Abstract
The security validation of practical computer systems calls for the ability to specify and verify information flow policies that are dependent on data content. Such policies play an important role in concurrent, communicating systems: consider a scenario where messages are sent to different processes according to their tagging. We devise a security type system that enforces content-dependent information flow policies in the presence of communication and concurrency. The type system soundly guarantees a compositional noninterference property. All theoretical results have been formally proved in the Coq proof assistant [9].
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Notes
- 1.
The proof script is accessible at http://lbtweb.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/97133580/dif_com_coq.zip.
- 2.
This pattern is reminiscent of the “Weak bisimulation up to H" by Focardi and Rossi [14].
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Li, X., Nielson, F., Nielson, H.R., Feng, X. (2016). Disjunctive Information Flow for Communicating Processes. In: Ganty, P., Loreti, M. (eds) Trustworthy Global Computing. TGC 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9533. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28766-9_7
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