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Finite Population Trust Game Replicators

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Artificial Life and Computational Intelligence (ACALCI 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 9592))

Abstract

Our previous work introduced the N player trust game and examined the dynamics of this game using replicator dynamics for an infinite population. In finite populations, quantization becomes a necessity that introduces discontinuity in the trajectory space, which can impact the dynamics of the game differently. In this paper, we present an analysis of replicator dynamics of the N player trust game in finite populations. The analysis reveals that, quantization indeed introduces fixed points in the interior of the 2-simplex that were not present in the infinite population analysis. However, there is no guarantee that these fixed points will continue to exist for any arbitrary population size; thus, they are clearly an artifact of quantization. In general, the evolutionary dynamics of the finite population are qualitatively similar to the infinite population. This suggests that for the proposed trust game, trusters will be extinct if the population contains an untrustworthy player. Therefore, trusting is an evolutionary unstable strategy.

H. Abbass—Portions of this work was funded by the Australian Research Council Discovery Grant number DP140102590.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, Portland State University, Portland, OR, USA

    Garrison Greenwood

  2. School of Engineering and Information Technology, University of New South Wales, Canberra, ACT, 2600, Australia

    Hussein Abbass

  3. Faculty of Arts and Design, University of Canberra, Canberra, Australia

    Eleni Petraki

Authors
  1. Garrison Greenwood
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  2. Hussein Abbass
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  3. Eleni Petraki
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Hussein Abbass .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Canberra, Aust Capital Terr, Australia

    Tapabrata Ray

  2. University of New South Wales, Canberra, Aust Capital Terr, Australia

    Ruhul Sarker

  3. RMIT University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

    Xiaodong Li

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© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Greenwood, G., Abbass, H., Petraki, E. (2016). Finite Population Trust Game Replicators. In: Ray, T., Sarker, R., Li, X. (eds) Artificial Life and Computational Intelligence. ACALCI 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9592. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28270-1_27

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28270-1_27

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-28269-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-28270-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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