Abstract
In this chapter, we will examine whether and how Dworkin’s defense of state neutrality is reconcilable with his defense of state subsidies for art. After a short discussion of Dworkin’s egalitarian liberalism, we will mainly focus on his paper Can a Liberal State Support Art? Following an analysis of his argumentation, attention is also given to some fundamental objections.
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Notes
- 1.
See also a footnote in Dworkin’s Tanner Lectures on Equal Freedom, where Dworkin mentions that state support for art can (but should not) be allowed:
[…] Nothing in my argument here denies that a state that has fulfilled the requirements of justice can properly use public funds to support art that the market will allow to perish, on the substantive ground that art improves the value of lives available in the community. (Dworkin 1998 [1995], 272, n.44 [emphasis mine])
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Franken, L. (2016). Ronald Dworkin: Liberal Neutrality and Subsidizing Art. In: Liberal Neutrality and State Support for Religion. Boston Studies in Philosophy, Religion and Public Life, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28944-1_5
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