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Liberal Neutrality and State Support for Religion

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Liberal Neutrality and State Support for Religion

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in Philosophy, Religion and Public Life ((BSPR,volume 5))

Abstract

Is state support for religion compatible with autonomy-based liberalism and its neutrality constraint? This is the core question of this chapter, in which it will be argued that religion is, in contemporary liberal societies, a perfectionist good. Accordingly, state support is, as a general principle not required by justice. Nonetheless, a policy of support can sometimes be allowed in order to guarantee equal access to autonomy, but only if certain criteria are fulfilled.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In line with Ninian Smart (1968, 104), I will interpret the concept of religion in a broad sense, i.e. as a coherent system of beliefs and practices which relates man to a supernatural or transcendent realm, without necessarily believing in a transcendent entity. Whatever else religion may or may not be – whether theistic or non-theistic – all religions possess some of the next elements or dimensions: (1) a doctrine, (2) a myth, (3) a normative ethos, (4) rituals, (5) experience, (6) an institutional or social aspect and (7) a mythological dimension. Accordingly, I will use the term ‘religion’ not only for religious worldviews, but for all kinds of worldviews, including secular ones. Similarly, faith-based institutions (schools, hospitals) can also be based on a non-religious worldview and religious education can also be non-confessional (e.g. humanistic, atheistic).

  2. 2.

    See Sect. 9.3.2.3.

  3. 3.

    Martha Nussbaum (2008, 109) defends a similar position and prefers the term nonpreferentialism (cf. even-handedness) instead of non-establishment (cf. hands-off). See in this regard also Alan Patten’s conception of neutrality of treatment:

    To maintain neutrality, when the state pursues a policy that is accommodating (or unaccommodating) of some particular conception of the good, it must adopt an equivalent policy for rival conceptions of the good. Neutrality of treatment means the state’s policies must be equally accommodating of rival conceptions of the good. (Patten 2012, 257)

  4. 4.

    See Sect. 8.5 for different models of proportionality.

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Franken, L. (2016). Liberal Neutrality and State Support for Religion. In: Liberal Neutrality and State Support for Religion. Boston Studies in Philosophy, Religion and Public Life, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28944-1_8

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