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mOT+: An Efficient and Secure Identity-Based Diffie-Hellman Protocol over RSA Group

  • Baoping TianEmail author
  • Fushan Wei
  • Chuangui Ma
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9473)

Abstract

In 2010, Rosario Gennaro et al. revisited the old and elegant Okamoto-Tanaka scheme and presented a variant of it called mOT. However the compromise of ephemeral private key will lead to the leakage of the session key and the user’s static private key. In this paper, we propose an improved version of mOT(denoted as mOT+). Moreover, based on RSA assumption and CDH assumption we provide a tight and intuitive security reduction in the id-eCK model. Without any extra computational cost, mOT+ achieves security in the id-eCK model, and furthermore it also meets full perfect forward secrecy against active adversary.

Keywords

Public key cryptography Diffie-Hellman Composite modulus id-eCK model 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful comments. This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61309016,61379150,61201220), Post-doctoral Science Foundation of China (No. 2014M562493), Post-doctoral Science Foundation of Shanxi Province and Key Scientific and Technological Project of Henan Province (No. 122102210126) and the National Cryptology Development Project of China (No. MMJJ201201005).

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.State Key Laboratory of Mathematical Engineering and Advanced ComputingZhengzhou Information Science and Technology InstituteZhengzhouChina

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