Abstract
The growth in results-based approaches (RBA) to development financing is motivated by the underlying assumption that these approaches will incentivize implementing agencies to more closely align their actions and exert more focused effort on achieving the objectives of the program that have been agreed upon by the recipient and donor. At the same time RBAs strengthen accountability of both recipient and donor, by generating objective evidence that the agreed upon results have been achieved. But it should not necessarily be taken for granted that they are a more efficient approach to development just because payments are tied to results. If donor and government objectives are misaligned, RBA can help focus government actions towards a clear target that they may not otherwise focus on, but this comes with a shift in the risk burden towards the government agency, which is likely to come with an implicit risk premium.
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Notes
- 1.
In reality, the exact sample size requirements will be a function of the variance in the output measurement at each level of aggregation, but the rule of thumb provides a close approximation for planning purposes.
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Chase, C., Coville, A. (2016). Trade-Offs and Risks in Results-Based Approaches. In: Thomas, E. (eds) Broken Pumps and Promises. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28643-3_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28643-3_3
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