Abstract
The paper provides a presentation and motivation of the concept of non-empirical theory confirmation. Non-empirical theory confirmation is argued to play an important role in the scientific process that has not been adequately acknowledged so far. Its formalization within a Bayesian framework demonstrates that non-empirical confirmation does have the essential structural characteristics of theory confirmation.
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Notes
- 1.
For an instructive philosophical perspective on historical sciences, see Turner (2007).
- 2.
- 3.
The presentation of this section is largely taken from Dawid et al. (2015).
- 4.
For the purpose of our argument, it is not necessary to assign a precise operational meaning to the various levels of \(S\). It is sufficient that they satisfy a natural monotonicity assumption with regard to their impact on \(F_{A}\)—see condition A3.
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Turner, D.: Making prehistory: historical science and the scientific realism debate. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2007)
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Dawid, R. (2016). Modelling Non-empirical Confirmation. In: Ippoliti, E., Sterpetti, F., Nickles, T. (eds) Models and Inferences in Science. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28163-6_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28163-6_11
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