Abstract
In 2010, Rosario Gennaro et al. revisited the old and elegant Okamoto-Tanaka scheme and presented a variant of it called mOT. However the compromise of ephemeral private key will lead to the leakage of the session key and the user’s static private key. In this paper, we propose an improved version of mOT(denoted as mOT+). Moreover, based on RSA assumption and CDH assumption we provide a tight and intuitive security reduction in the id-eCK model. Without any extra computational cost, mOT+ achieves security in the id-eCK model, and furthermore it also meets full perfect forward secrecy against active adversary.
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Notes
- 1.
With Jacobi symbol 1, determining the membership in \( QR_N \) is equivalent to solving the quadratic residues assumption [21].
- 2.
As the simulation is almost the same with that in mOT, so we omit the proof in this paper.
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful comments. This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61309016,61379150,61201220), Post-doctoral Science Foundation of China (No. 2014M562493), Post-doctoral Science Foundation of Shanxi Province and Key Scientific and Technological Project of Henan Province (No. 122102210126) and the National Cryptology Development Project of China (No. MMJJ201201005).
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Tian, B., Wei, F., Ma, C. (2015). mOT+: An Efficient and Secure Identity-Based Diffie-Hellman Protocol over RSA Group. In: Yung, M., Zhu, L., Yang, Y. (eds) Trusted Systems. INTRUST 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9473. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27998-5_26
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