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Shifting Sands: Interrogating the Problematic Relationship Between International Public Finance and International Financial Regulation

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European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2016

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EUROYEAR,volume 7))

Abstract

International public finance and international financial institutions have regained prominence in wake of the global financial crisis. The conscription of international public finance to crisis resolution and management in recurrent sovereign debt crises has highlighted the centrality of international public finance and its institutions to global economic regulation. In particular, the financial crisis has underscored the fundamental role of international public finance in managing the negative externalities caused by failures of international economic law and governance.

This paper interrogates the problematic relationship between international public finance and international economic law, in particular their shared responsibility for the distribution of international economic resources. It investigates the role played by international financial aid in mitigating the distributive dislocations resulting from international law’s allocation of the risks and benefits of a globalized economy and examines how utilisation of aid finance in this manner has influenced the regulatory trajectories of international economic law.

Drawing on the example of sovereign debt relief and international financial regulation, this paper argues that the deployment of development finance as responses to the regulatory crises of the global financial system have had adverse effects on regulatory change, especially on efforts to reorient international financial law towards a more progressive social and economic agenda. It demonstrates how current practices of financial aid not only fail to address the systemic failings of the international financial system, they serve to sustain, if not entrench, existing asymmetries in international economic law, thereby exacerbating its negative distributive outcomes.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Akyüz (2006), pp. 486–491; Arner and Buckley (2011), pp. 2–15.

  2. 2.

    Akyüz (2010), p. 40; Akyüz (2006), p. 487; Picciotto (2011), pp. 64–65.

  3. 3.

    A global public good is defined as a service or policy whose production and consumption are in the public domain and whose benefits extend beyond national borders and across socio-economic groups (Kaul et al. 2003, p. 3).

  4. 4.

    Ruggie (1982), p. 393.

  5. 5.

    Akyüz Y, Reforming the IMF: Back to the Drawing Board, TWN Global Economy Series 7, p. 7; see also Article I of the IMF Articles of Agreement, hereinafter, the ‘IMF Agreement’.

  6. 6.

    This included the withholding of access to IMF resources, suspension or even withdrawal from the organisation.

  7. 7.

    Akyüz Y, Reforming the IMF: Back to the Drawing Board, TWN Global Economy Series 7, p. 7; Alexander et al. (2006), p. 84; Chowla P, Sennholtz B, Griffiths J, At Issue: Dollars, Devaluations and Depressions: How the International Monetary System Creates Crisis, 23 September 2009, London: Bretton Woods Project, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-565403 (last accessed 21 April 2015), p. 1.

  8. 8.

    Article VIII, Sect. 2(a) stipulates that subject to certain exceptions, ‘no member shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions’ while Article VI, Sect. 3 provides that members ‘may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movements’ as long as such controls’ do not restrict payments for current transactions’ or ‘unduly delay transfers of funds in settlement of commitments’.

  9. 9.

    Hagan (2010), p. 966.

  10. 10.

    These resources are traditionally drawn primarily from subscriptions to the IMF from member countries in the form of quota payments—each member is allocated a quota based broadly on its relative weight in the global economy which determines not only the aforementioned subscriptions but also their entitlement to borrow from the IMF and their voting rights (IMF, Where the IMF Gets Its Money, A Factsheet, 3 October 2014, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/finfac.htm (last accessed 21 April 2015); IMF, IMF Quotas, A Factsheet, 3 October 2014, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm) (last accessed 21 April 2015). Over the years, the IMF has supplemented its resources through gold sales and arrangements to borrow from member states under multilateral and bilateral arrangements (see Sect. 3.1).

  11. 11.

    Alexander et al. (2006), pp. 20–21; Akyüz (2006), pp. 489–491.

  12. 12.

    Article I (v) of the IMF Agreement provides that one of the purposes of the IMF is ‘[t]o give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity’.

  13. 13.

    Akyüz Y, Reforming the IMF: Back to the Drawing Board, TWN Global Economy Series 7, p. 9 f.; Tan (2013), p. 103; Tan (2010a), pp. 169–171.

  14. 14.

    Akyüz Y, Reforming the IMF: Back to the Drawing Board, TWN Global Economy Series 7, p. 9 f.; Tan (2013), p. 103; Tan (2010a), pp. 169–171; see discussion in Sect. 3.2.

  15. 15.

    This included the reorientation of postcolonial economies to facilitate the entry of foreign capital, ostensibly for industrial, infrastructural and agricultural development, and the restructuring of economic sectors towards a market-led, export-oriented model of economic organisation. See Anghie (2005), pp. 3–4; Pahuja (2005), p. 465; Tan (2013), pp. 26–29.

  16. 16.

    Like postcolonial states, many of the former communist states lacked the institutional and regulatory framework to deal with entry into a globalized market and were particularly vulnerable to economic shocks, particularly the impact of rising oil and other commodity prices and ‘currency volatility arising from the privatization of foreign exchange risk’ Alexander et al. (2006), p. 92.

  17. 17.

    Picciotto (2011), pp. 260–265; also Alexander et al. (2006), pp. 22–32; Brummer (2011), pp. 265–266; Weber and Arner (2007), p. 403.

  18. 18.

    Akyüz (2010), pp. 39–40; Faundez (2010), pp. 17–18.

  19. 19.

    Attempts in the 1990s to amend these provisions to allow for the IMF to pursue capital liberalisation in member states were thwarted by the onset of the Asian financial crisis and there has been a rethinking of the IMF’s stance since the inception of the current global financial crisis, including an acknowledgment by Fund staff that such controls may be necessary under certain circumstances (Chowla P, Rethinking the IMF’s Capital Account Mandate, Briefing Paper, 28 September 2010, London: Bretton Woods Project, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-566692#_edn4 (last accessed 21 April 2015); Ostry JD et al., Capital Inflows: The Role of Controls, IMF Stuff Position Note, 19 February 2010, at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1004.pdf (last accessed 21 April 2015).

  20. 20.

    Brummer (2012), pp. 63–65.

  21. 21.

    Brummer (2012), pp. 63–65.

  22. 22.

    See also IMF, IMF Surveillance, A Factsheet, 3 October 2014, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/surv.htm (last accessed 21 April 2015).

  23. 23.

    IMF, The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), A Factsheet, 30 September 2014, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fsap.htm (last accessed 21 April 2015).

  24. 24.

    Akyüz Y, Reforming the IMF: Back to the Drawing Board, TWN Global Economy Series 7, pp. 48–49; Bradlow DD, The Governance of the IMF: The Need for Comprehensive Reform, Paper prepared for the G 24 technical committee, Singapore, September 2006, p. 15.

  25. 25.

    Bruner (2008), p. 1; Picciotto (2011), pp. 13–15 and 269–271; Stephan PB, Privatising International Law, University of Virginia School of Law John M Olin Law and Economics Research Paper Series No 2011-02, March 2011.

  26. 26.

    Pan (2010), pp. 247–248.

  27. 27.

    Alexander et al. (2006); Giovanoli (2009), p. 84; Weber and Arner (2007), pp. 410–411.

  28. 28.

    Alexander et al. (2006), p. 134.

  29. 29.

    Picciotto (2011), p. 270.

  30. 30.

    Raustiala’s study of transgovernmental networks, for example, demonstrates that ‘power plays a critical role’ in the export of ‘regulatory ideas, rules and practices’ from economically dominant states to weaker states, with ‘economically weak jurisdictions’ frequently embracing ‘as substantial part of the regulatory models of the dominant powers’ Raustiala (2002), pp. 51, 59–60.

  31. 31.

    See United Nations, Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, 21 September 2009, para 29–34; also Sect. 4.2.

  32. 32.

    See Akyüz Y, Why the IMF and the International Monetary System Need More than Cosmetic Reform, South Centre Research Paper 32, November 2010, http://www.southcentre.int/research-paper-32-November-2010/#more-1364 (last accessed 16 October 2015), p. 27.

  33. 33.

    Arner and Buckley (2011), chapters 2 and 3; Salamanca (2010).

  34. 34.

    Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF, IMF Response to the Financial and Economic Crisis, Evaluation Report, 2014, p. 18.

  35. 35.

    These quota reforms form part of a wider reform of IMF governance reforms (see discussion in Sect. 4.1).

  36. 36.

    Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF, IMF Response to the Financial and Economic Crisis, Evaluation Report, 2014, p. 18.

  37. 37.

    See IMF, IMF Standby Arrangement: A Factsheet, 10 April 2015, https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sba.htm (last accessed 21 April 2015).

  38. 38.

    Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF, IMF Response to the Financial and Economic Crisis, Evaluation Report, 2014, pp. 19–20.

  39. 39.

    European Central Bank (ECB), The European Stability Mechanism, ECB Monthly Bulletin, July 2011, pp. 74–77.

  40. 40.

    European Central Bank (ECB), The European Stability Mechanism, ECB Monthly Bulletin, July 2011, pp. 74–77.

  41. 41.

    European Central Bank (ECB), The European Stability Mechanism, ECB Monthly Bulletin, July 2011, pp. 74–77.

  42. 42.

    IMF, Review of Fund Facilities: Analytical Basis for Fund Lending and Reform Options, 6 February 2009, para 5–11.

  43. 43.

    IMF, Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors: Further Consideration of the Good Faith Criterion, 30 July 2002, para 7.

  44. 44.

    Simpson L, The Role of the IMF in Debt Restructurings: Lending into Arrears, Moral Hazard and Sustainability Concerns, UNCTAD, G 24 Discussion Paper Series No 40, May 2006, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/privcred/073002.pdf (last accessed 16 October 2015), p. 10; also IMF, Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors: Further Consideration of the Good Faith Criterion, 30 July 2002, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/privcred/073002.pdf (last accessed 16 October 2015), para 14.

  45. 45.

    IMF, Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors: Further Consideration of the Good Faith Criterion, 30 July 2002, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/privcred/073002.pdf (last accessed 16 October 2015), para 51.

  46. 46.

    IMF, IMF Executive Board Discusses Reforming the Fund's Policy on Non-Toleration of Arrears to Official Creditors, Press Release No 15/555, 10 December 2015, https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr15555.htm (last accessed 29 April 2016).

  47. 47.

    IMF, Reforming the Fund’s Policy on Non-Toleration of Arrears to Official Creditors, IMF Policy Paper, December 2015, para 11.

  48. 48.

    IMF, Reforming the Fund’s Policy on Non-Toleration of Arrears to Official Creditors, IMF Policy Paper, December 2015, para 18.

  49. 49.

    IMF, IMF Standing Borrowing Arrangements, 6 April 2016, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gabnab.htm (last accessed 29 April 2016).

  50. 50.

    IMF, IMF Standing Borrowing Arrangements, 6 April 2016, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gabnab.htm (last accessed 29 April 2016).

  51. 51.

    IMF, Where the IMF Gets its Money, 6 April 2016, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/finfac.htm (last accessed 29 April 2016).

  52. 52.

    Gould (2003) and further discussion in Sect. 4.3.

  53. 53.

    See Akyüz Y, Why the IMF and the International Monetary System Need More than Cosmetic Reform, South Centre Research Paper 32, November 2010, http://www.southcentre.int/research-paper-32-November-2010/#more-1364 (last accessed 16 October 2015), p. 30.

  54. 54.

    See Akyüz (2006), pp. 498–499; Rieffel (2003), pp. 49–50.

  55. 55.

    IMF, The IMF’s Flexible Credit Line (FCL), A Factsheet, 22 March 2016, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fcl.htm (last accessed 29 April 2016); IMF, The IMF’s Precautionary Credit Line (PLL) A Factsheet, 30 March 2016, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pll.htm (last accessed 29 April 2016).

  56. 56.

    IMF, Review of Fund Facilities: Analytical Basis for Fund Lending and Reform Options, 6 February 2009, para 8; IMF, The Fund’s Mandate: The Future Financing Role: Reform Proposals, 29 June 2010, para 13).

  57. 57.

    See Akyüz Y, Why the IMF and the International Monetary System Need More than Cosmetic Reform, South Centre Research Paper 32, November 2010, http://www.southcentre.int/research-paper-32-November-2010/#more-1364 (last accessed 16 October 2015), p. 32; IMF, The Fund’s Mandate: The Future Financing Role—Reform Proposals, 29 June 2010, p. 2; IMF, Review of Fund Facilities: Analytical Basis for Fund Lending and Reform Options, 6 February 2009, para 1–16.

  58. 58.

    IMF, The Fund’s Mandate: The Future Financing Role—Reform Proposals, 29 June 2010, p. 2; IMF, Review of Fund Facilities: Analytical Basis for Fund Lending and Reform Options, 6 February 2009, para 1–16; also European Central Bank (ECB), The European Stability Mechanism, ECB Monthly Bulletin, July 2011, pp. 73–74.

  59. 59.

    Tan (2010b), p. 114.

  60. 60.

    This provision, which was inserted as part of the IMF’s Second Amendment to its Articles of Agreement, stipulates that ‘If requested, the Fund may decide to perform financial and technical services, including the administration of resources contributed by members that are consistent with the purposes of the Fund’. The Fund’s concessional lending framework has undergone a number of revisions since it was first introduced in 1979, the latest overhaul taking place in 2009 and establishing three facilities—the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and the Standby Credit Facility (SCF)—with different terms for access under the umbrella of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PGRT) for which the Fund serves as trustee (IMF, A New Architecture of Facilities for Low-Income Countries, 26 June 2009, pp. 3–4).

  61. 61.

    IMF, Review of Fund Facilities: Analytical Basis for Fund Lending and Reform Options, 6 February 2009, para 8, 11.

  62. 62.

    Broome (2010), pp. 41–42; Broome (2008), pp. 130–132.

  63. 63.

    Broome (2010), pp. 41–42; Broome (2008), pp. 130–132.

  64. 64.

    Broome (2010), pp. 41–42; Broome (2008), pp. 130–132.

  65. 65.

    Tan (2010b), pp. 188–193.

  66. 66.

    Tan (2010b), pp. 188–193.

  67. 67.

    Tan (2010a), pp. 48–49; also Woods (2006), pp. 164–165.

  68. 68.

    Gould (2003), p. 559.

  69. 69.

    The Chiang Mai initiative (CMI) was originally a series of bilateral currency swaps arrangements established in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. In 2010, the CMI was transformed into a multilateral arrangement, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), involving the finance ministries and central banks of the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus China, Japan and South Korea (ASEAN + 3) and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, aimed at providing currency swaps under pooled reserves governed by a single contractual agreement (see Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization, March 2012, Philippines Central Bank FAQs, http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/Publications/FAQs/CMIM.pdf (last accessed 21 April 2015).

  70. 70.

    Tan (2010a), p. 49; also Villanov and Martin, The Paris Club, Debt Relief International (DRI) Publication 3, 2001, p. 2.

  71. 71.

    IMF, Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, A Factsheet, 8 April 2016, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last accessed 29 April 2016); IMF, The Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust, 18 March 2016, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/ccr.htm (last accessed 29 April 2016).

  72. 72.

    Cosio-Pascal (2010), pp. 250–251 and section 4.2.

  73. 73.

    Weber and Arner (2007), p. 411.

  74. 74.

    Alexander et al. (2006), p. 171.

  75. 75.

    The G20 was created initially as a forum for ‘finance ministers and central bank governors from systematically important industrialized and developing countries to discuss issues relating to the global economy’ but was elevated to an inter-governmental forum with the convening of annual summits of heads of states and governments from 2008. See: Carrasco (2010), pp. 199–200; also Gnarth K, Schmucker C (2011) The Role of the Emerging Countries in the G20: Agenda-Setter, Veto Player or Spectator?, Bruges Regional Integration and Global Governance Papers 2/2011, www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/…/BRIGG_2011-2.pdf (last accessed 16 October 2015). The group is comprised of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. Representatives from international organisations, including the IMF, OECD and the World Bank, also attend the meetings (see Gnarth K, Schmucker C (2011) The Role of the Emerging Countries in the G20: Agenda-Setter, Veto Player or Spectator?, Bruges Regional Integration and Global Governance Papers 2/2011), www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/…/BRIGG_2011-2.pdf (last accessed 16 October 2015).

  76. 76.

    See Gnarth K, Schmucker C (2011) The Role of the Emerging Countries in the G20: Agenda-Setter, Veto Player or Spectator?, Bruges Regional Integration and Global Governance Papers 2/2011, www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/…/BRIGG_2011-2.pdf (last accessed 16 October 2015).

  77. 77.

    In December 2010, the IMF’s Board of Governors approved a package of governance reforms that will double quotas and realign shares to shift 6 % of quota shares to emerging market and developing countries at a small expense (around 1.35 %) to industrialised, mostly European countries, the outcome being that the ten largest shareholders of the Fund now include Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRICs) (IMF, IMF Approves Far-Reaching Governance Reforms, IMF Survey Online, 5 November 2010, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/NEW110510B.htm (last accessed 21 April 2015)). The reforms also include a restructuring in the Executive Board composition to decrease by two seats held by European countries and to move towards an all-elected Executive Board as opposed to the current mix of appointed representatives for the top five shareholders and elected representatives for the rest (IMF, IMF Approves Far-Reaching Governance Reforms, IMF Survey Online, 5 November 2010, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/NEW110510B.htm (last accessed 21 April 2015)). The reforms have yet to be implemented due to the lack of ratification by the US of necessary agreements (Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF, IMF Response to the Financial and Economic Crisis, Evaluation Report, 2014, p. 19).

  78. 78.

    The Commission of Experts on Reform of the International Financial and Monetary System was convened by the President of the 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly Miguel d’Escoto Brokmann under the leadership of economist Joseph Stiglitz in November 2008 to assist member states ‘in their deliberations on the world financial and economic crisis’ (United Nations, Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, 21 September 2009, para 7).

  79. 79.

    United Nations, Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, 21 September 2009, para 29.

  80. 80.

    United Nations, Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, 21 September 2009, para 30–31.

  81. 81.

    United Nations, Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, 21 September 2009, para 32–34.

  82. 82.

    Herman et al. (2010a), pp. 4–5; Rieffel (2003), pp. 1–7.

  83. 83.

    Herman et al. (2010a), p. 4.

  84. 84.

    See Bolton and Skeel (2010); Herman et al. (2010a, b).

  85. 85.

    Herman et al. (2010b), p. 489.

  86. 86.

    Herman et al. (2010b), p. 489.

  87. 87.

    Paris Club, Paris Club Agrees on a Comprehensive Treatment of Nigeria’s Debt, 20 October 2005, Press Release; Paris Club, The Paris Club and the Republic of Iraq Agree on Debt Relief, 21 November 2004, Press Release.

  88. 88.

    Bolton and Skeel (2010) pp. 449–485.

  89. 89.

    Gelpern and Gulati (2010), p. 350.

  90. 90.

    In June 2014, the US Supreme Court declined Argentina’s appeal of a New York federal court decision that Argentina had violated the parri passu clause in defaulted bonds by making payments to bondholders who participated in unilateral exchanges of Argentinean debt in 2005 and 2010 without also paying the holdout creditors and prohibited Argentina from ‘making future payments on restructured bonds unless it paid the defaulted bondholders’ in full (IMF, Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, October 2014, Box 1). Argentina finally settled with the holdout creditors in early 2016, putting an end to its 15-year legal battle with the holdout creditors but setting a worrying precedent for other similar debt negotiations by raising ‘the likelihood that a variety of ‘creative’ holdout strategies will be developed, reducing overall efficiency and increasing the long-term transaction costs of credit’ (Mario Blejer, Argentina’s Deal with the Holdouts is A Mixed Blessing, Financial Times, 31 March 2016).

  91. 91.

    IMF, Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, October 2014, para 14.

  92. 92.

    IMF, Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, October 2014, para 25.

  93. 93.

    Bolton and Skeel (2010), pp. 449–485; Stiglitz (2010), pp. 35–69.

  94. 94.

    Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF, IMF Response to the Financial and Economic Crisis, Evaluation Report, p. 19.

  95. 95.

    Gould (2003), pp. 555–556.

  96. 96.

    Gould (2003), pp. 552–555.

  97. 97.

    Copelovitch (2010), pp. 63–67.

  98. 98.

    Woods (2006), p. 4; see also Copelovitch (2010); Gould (2003), p. 551 et al.

  99. 99.

    Herman et al. (2010b), p. 490.

  100. 100.

    Akyüz (2010), pp. 1–5; United Nations, Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, 21 September 2009, para 19.

  101. 101.

    Alexander et al. (2006), p. 96; Bolton and Skeel (2010), pp. 450–456.

  102. 102.

    United Nations, Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, 21 September 2009, para 60.

  103. 103.

    Herman et al. (2010b), p. 492.

  104. 104.

    Tan C (2013) Life, debt, and human rights: contextualizing the international regime for sovereign debt relief. In: Nadakavukaren Schefer K (ed) Poverty and the international economic legal system poverty and the international economic legal system: duties to the world's poor. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 307–324.

  105. 105.

    International Development Association (IDA), Report from the Executive Directors of the International Development Association to the Board of Governors, 15 February 2011 (modified 18 February 2011), Annex 2, para 16.

  106. 106.

    Akyüz Y, Why the IMF and the International Monetary System Need More than Cosmetic Reform, South Centre Research Paper 32, November 2010, http://www.southcentre.int/research-paper-32-November-2010/#more-1364 (last accessed 16 October 2015), pp. 32–33.

  107. 107.

    Akyüz Y, Why the IMF and the International Monetary System Need More than Cosmetic Reform, South Centre Research Paper 32, November 2010, http://www.southcentre.int/research-paper-32-November-2010/#more-1364 (last accessed 16 October 2015), p. 37.

  108. 108.

    Alexander et al. (2006), p. 32.

  109. 109.

    Alexander et al. (2006), p. 32.

  110. 110.

    Alexander et al. (2006), p. 134.

  111. 111.

    United Nations, Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, 21 September 2009.

  112. 112.

    Akyüz (2006), p. 489.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Law, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK

    Celine Tan

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  1. Celine Tan
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  1. Chair for Public Law, International and European Law, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

    Marc Bungenberg

  2. Faculty of Law, University of Passau , Passau, Germany

    Christoph Herrmann

  3. Chair for Public Law and International Law, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg Faculty of Law, Erlangen, Germany

    Markus Krajewski

  4. Competition and Regulation Institute, Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Lüneburg, Germany

    Jörg Philipp Terhechte

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Tan, C. (2016). Shifting Sands: Interrogating the Problematic Relationship Between International Public Finance and International Financial Regulation. In: Bungenberg, M., Herrmann, C., Krajewski, M., Terhechte, J. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2016. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29215-1_14

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