Abstract
In this chapter, Rawls’s two major works are examined with a particular focus on the concept of neutrality. While Rawls admits that his Theory of Justice is based on autonomy as a comprehensive doctrine, in Political Liberalism he tries to avoid this. However, even the later Rawls is unable to avoid a mild form of comprehensive or autonomy-based liberalism. It seems impossible (but also not necessary) to give a neutral justification for a neutral (antiperfectionist) state policy. Based on this conclusion, I propose that autonomy-based liberalism is a more consistent basis for an antiperfectionist policy than is Rawls’s political (noncomprehensive) liberalism.
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Notes
- 1.
A well-ordered society is defined by Rawls as follows:
Now let us say that a society is well-ordered when it is not only designed to advance the good of its members but when it is also effectively regulated by a public conception of justice. That is, it is a society in which (1) everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice, and (2) the basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these principles. (Rawls 1971, 4–5)
- 2.
Peculiarly, Ben-Shemesh (2005, 459–460), who defends the Rawlsian principle of political legitimacy, notes that the effects of political liberalism and autonomy-based liberalism are almost the same because many citizens in modern liberal democracies consider several liberal principles, such as the principle of autonomy, to be reasonably justifiable.
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Franken, L. (2016). Comprehensive and Political Antiperfectionism. In: Liberal Neutrality and State Support for Religion. Boston Studies in Philosophy, Religion and Public Life, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28944-1_2
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