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Dynamic Games with Perfect Information

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Book cover Advances in Dynamic and Evolutionary Games

Part of the book series: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games ((AISDG,volume 14))

Abstract

In this paper we formulate some easy looking but hard to solve problems from pursuit-evasion game theory. Then we focus on the main problem which, from our point of view, arises in dynamic cooperative games: this is the time-inconsistency of optimal solutions. We propose a system of payments, which we call imputation distribution procedure, that can keep the solution time-consistent when the game develops along the cooperative trajectory. It is shown that if payments are made according to an imputation distribution procedure, the cooperative solution can be achieved as a specially constructed Nash equilibrium in punishment strategies. This brings together noncooperative and cooperative approaches in modern game theory, as cooperation can be supported strategically.

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the St. Petersburg State University under research grant No. 9.38.245.2014. The author thanks Florian Wagener for many valuable comments.

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Correspondence to Leon A. Petrosyan .

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Petrosyan, L.A. (2016). Dynamic Games with Perfect Information. In: Thuijsman, F., Wagener, F. (eds) Advances in Dynamic and Evolutionary Games. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol 14. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28014-1_1

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