Abstract
In this introductory chapter, we will elaborate on the concept of neutrality: what is meant by neutrality, when should the concept be applied and who should apply it? After a clarification of different kinds of neutrality (neutrality of justification, neutrality of aim, neutrality of effects, neutrality of opportunity and compensatory neutrality), it will be argued that neutrality of justification or neutrality of aim is the most plausible concept of neutrality and that this neutrality principle should be applied to all policy decisions. Finally, a distinction will be made between a neutral (or antiperfectionist) state policy on one hand (internal neutrality), and the justification for that policy on the other (external neutrality).
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In Belgium for instance, wearing items “covering the face fully or largely” in public places has been prohibited since June 2011. Because the law is formulated in general terms and is not only aimed at the burka, and because the state can give neutral arguments for such a law (the protection of public order, safety and social interaction), this law is in line with the idea of liberal neutrality or neutrality of justification. In 2014, the Grand Chamber of the ECHR ratified this idea when it decided, in S.A.S. v. France (Appl. no. 43835/11) that the French ban on the full-face veil (burka) of 2010 “was not expressly based on the religious connotation of the clothing in question but solely on the fact that it concealed the face” and that the ruling also “took into account the state’s submission that the face played a significant role in social interaction”.
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These examples can be found in Rawls 2005 [1993], 214–215.
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See also Mulhall and Swift 1996 (1992), 251; Wall 1998, 197–198. In the same vein, Gerald Gaus (2008, 83) makes a distinction between a neutral/antiperfectionist liberal policy – or first-level neutrality – on one hand, and the legitimation for this neutral/antiperfectionist policy – or second-level neutrality – on the other. First-level neutrality is connected to the idea of an antiperfectionist government, while second-level neutrality is connected to the idea of political liberalism.
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Franken, L. (2016). Liberalism and Neutrality: A Philosophical Examination. In: Liberal Neutrality and State Support for Religion. Boston Studies in Philosophy, Religion and Public Life, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28944-1_1
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