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Horizontal Effect of Human Rights in the Era of Transnational Constellations: On the Accountability of Private Actors for Human Rights Violations

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European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2016

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EUROYEAR,volume 7))

Abstract

This article discusses the horizontal effect of human rights and proposes a new and unconventional approach to the accountability of private actors for human rights violations. It argues that current theoretical and doctrinal approaches are not able to provide adequately for the protection of human rights, as these approaches are underpinned by state-centric perspectives of law and classical theoretical concepts of human rights. The article aims to highlight the gap in accountability that exists within international and national law as well as the weaknesses of the existing theoretical and doctrinal approaches. It proposes a new concept for the horizontal effect of fundamental human rights borrowing elements from systems-theory, especially from the work of Gunther Teubner. Finally, this article demonstrates the practicability of this concept.

I would like especially to thank Chris Thornhill and Andreas Fischer-Lescano for their critical comments.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, Session on Agrochemical Transnational Corporations, Bangalore, December 2011, http://agricorporateaccountability.net/sites/default/files/tpp_bangalore3dec2011.pdf (last accessed 28 September 2015).

  2. 2.

    Statement of United Kingdom National Contact Point, Global Witness v Afrimex (UK) Ltd, 28 August 2008 http://oecdwatch.org/cases/advanced-search/cases/advanced-search/keywords/casesearchview?b_start:int=60&search=en_Human%20rights&type=Keyword (accessed 16 March 2015).

  3. 3.

    See, for instance, the US Supreme Court, Kiobel et al v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et al, (No. 10-1491), 17 April 2013; United States Court of Appeals, Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F 3d 111, 2nd Cir 17 September 2010.

  4. 4.

    See, for example, for an overview, Scherer and Palazzo (2011), p. 903ff.

  5. 5.

    The Panel of Eminent Persons, Protecting Dignity: Agenda for Human Rights, Report 2008, www.UDHR60.ch (last accessed 16 March 2015).

  6. 6.

    Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97, 22 February 2006; Ratner (2001), p. 443; Monshipouri et al (2003), p. 965. Briefly, for the concepts from the 1970s onwards, see Nolan (2005), pp. 582–583.

  7. 7.

    See, for example, www.forbes.com/global2000/list (last accessed 16 March 2015); www.globaltrends.com/knowledge-center/features/shapers-and-influencers/190-corporate-clout-2013-time-for-responsible-capitalism (last accessed 16 March 2015); Nolan (2005), pp. 582–583; Joseph (2004), p. 1ff.

  8. 8.

    Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97, 22 February 2006, para. 9ff; Westaway (2012), p. 63.

  9. 9.

    Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97, 22 February 2006, para. 15; Teubner (2006), pp. 327, 328; Monshipouri et al (2003), p. 973ff; Joseph (2004), p. 2ff., with diverse examples; European Coalition for Corporate Justice, With Power come Responsibility, May 2008, http://www.corporatejustice.org/IMG/pdf/ECC_001-08.pdf (last accessed 5 October 2015).

  10. 10.

    For instance, the involvement of transnational corporation Shell was not only in the violation of human rights, but also in the massive destruction of the environment; see, for example, the United Nations Environment Programme, Environment Assessment of Ogoniland, 2011.

  11. 11.

    Monshipouri et al. (2003), p. 983ff.

  12. 12.

    Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008.

  13. 13.

    See, for an introduction and a brief summary, for instance, Uitz (2005), p. 1.

  14. 14.

    See, for example, Beyleveld and Pattinson (2002), p. 623; Young (2007), p. 35.

  15. 15.

    See, for example Garlicki (2005), p. 129; Gardbaum (2003), p. 393ff., 404; Tushnet (2003), pp. 87–88; Hunt (1998), pp. 428–429.

  16. 16.

    See Ratner (2001), pp. 538–539.

  17. 17.

    See Clapham (1993), pp. 95–96; Ratner (2001), p. 467.

  18. 18.

    See Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/035, 9 February 2007, para. 34.

  19. 19.

    Detailed analysis with sufficient examples can be found by Joseph (2004), p. 1ff. See, also, Ratner (2001), pp. 533–536.

  20. 20.

    Steinhardt and D’Amato (1999); Wouters J, De Smet L and Ryngaert C (2003) Tort Claims Against Multinational Companies for Foreign Human Rights Violations Committed Abroad: Lessons from the Alien Tort Claims Act? Institute for International Law K. U. Leuven, Working Paper No 46, www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/WP46e.pdf (last accessed 16 March 2015); Weschka (2006), p. 625.

  21. 21.

    US Supreme Court, Kiobel et al. v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et al., (No. 10-1491), 17 April 2013, (569 U.S. (2013)).

  22. 22.

    Weschka (2006), p. 625; De Schutter O (2004) The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European Law. CHRGJ Working Paper No 1, http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/s04deschutter.pdf (last accessed 5 October 2015).

  23. 23.

    See De Jonge (2011), p. 91ff, 117; Joseph (2004), p. 153ff.

  24. 24.

    Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, para. 14ff; Land and Power—The Growing Scandal Surrounding the New Wave of Investments in Land, Oxfam Briefing Paper, September 2011, p. 23ff.

  25. 25.

    Joseph (2004), p. 21ff, 83ff, 113ff.

  26. 26.

    Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97, 22 February 2006; Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/035, 9 February 2007; Clapham (2006), p. 195ff; De Schutter (2006), p.1; De Jonge (2011), p. 21ff; McLeay (2006), p. 219.

  27. 27.

    OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises—2011 updated version, OECD Publishing; Clapham (2006), p. 201ff; Weschka (2006), p. 647ff; Karl (1999), p. 89.

  28. 28.

    It has been adopted at the 204th Session (1977) and amended lastly at its 295th Session (2006), www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf (last accessed 16 March 2015). See, for example, Clapham (2006), p. 211ff.

  29. 29.

    OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises—2011 updated version, OECD Publishing, p. 17, Concepts and Principles, para. 1.

  30. 30.

    OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises—2011 updated version, OECD Publishing, Chapter IV, Commentary on Human Rights, para. 36–46.

  31. 31.

    The Guidelines grant “National Contact Points” but the object and tasks of these points are very general, OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises—2011 updated version, OECD Publishing, Part II, Implementation Procedure; Amnesty International, The 2010-11 Update of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises has come to an end: the OECD must now turn into effective implementation, 23 May 2011, http://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/IOR30/001/2011/en/ (last accessed 5 October 2015).

  32. 32.

    ILO Declaration, www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf (last accessed 5 October 2015), para. 4, 7.

  33. 33.

    Nolan (2005), p. 587; Kinley and Tadiki (2004), p. 950; Weschka (2006), pp. 646–647.

  34. 34.

    Indeed, circumstances exist in which codes of conduct contribute to the prevention of human rights violations. See for instance, Land and Power—The Growing Scandal Surrounding the New Wave of Investments in Land, Oxfam Briefing Paper, September 2011, p. 33ff, with a few positive examples. See, also, Teubner (2011a), pp. 619–620.

  35. 35.

    Kinley and Tadiki (2004), p. 950; Narula (2006), pp. 752–753.

  36. 36.

    See, for example, The London School of Economics and Political Science, The Reality of Rights, 2009, http://www.lse.ac.uk/businessAndConsultancy/LSEEnterprise/pdf/reality_of_rights.pdf (last accessed 5 October 2015), p. 36f; Action Aid International, Power Hungry, 2005, http://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/doc_lib/13_1_power_hungry.pdf (last accessed 5 October 2015), pp. 47–48.

  37. 37.

    Economic and Social Council, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, “Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights” (UN-Norms) UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 26 August 2003. See, also, Weissbrodt and Kruger (2003), p. 901; Backer (2006), p. 287; Nolan (2005).

  38. 38.

    Weissbrodt and Kruger (2003), p. 903, 913; Backer (2006), p. 333ff, 343.

  39. 39.

    Economic and Social Council, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, “Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights” (UN-Norms) UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 26 August 2003, at para. 1.

  40. 40.

    Commission on Human Rights, Decision of 20 April 2004 in Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Sixtieth Session, UN Doc. E/2004/23—E/CN.4/2004/127, para. 525–527.

  41. 41.

    Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/035, 9 February 2007, para. 63ff; European Commission, A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM (2011) 681, 25 October 2011, p. 4ff; European Commission, Green Paper, COM (2001) 366, 18 July 2001, para. 20ff.

  42. 42.

    See European Commission, Green Paper, COM (2001) 366, 18 July 2001, para. 8f; for a comprehensive concept, see European Commission, A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM (2011) 681, 25 October 2011, p. 6f.

  43. 43.

    European Commission, Green Paper, COM (2001) 366, 18 July 2001, para. 55f; Action Aid International, Power Hungry, 2005, http://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/doc_lib/13_1_power_hungry.pdf (last accessed 5 October 2015), p. 41f; Narula (2006), p. 754.

  44. 44.

    Land and Power—The Growing Scandal Surrounding the New Wave of Investments in Land, Oxfam Briefing Paper, September 2011, p. 35f.

  45. 45.

    Ruggie (2007), p. 835f; Narula (2006), p. 755.

  46. 46.

    Reinisch (2005), p. 70; Alston (2005), p. 20, with other references.

  47. 47.

    See, for example, for an overview, Clapham (1993), p. 94ff.

  48. 48.

    Clapham (1993), pP. 94–124; Ratner (2001), p. 467ff; Kinley and Tadiki (2004), p. 944ff; Jägers (1999), p. 264ff.

  49. 49.

    Ratner (2001), p. 494ff; Kinley and Tadiki (2004), p. 960ff; Clapham (1993), p. 94ff, 134ff.

  50. 50.

    See, for example, Kamminga and Zia-Zarifi (2000), p. 5ff; Dahm et al. (2002), p. 245ff, 257.

  51. 51.

    Bilchitz (2010), pp. 208–211.

  52. 52.

    See, for comprehensive duties beyond the duty to respect human rights, for instance, Bilchitz (2010), pp. 207–211.

  53. 53.

    Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008.

  54. 54.

    Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011.

  55. 55.

    Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, para. 9. For a detailed analysis, see Deva (2012), p. 101; Simons (2012), p. 5; Bilchitz (2010).

  56. 56.

    Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, para. 23f, 51ff; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, Annex para. 11ff.

  57. 57.

    Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, para. 24; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/13, 22 April 2009, para. 61ff.

  58. 58.

    Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, Annex para. 13; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, para. 55; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/13, 22 April 2009, para. 59. See, also, Bilchitz (2010), p. 204ff.

  59. 59.

    Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/035, 9 February 2007, para. 20; Ruggie (2007), p. 824.

  60. 60.

    Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, para. 6; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, para. 9, 54.

  61. 61.

    Ruggie (2007), p. 824ff; Kinley and Tadiki (2004); Ratner (2001); Muchlinski (2007); Alston (2005), p. 3ff; Weissbrodt and Kruger (2003); Jägers (1999); Clapham (1993), p. 89ff.

  62. 62.

    Monshipouri et al (2003), p. 966 with further references; Scherer and Palazzo (2011), p. 901ff; Ratner (2001), p. 461 ff. Knox (2008), p. 39 with further references; Nolan (2005), p. 581ff. Critical to this approach, see Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/13, 22 April 2009, para. 65 with other references.

  63. 63.

    Weissbrodt and Kruger (2003), p. 901. See, also, European Coalition for Corporate Justice, With Power come Responsibility, May 2008, http://www.corporatejustice.org/IMG/pdf/ECC_001-08.pdf (last accessed 5 October 2015); Nolan (2005); Kinley and Tadiki (2004), p. 1021.

  64. 64.

    See, for instance, Ratner (2001), p. 449ff.

  65. 65.

    Despite the critique concerning the concept of Ruggie, a large number of states has stressed that the question of accountability of business will not end with the proposal of Ruggie; rather, this concept should be elaborated further; HRC, Council holds dialogue with Experts on summary executions, independence of judges and lawyers, transnational corporations, Information Release, 30 May 2011, www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11082&LangID=E (last accessed 16 March 2015).

  66. 66.

    Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/035, 9 February 2007, para. 20; Ruggie (2007), p. 824.

  67. 67.

    Higgins (1994), p. 48f.

  68. 68.

    Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/035, 9 February 2007, para. 35–44.

  69. 69.

    See Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, para. 24; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/13, 22 April 2009, para. 61ff.

  70. 70.

    Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/13, 22 April 2009, para. 46–48; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, para. 54–55.

  71. 71.

    Vandenhole W (2012) Emerging Normative Frameworks on Transnational Human Rights Obligations. EUI Working Papers (RSCAS 2012/17), p. 12ff; Simons (2012), p. 37.

  72. 72.

    Simons (2012), p. 38 with further references. From view of NGO’s: UN Human Rights Council: Weak Stance on Business Standards. Human Rights Watch, 16 June 2011, www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/16/un-human-rights-council-weak-stance-business-standards (last accessed 16 March 2015); Resolution of Human Rights Council on Business and Human Rights fails victims of transnationals. FIAN, 17 June 2011, www.fian.org/en/news/article/detail/resolution_of_human_rights_council_on_business_and_human_rights_fails_victims_of_transnationals/ (last accessed 16 March 2015).

  73. 73.

    At international level, progressive approaches exist which operate in accordance with the ‘respect, protect, fulfil’ concept and argue that the expectation of society includes positive obligations, that is, the obligation to promote the protection and fulfilment of human rights; see Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Health—Mission to GlaxoSmithKline, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/12/Add.2, 5 May 2009, para. 16ff, 35ff. See, critically, also Bilchitz (2010), pp. 204–208. In fact, Ruggie does not intend to propose a new concept with binding obligations, but, instead, draws existing weak obligations through a pragmatic approach and abandons important human rights principles; see, especially, Bilchitz (2010).

  74. 74.

    See, also, Deva (2012), p. 104.

  75. 75.

    See, for example, McLean (2004), p. 363; Simons (2012). In general, for a critical analysis of international law, see Marks (2003); Anghie (2005); Koskenniemi (2002).

  76. 76.

    Hale (1935), p. 149, had already in 1935 emphasised the aspect of power phenomena of private actors and asserts that there is no difference to that of the power of states, quoted, in Clapham (1993), pp. 126–127. In addition, it will be demonstrated below that business corporations have always been in possession of power.

  77. 77.

    In line with this primarily ‘formalistic-positivist’ approach, for instance, see Kinley and Tadiki (2004), p. 945ff, 960ff. In general, concerning (human) rights as a construction positivising, producing and shaping political power, see Thornhill (2010) and Thornhill (2008).

  78. 78.

    Teubner (2006), p. 342; Verschraegen (2006), p. 112; Knox (2008), p. 19. On this point, see the following section.

  79. 79.

    Critical, also, is Ratner (2001), pp. 541–542; Knox (2008), p. 39.

  80. 80.

    See, also, Teubner (2006), p. 342.

  81. 81.

    Teubner (2011b), p. 208f; Verschraegen (2006), p. 121; Teubner (2012), p. 206ff.

  82. 82.

    Teubner (2006), p. 330f. See, also, Teubner (2003), p. 5ff.

  83. 83.

    For a critique of the traditional concept as a solution against human rights violations from another perspective, see, also, Narula (2006).

  84. 84.

    For his initial critique concerning a global constitution, see Teubner (2003), p. 3.

  85. 85.

    See, for instance, Baxi (2008); Beitz (2009); Kennedy (2002); Shestack (1998); Mutua (1996); Nickel (2008); Donnelly (1984); Freeman (1994); Perry (1997).

  86. 86.

    Thornhill (2011a), p. 181ff.

  87. 87.

    See, for example, the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See also Barreto (2013), p. 140.

  88. 88.

    Brugger (1989), p. 537; Barreto (2013), p.140.

  89. 89.

    Teubner (2012), p. 207f; Teubner (2011b), p. 200ff; Verschraegen (2006); Luhmann (2009), p. 136ff. Thornhill has elaborated the inclusionary function of (human) rights especial for the political system, Thornhill (2011b), p. 381, 390ff. See, also, Thornhill (2010), Thornhill (2008). This accomplishment of human rights is, however, not exclusively normatively conditioned, but functional as well. See Thornhill (2011b).

  90. 90.

    In general, regarding human rights, see Marshall (1950). See, also, Thornhill (2008).

  91. 91.

    Teubner (2006) p. 336ff; Graber and Teubner (1998), p. 61, 64f, 68f.

  92. 92.

    McLean (2004); Barreto (2013).

  93. 93.

    Teubner (2006), p. 336.

  94. 94.

    As Thornhill accurately states, the base of (human) rights is not exclusively normative, but functional instead, as rights provide the means for political system to articulate the reserves of power; Thornhill (2011a).

  95. 95.

    Ratner (2011), pp. 524–525, 540. Ratner also tends to consider the potential of TNCs to violate human rights as being decisive.

  96. 96.

    See, also, Teubner (2011b), p. 199ff.

  97. 97.

    In detail, see Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2006).

  98. 98.

    Teubner (2012), p. 179ff.

  99. 99.

    Teubner (2011b); Teubner (2012), p. 189ff; Teubner (2006). For the first approach, see, also, Graber and Teubner (1998).

  100. 100.

    Luhmann (1997), p. 630f, 1088ff. See, also, Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2006), p. 25ff.

  101. 101.

    Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2006) p. 28ff; Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2007), p. 37, 41ff.

  102. 102.

    Teubner (2006), p. 339.

  103. 103.

    Teubner (2011b), p. 211ff; Teubner (2006), p. 336ff.

  104. 104.

    Teubner (2006), p. 339.

  105. 105.

    Teubner (2006), p. 338 ff. Teubner (2011b), pp. 209–212.

  106. 106.

    Teubner (2012), p. 213; Teubner (2011b), p. 211.

  107. 107.

    Teubner (2012), p. 215f; Teubner (2006), pp. 339–341.

  108. 108.

    Teubner (2006), p. 339.

  109. 109.

    Teubner (2006), p. 333ff; Teubner (2012), p. 189ff; Teubner (2011b), p. 199ff.

  110. 110.

    Teubner (2006), p. 330ff.

  111. 111.

    Teubner (2006), p 333.

  112. 112.

    Teubner (2006), p 334; Graber and Teubner (1998), p. 68ff.

  113. 113.

    Similar to the function of the constitution; Teubner (2003), p. 10ff.

  114. 114.

    Teubner (2011b), p. 202ff; Teubner (2012), p. 202ff; Luhmann (2009), p. 41f; See also Verschraegen (2006).

  115. 115.

    See also Teubner (2011b), p. 202; Teubner (2012), p. 207ff.

  116. 116.

    Teubner (2011b), p. 204–205; Teubner (2012), p. 208ff; Verschraegen (2006), p. 107ff, 120ff.

  117. 117.

    Teubner (2006), p. 333ff.

  118. 118.

    Teubner (2006), p. 342; See also Teubner (2011b), p. 210ff.

  119. 119.

    Teubner (2006), pp. 343–344; Teubner (2011b), p. 212ff.

  120. 120.

    See to this concept Teubner (2003), p. 4f; Fischer-Lescano (2002), p. 349.

  121. 121.

    Teubner (2012), p 175ff.

  122. 122.

    The extension of the circle of duty-bearer to all corporations was initially formulated by the UN Norms of the Economic and Social Council, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, “Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights”, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 26 August 2003 and later Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, para. 24.

  123. 123.

    See also critically Teubner (2011b), pp. 192–194.

  124. 124.

    Kanalan (2014), p. 495.

  125. 125.

    Similarly Teubner (2012), p 195ff, 204ff.

  126. 126.

    Teubner (2011b), p. 195ff.

  127. 127.

    Similar, but with other arguments, Ratner (2001), p. 492ff, 511ff.

  128. 128.

    Accurately Teubner (2012), p. 203.

  129. 129.

    Economic and Social Council, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, “Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights”, (UN-Norms), UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 26 August 2003, para. 1 and the preamble.

  130. 130.

    See for example Peters (2006), p. 100.

  131. 131.

    See for instance The impact of business corporations on the rights to food; Narula (2010), p. 403, 407ff; Land and Power—The Growing Scandal Surrounding the New Wave of Investments in Land, Oxfam Briefing Paper, September 2011, p. 23ff; Murphy (2006) Concentrated market power and agricultural trade. ECOFAIR Trade Dialog and Heinrich Böll Stiftung (eds).

  132. 132.

    See for instance, in context of the right to health, Hunt (1998), para. 16.

  133. 133.

    Bilchitz (2010), p. 207ff; Narula (2010), p. 403, 407ff.

  134. 134.

    See for the power, impact and privileges of the corporations, for example Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97, 22 February 2006, para. 7ff.

  135. 135.

    See also Westaway (2012), p. 63.

  136. 136.

    See, for other arguments and approaches Lichtenberg (2009), p. 76; ECHR, Van der Mussele v Belgium, Application No 8919/80 (= Series A Nr. 70) (27 October 1983), para. 29, noticed the privileges and equipment of private actors with special authorization. However, due to the state-centric concept and procedural necessity—that the court can only examine states obligation to protect—it has recognized the accountability of private actors mediated that is with means of imputation of the violation of privates to the state; See also Ziemele I (2009), Human rights violations by private persons and entities: The case-law of International Human Rights Courts and Monitoring Bodies. EUI Working Paper, AEL (22 August 2009), p. 25.

  137. 137.

    Similarly Beitz and Goodin (2009), p. 17.

  138. 138.

    In detail, regarding global responsibility, see Crawford (2009), p. 131.

  139. 139.

    For instance Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008), para. 54. See, for this argument also Hunt (1998), para. 35ff.

  140. 140.

    Ruggie, however, relativizes his concept and broadens the obligation in certain circumstances to an obligation to protect, that is, to perform actively to prevent human-rights violations; see, for instance Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, para. 24.

  141. 141.

    Appealing in general for restrictions of human-rights violations to the ‘crassʼ matter of society threatening mental and physical integrity; Teubner (2006), p. 335. Similarly, already prior to Teubner, Luhmann (1993), p. 578ff.

  142. 142.

    Bilchitz (2010), p. 209, 216.

  143. 143.

    Similarly Bilchitz (2010), p. 210ff.

  144. 144.

    Similarly, Hunt (1998), para. 37ff. In general, for capacity and potential as criteria to determine obligations, see Shue (1988) p. 687; Shue (1996), p. 164f; Beitz and Goodin (2009), p. 14ff.

  145. 145.

    Hunt has, according to these principles, elaborated the obligation of business corporations to contribute to the fulfilment of the right to health; see Hunt (1998), para. 16ff.

  146. 146.

    Teubner (2011b), p. 204 (footnote omitted).

  147. 147.

    Luhmann (2000), p. 427; quoted in Teubner (2011b), p. 205.

  148. 148.

    Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, The European Union and transnational corporations in Latin America. Madrid, 14–17 May 2010, Transnational Institute (December 2010), p. 6.

  149. 149.

    See preamble and Article 29 UDHR; See also preamble of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

  150. 150.

    Beyleveld and Pattinson (2002), p. 632; The provisions at national level do not operate for an objection and, furthermore, some constitutions assertively include provisions which recognise the accountability of private actors as well; see Oliver and Fedtke (2007), p. 3, 9ff.

  151. 151.

    Clapham (1993), pp. 94–124.

  152. 152.

    In detail, Beyleveld and Pattinson (2002), p. 629ff.

  153. 153.

    Articles 27–29 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).

  154. 154.

    See also Ziemele I (2009), Human rights violations by private persons and entities: The case-law of International Human Rights Courts and Monitoring Bodies. EUI Working Paper, AEL, 22 August 2009.

  155. 155.

    I-ACtHR, Juridical Condition and rights of undocumented migrants—advisory opinion OC-18/03 (17 September 2003), p. 146ff.

  156. 156.

    For instance Oliver and Fedtke (2007).

  157. 157.

    For instance Hunt (1998), pp. 428–429; Beyleveld and Pattinson, (2002), p. 623; Young (2007), p. 35.

  158. 158.

    For instance UK Supreme Court, Wainwright v Home Office, [2003] UKHL 53; UK Supreme Court, Campbell v MGN Ltd, (n24) UKHL [2004] 22, pp. 17–18, 132.

  159. 159.

    Re S, UK Supreme Court, [2004] UKHL 47, p. 23ff; See also Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd, [2008] EWCA Civ 446 (07 May 2008); Young (2007), p. 42ff.

  160. 160.

    Indian Constitutional Court, Consumer Education and Research Centre v Union of India, 1995 AIR 922, 1995 SCC (3) 42, 27 January 1995, p. 22ff.

  161. 161.

    See for example Federal High Court of Nigeria, Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited and others, AHRLR 151 (NgHC 2005) (14 November 2005); High Court of Uganda, Kasha Jacqueline et al. v Rolling Stone Ltd, Case No 163 of 2010 (30 December 2010).

  162. 162.

    Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited and others, Federal High Court of Nigeria, (2005) AHRLR 151 (NgHC 2005) (14 November 2005), Declaration No 2.

  163. 163.

    OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises—2011 updated version, OECD Publishing, Concepts and Principles I.1.

  164. 164.

    See for example the documentation of OECD Watch, http://oecdwatch.org/cases (last accessed 16 March 2015).

  165. 165.

    Statement of United Kingdom National Contact Point, Global Witness v Afrimex (UK) Ltd, para. 59.

  166. 166.

    Statement of United Kingdom National Contact Point, Global Witness v Afrimex (UK) Ltd, para. 61.

  167. 167.

    Statement of United Kingdom National Contact Point, Survival International v Vedanta Resources plc (25 September 2009).

  168. 168.

    Statement of National Contact Point Sweden, Jijnjevaerie Sami Village v Statkraft AS (14 February 2013).

  169. 169.

    Teubner (2005), p. 109.

  170. 170.

    See, for example, Zumbansen (2012), p. 305, 329f; Peters et al. (2009) p. 544, 575f; Tietje (2003), p. 27, especially p. 38f;

  171. 171.

    OECD, Report by the Chair of the 2011 Meeting of the National Contact Points, p. 2, emphasis added. See also Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/035, 9 February 2007, para. 61.

  172. 172.

    Teubner (1996), p. 255, 270f.

  173. 173.

    South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) (2008), Mining-related observations and recommendations: Anglo Platinum, affected communities and other stakeholders, in and around the PPL Mine, Limpopo, November 2008.

  174. 174.

    South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) (2008), Mining-related observations and recommendations: Anglo Platinum, affected communities and other stakeholders, in and around the PPL Mine, Limpopo, November 2008, p. 27, 51f, 75ff.

  175. 175.

    See for example International Finance Corporation (2012), Sustainability Framework—Policy and Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability Access to Information Policy, January 2012.

  176. 176.

    In detail, see for example, Renner (2010), p. 187ff.

  177. 177.

    WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Bridgestone Firestone, Inc., Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc., and Bridgestone Corporation v. Jack Myers, Case No D2000-0190, 5.

  178. 178.

    See, for example, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Equality Charter School, Inc. v. Mona Davids / A Happy DreamHost Customer, Case No. D2011-1226; WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Nippon Paper Industries Co., Ltd. v. Harriett Swift, Case No. D2011-0832; WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Fundación Calvin Ayre Foundation v. Erik Deutsch, Case No. D2007-1947.

  179. 179.

    WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Fundación Calvin Ayre Foundation v. Erik Deutsch, Case No. D2007-1947, para. 6.12.

  180. 180.

    WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Fundación Calvin Ayre Foundation v. Erik Deutsch, Case No. D2007-1947, para. 6.12.

  181. 181.

    ICSID, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v Argentina, Case No ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition by Five Non-Governmental Organisations for Permission to make an Amicus Curiae Submission (12 February 2007), para. 18.

  182. 182.

    See for example ICSID, Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v United Republic of Tanzania, Case No ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No 5 (02 February 2007), para. 46ff; ICSID, Azurix Corp. v The Argentine Republic, Case No ARB/01/12 (23 June 2006), para. 254ff; See, in general, also Marrella (2010) p. 335. However, the court has recently rejected an amicus curiae brief, where violations of human rights and violations of duty of states to respect human rights were stressed. See ICSID, Bernhard von Pezold et al. v Republic of Zimbabwe, Case No ARB/10/15, Border Timbers Limited et al. v Republic of Zimbabwe, Case No ARB/10/25, Procedural Order No. 2 (26 June 2012), para. 58.

  183. 183.

    For Customary Transnational Law in general, see for example Müller (2008), p. 19.

  184. 184.

    For an overview, see Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, Session on Neo-liberal Policies and European Transnationals in Latin America and the Caribbean, Lima, 6 May 2008, www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/archives/reports/altreg/pptlima.pdf (last accessed 16 March 2015).

  185. 185.

    Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, 2011; Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, 2008; Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, Session on Global Corporations and Human Wrongs, Coventry (UK) 22–25 March 2000, Findings and Recommended Action. Law, Social Justice & Global Development Journal 2001, http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2001_1/ppt (accessed 16 March 2015). See, also, Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, 2010.

  186. 186.

    Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, 2008, p. 12.

  187. 187.

    Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, 2008, p. 12.

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  1. Centre for Human Rights Erlangen-Nuremberg, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Schillerstraße 1, 91054, Erlangen, Germany

    Ibrahim Kanalan

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  3. Chair for Public Law and International Law, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg Faculty of Law, Erlangen, Germany

    Markus Krajewski

  4. Competition and Regulation Institute, Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Lüneburg, Germany

    Jörg Philipp Terhechte

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Kanalan, I. (2016). Horizontal Effect of Human Rights in the Era of Transnational Constellations: On the Accountability of Private Actors for Human Rights Violations. In: Bungenberg, M., Herrmann, C., Krajewski, M., Terhechte, J. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2016. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29215-1_17

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