, Halving Hunger: It can be done, summary of the report of the task force on hunger, The Earth Institute, Columbia University, 2005, pp. 4–6, available at: http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/HTF-SumVers_FINAL.pdf (last accessed 16 March 2015).

  42. 42.

    UNGA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, De Schutter, UN doc. A/63/278 (21 October 2008), para 18.

  43. 43.

    Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, De Schutter: Mission to the World Trade Organization, UN doc. A/HRC/10/5/Add.2 (25 June 2008), para 21; Wolf (2005), p. 206.

  44. 44.

    Murphy (2005), p. 3.

  45. 45.

    Breining-Kaufman (2005), p. 368.

  46. 46.

    World Bank (2008) World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development, pp. 135–136.

  47. 47.

    De Schutter O (2009), International Trade in Agriculture and the Right to Food, Dialogue on Globalization Occasional Paper No. 46, p. 30.

  48. 48.

    United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2005) Human Development Report 2005: International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World, pp. 142–143.

  49. 49.

    United Nations Development Programme (2005) Human Development Report 2005: International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World, p. 139.

  50. 50.

    Dommen (2002), p. 34.

  51. 51.

    United Nations Human Settlements Programme (2006) Global Report on Human Settlements 2006: The Challenge of Slums, p. 41.

  52. 52.

    International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge (2009) Science and Technology for Development, Agriculture at the Crossroads, 2009, Executive Summary, p. 6; World Bank (2008) World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development, p. 2.

  53. 53.

    Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, De Schutter: Mission to the World Trade Organization, UN doc. A/HRC/10/5/Add.2 (25 June 2008), para 14.

  54. 54.

    International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge (2009), Science and Technology for Development, Agriculture at the Crossroads, p. 50.

  55. 55.

    See Dubai School of Government (2011) Civil Movements: The Impact of Facebook and Twitter Arab Social Media Report vol. 1, no. 2; Howard PN, Duffy A, Freelon D, Hussain MM, Mari W, Mazaid M (2011) Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media during the Arab Spring?, Working Paper 2011.1, http://pitpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2011_Howard-Duffy-Freelon-Hussain-Mari-Mazaid_pITPI.pdf (last accessed 7 March 2015).

  56. 56.

    Morozov (2011), p. 196.

  57. 57.

    Joseph (2012a), p. 168.

  58. 58.

    Freedom of expression is recognised in Article 19 of the UDHR and Article 19 of the ICCPR. While China is not a party to any treaty that guarantees freedom of expression, it is arguable that the right is protected under customary international law. In any case, greater enjoyment of freedom of expression in China would boost the enjoyment of an internationally recognized right in that country, regardless of China’s strict human rights obligations.

  59. 59.

    Scheer, Obama should back Google with more than rhetoric: the US should challenge China’s “firewall” before the WTO, The Huffington Post, 25 May 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-scheer/obama-should-back-up-goog_b_425724.html (last accessed 15 March 2015).

  60. 60.

    See, eg, Google losing market share in China, The Boston Globe, 23 April 2010.

  61. 61.

    See, generally, Wu T, The World Trade Law of Censorship and Internet Filtering, 3 May 2006, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=882459 (last accessed 15 March 2015), p 10.

  62. 62.

    Lamy P, Towards Shared Responsibility and Greater Coherence: Human Rights, Trade and Macroeconomic Policy, Speech at the Colloquium on Human Rights in the Global Economy, Co-organized by the International Council on Human Rights and Realizing Rights, Geneva, 13 January 2010, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl146_e.htm (last accessed 15 March 2015).

  63. 63.

    See Garcia (1999), p. 59; Bhagwati (2002), pp. 43–44.

  64. 64.

    See Griswold D, Trading Tyranny for Freedom: How Open Markets till the soil for Democracy, Cato Institute, 6 January 2004, http://www.cato.org/publications/trade-policy-analysis/trading-tyranny-freedom-how-open-markets-till-soil-democracy (last accessed 16 March 2015).

  65. 65.

    Gervais (2009), p. 393.

  66. 66.

    See statistics cited in Joseph (2011), pp. 166–167.

  67. 67.

    Pogge (2008).

  68. 68.

    See generally Chua (2000), p. 287.

  69. 69.

    Wolf (2005), p. 29.

  70. 70.

    Driesen (2001), p. 279.

  71. 71.

    See Lang (2001), p. 801.

  72. 72.

    Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R and WT/DS401/AB/R, 22 May 2014; See Howse R, Langille J, Sykes K, Sealing the Deal: the WTO’s Appellate Body Report in EC-Seal Products. ASIL Insights, 4 June 2014, http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/12/sealing-deal-wto%E2%80%99s-appellate-body-report-ec-%E2%80%93-seal-products (last accessed 15 March 2015).

  73. 73.

    See Singham (2001), pp. 375–385.

  74. 74.

    However, it has been argued that this rationale for TRIPS effectively put “the policy cart before the empirical horse”, Gervais (2009), p. 370.

  75. 75.

    Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17: The right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author (Art. 15, para. 1(c)), UN doc. E/C.12/GC/17, 12 January 2006, para 2.

  76. 76.

    Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17: The right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author (Art. 15, para. 1(c)), UN doc. E/C.12/GC/17, 12 January 2006, para 7.

  77. 77.

    Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17: The right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author (Art. 15, para. 1(c)), UN doc. E/C.12/GC/17, 12 January 2006, paras 2, 16 and 47.

  78. 78.

    Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, Anand Grover, UN doc. A/HRC/11/12 (31 March 2009), para 94.

  79. 79.

    See, generally, Chon (2007), p. 803; 3D, The Philippines: Impact of copyright rules on access to education, June 2009, http://www.crin.org/docs/3DCRC_PhilippinesJun09.pdf (last accessed 15 March 2015).

  80. 80.

    UN doc. A/HRC/28/57, 24 December 2014.

  81. 81.

    Abbott and Reichmann (2007), pp. 963–964.

  82. 82.

    A good history of BITs is found in Vandevelde (1998), p. 621.

  83. 83.

    See Jandhyala et al. (2011), p. 1047.

  84. 84.

    However, the common assumption that BITs encourage foreign investment in a State may be challengeable: see Hallward-Driemeyer M (2003) Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a bit…and they could bite, World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 3121.

  85. 85.

    See, eg, World Bank (2002), World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets, http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/fulltext/fulltext2002.htm (last accessed 20 September 2010).

  86. 86.

    Karamanian (2012), p. 243.

  87. 87.

    Kriebaum (2009), p. 244.

  88. 88.

    Arbitral awards may be reviewed on narrow grounds by courts in proceedings regarding enforcement of the award. See Fry (2007), pp. 118–119.

  89. 89.

    Fry (2007), pp. 83–84.

  90. 90.

    Fry (2007), pp. 115–117.

  91. 91.

    Goldhaber (2013), pp. 407–408.

  92. 92.

    See Application for Leave to File a Non-party Submission and Submission of the Quechan Indian Nation, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/52531.pdf (last accessed 15 March 2015) p. 8. Amicus briefs may be submitted to tribunals though the tribunals do not have to accept them, or take them into consideration in making decisions.

  93. 93.

    See Tribunal Award http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf (last accessed 15 May 2015) p. 22.

  94. 94.

    Award and decision to discontinue, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1651_En&caseId=C90 (last accessed 15 March 2015).

  95. 95.

    See Bechtel Bows to Bolivia, Multinational Monitor 27, January-February 2006, 1, p. 4.

  96. 96.

    Peterson L, South Africa Mining Arbitration ends with a Whimper, as terms of Discontinuance are set out in the award, Investment Arbitrator Reporter, 5 August 2010, http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20100818_6 (last accessed 15 March 2015).

  97. 97.

    See, eg, Joseph (2012b), pp. 70–91.

  98. 98.

    See, eg, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador, Fourth Interim Award on Interim Measures, 7 February 2013.

  99. 99.

    PCA Case No 2009-23, Chevron and Texaco v Ecuador, First Partial Award on Track 1, 17 September 2013. This decision focused on the interpretation of remediation agreements concluded between Texaco and Ecuador in 1995 and 1998.

  100. 100.

    Goldhaber (2013), pp. 406–410.

  101. 101.

    Joseph (2012b), p. 87.

  102. 102.

    Joseph (2012b), p. 85.

  103. 103.

    Low L, The Chevron-Ecuador Dispute: A Paradigm of Complexity, American Society of International Law Proceedings, 28–31 March 2012, p. 419, 421.

  104. 104.

    Chevron v. Naranjo, 667F. 3d 232 (2nd Cirt, 2012).

  105. 105.

    See generally, Goldhaber (2013), pp. 373–416.

  106. 106.

    Chevron v. Donziger, US District Court, Southern District of New York (4 March 2014), http://www.theamazonpost.com/wp-content/uploads/Chevron-Ecuador-Opinion-3.4.14.pdf (last accessed 16 March 2015).

  107. 107.

    See, eg., Alvarez (1997), pp. 307–309.

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Acknowledgement

Thanks to Adam Fletcher for assisting in preparing the footnotes and format of this paper.

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  1. Faculty of Law, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, 3800, Australia

    Sarah Joseph

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  3. Chair for Public Law and International Law, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg Faculty of Law, Erlangen, Germany

    Markus Krajewski

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    Jörg Philipp Terhechte

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Joseph, S. (2016). Human Rights and International Economic Law. In: Bungenberg, M., Herrmann, C., Krajewski, M., Terhechte, J. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2016. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29215-1_18

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