Abstract
In this chapter, we will take a closer look at Galston’s and Kukathas’s liberal theories. Both philosophers reject autonomy-based liberalism and defend reformation liberalism as an alternative. However, in the end, Galston’s theory also seems to be close to autonomy-based liberalism, and therefore it is not fully convincing. Kukathas’s theory, by contrast, is more consistent, but therefore also more far-reaching. This is why we do not consider these theories of reformation liberalism to be valid alternatives for autonomy-based liberalism.
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Notes
- 1.
Mistakenly, Galston supposes that Rawls, Kymlicka, Kant and Mill defend the same concept of autonomy. This is, however, not the case (see Sect. 4.2.2).
- 2.
For this reason, Galston (1993 [1991], 4) speaks about “purposive liberalism”.
- 3.
This kind of support is similar to Rawls’s support for primary goods: it is justified because it contributes to the good life of all citizens, notwithstanding their particular conceptions about the good life.
- 4.
Susan Moller Okin (2002, 226) formulates a similar criticism, in the specific context of women’s exit-options.
- 5.
For this terminology, see Kymlicka 2002, 239.
- 6.
Kukathas’s emphasis.
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Franken, L. (2016). Reformation Liberalism and Liberal Neutrality: Galston and Kukathas. In: Liberal Neutrality and State Support for Religion. Boston Studies in Philosophy, Religion and Public Life, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28944-1_4
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