Abstract
This chapter takes the findings from chapter seven on Derrida’s rejection of intentionality and desire from having a role in deconstruction and applies them to an interpretation of how he understands the gift in his ambiguously titled Given Time (Donner Le Temps). Given Time does not simply unfold how time is given, but is dedicated to showing how a gift can be given, given the parameters of time. The temporal dimensions of the gift demand that the gift be “impossible,” and that any desiring or “intending to give” presupposes a future, which inhibits the arrival of the gift. As “the impossible,” the gift cannot be desired because it is unconditionally beyond the possible, and in relation to the aporia, one experiences a tense profusion of desires for the seemingly opposite demands of gift and economy, which ends in indecision. The gift can be “at play” in time, but cannot happen as a result of the intent to give because the gift cannot be derivative of one’s desire, which is reflective of past experiences. It is indeed not “the gesture that counts” when it comes to giving, for if anything, an act of generosity inhibits a gift’s happening, which must take place beyond any conscious intending of any “subject.”
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Notes
- 1.
Jacques Derrida, “How to avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other Volume II, eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 313 footnote 24.
- 2.
As Sebbah recently put it, in Given Time “the gift ‘is’ time itself.” François-David Sebbah. Testing the Limit: Derrida, Henry, Levinas, and the Phenomenological Tradition. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 101.
- 3.
Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 9 and p. 14 respectively. On page 14 he continues to assert that this destruction remains in process “through keeping, restitution, reproduction, the anticipatory expectation or apprehension that grasps or comprehends in advance.”
- 4.
Jacques Derrida, in God, The Gift, and Postmodernism, eds. John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 59.
- 5.
Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 7.
- 6.
Raschke suggests that, as impossible, “the gift is an ‘overrunning’ of the circuit of exchanges and calculable signifiers,” then later reads Derrida to be saying that “any ‘possibility’ of the gift depends necessarily on a ruse that engenders the illusion of money as tokens of exchange, when in fact there is no real exchange, only the productivity of pure signs of exchange. In other words, a ‘gift economy’ is impossible de re. Nonetheless, it is indeed possible de dicto, if simply because what seems to be the actual intension of the expression arises from a deceit – specifically, a deceit that could in its ‘criminal’ guise destroy, at least theoretically, the credibility of the exchange system that it simulates.” Carl Raschke, Force of God (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2015), p. 48 and p. 53, respectively.
- 7.
Jacques Derrida, “A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event” in The Late Derrida, eds. W. J. T. Mitchell and Arnold I. Davidson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 230.
- 8.
The notion that the event “defeats my will” was briefly engaged in chapter four of this book. In gesturing, it seems, to the duplex-cogito who does not understand his desires, Derrida claims that “what I cannot, and hence the impossible that exceeds my ability and my power, is precisely what I cannot want. I am keeping here to the moment when the experience of the event defeats my will.” In continuing along these lines, to say “I decide” is to say that I am capable of deciding, and am the “master of my decision.” As such, Derrida continues, it “is an expression of my power, of my possibility.” But this is problematic, for Derrida wants to say “my decision is, in fact, the other’s decision… my decision can never be mine.” It must “disrupt my power, my ability, my possibility…as it is always for the other that I decide; it is the other who decides in me, without in any way exonerating me from ‘my’ responsibility.” This kind of decisionism disrupts my agency, for “if I want what I cannot, this willing must be stripped of what traditionally clothes the will and determines it as will, namely agency, control, the ‘I want what I want.” Ibid., p. 237. For more on this relationship between responsibility, freedom, will, and desire, see Derrida’s The Gift of Death. There, he suggests that responsibility is “often thought, on the basis of an analysis of the very concepts of responsibly, freedom, or decision, that to be responsible, free, or capable of deciding cannot be something that is acquired, something conditioned or conditional.” Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 7.
- 9.
Jacques Derrida, Psyche: Inventions of the Other Vol I. Trans Peggy Kamuf. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 27. Also see p. 15.
- 10.
Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 34.
- 11.
As Moore would have it, “Derrida’s concept of economy should be read as a literal interpretation of the Greek oikonomia: the management, or rather the law (nomos) of the oikos, meaning household or hearth, a place of identity.” Gerald Moore, Politics of the Gift: Exchanges in Postmodernism (Edinburgh Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), p. 11. See Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 6 and 18.
- 12.
Derrida, much later, offers an eloquent exposition of “economy,” which is “the management of the oikos, of the home, the family, or the hearth, [and] is limited to the goods necessary to life.” Ibid., p. 158. It is helpful to consider here Jean-Joseph Goux’s argument in his 1984 Les Monnayeurs du Langage (The Coiners of Language [Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994]), where he suggests that literature, as it “progressed” through modernity, came to reflect the current and contemporary economic situation, specifically the decline of the gold-standard.
- 13.
Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 159.
- 14.
Instead, the gift is, as Derrida suggests “at once reason and unreason, because it also manifests that madness of the rational logos itself, that madness of the economic circle the calculation of which is constantly reconstructed.” Ibid., p. 36. Perhaps it is the case that the repetitive and circular nature of economy is indeed an inversion of the Nietzschean “eternal recurrence of the same.”
- 15.
Ibid., p. 35.
- 16.
In reference to Lacan, he believes his work to have had a great influence on Derrida: “Properly speaking, the noeud bo [Borromean knot] in question completely changes the meaning of writing. It gives to the aforementioned writing an autonomy, which is all the more remarkable in that there is another writing [une autre écriture], which results from that which one could call a precipitation of the signifier. Derrida has laid emphasis on this, but it is quite clear that I showed him the way.” My emphasis. Jacques Lacan quoted in Michael Lewis, Derrida and Lacan: Another Writing (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh Press, 2008), p. 1.
- 17.
Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 1.
- 18.
From version (draft) one of Donner Le Temps, taken from the Derrida Archives at University of California, Irvine: “Son Désir serait la oú elle voudrait (conditionnel) Donner ce qu’elle ne peut pas donner, le tout, ce reste de reste dont elle ne peut pas faire présent ce reste de reste de temps dont elle ne peut pas faire présent, voila ce que Mme de Maintenant (comme j’ai envie de l’appeler) désirerait, desir donner.”
Jacques Derrida, version 1 of Donner Le Temps. Chapter 1, p. 3. UC Irvine Libraries, Special Collections – Jacques Derrida Papers. Accessed July 9, 2012. I translate this as: “Her desire would be where she would like [or desire], there in the conditional, thus allowing her to give the all, which she cannot give or do, this the rest of the rest of the time, she cannot do [or give] this here, though Madame de Maintenant (as I want to call her) wishes, desires to give.” This is slightly different from Kamuf’s translation, which reads: “Her desire would be there where she would like, in the conditional, to give what she cannot give, the all, that rest of the rest of which she cannot make a present, that is what Madame de Maintenant (as one might call her) desires, that is in truth what she would desire, not for herself but so as to be able to give it…” Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 4.
- 19.
Here Derrida summons Lacan, who suggests that to love is to give a gift of what one does not have. And then later, on a similar note, he raises the question of Heidegger and the “gift that one doesn’t have.” This is only an allusion between Heidegger and Lacan, though, and one that we should not take too seriously as a demand on Derrida’s own interests here. For Lacan, this specific gift of love is qualified by lack, which is a kind of “first action” of “desire.” And this is a point to which Derrida later draws attention in Given Time in his reading of Heidegger’s “Anaximander’s Fragment.” See Martin Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy, trans. David Krell and Frank Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 52. For Heidegger, “giving is not only giving-away; originally, giving has the sense of acceding or giving-to. Such giving lets something belong to another which properly belongs to him…the didonai designates this ‘letting belong to.’” Ibid., pp. 43–44.
- 20.
Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 3.
- 21.
Ibid., p. 2.
- 22.
Ibid., p 4.
- 23.
Ibid., See footnote 28, chapter 4. This reference of Heidegger’s was considered in closer detail in Chap. 4.
- 24.
See also Jacques Derrida, “A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event” in The Late Derrida, eds. W. J. T. Mitchell and Arnold I. Davidson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 237. Also, recall here the distinction between will and desire. The will has been historically considered the place of freedom, while desire is an irresistible and natural drive.
- 25.
Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 4.
- 26.
She chooses where she wishes to direct this rest, or nothing, for as Derrida continues, “nobody takes it all from her…” as no one can take her nothing from her. Ibid., p. 4.
- 27.
Ibid., p. 5. There is a slight distinction here between this published version, and the first draft: “…voila le tout de son desire, et le desir et le desir de donner, c’est la meme chose, c’es cette tautologie…” This could be translated as “… here is all of her desire. And the desire and the desire to give is the same thing, this is a tautology.” Jacques Derrida, “version one” of Donner Le Temps, Chapter 1, p 3. UC Irvine Libraries, Special Collections – Jacques Derrida Papers. Accessed July 9, 2012.
- 28.
Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 11. Derrida uses want, desire and intention synonymously here and shortly after (similarly, but not equivocally) on pg 11: “I suppose that I know and that you know what ‘to give,’ ‘gift,’ donor,’ ‘donee’ mean in our common language. As well as ‘to want,’ ‘to desire,’ ‘to intend.’”
- 29.
Ibid., p. 10.
- 30.
“It supposes a subject and a verb, a constituted subject, which can also be collective – for example, a group, a community, a nation, a clan, a tribe – in any case, a subject identical to itself and conscious of its identity, indeed seeking through the gesture of the gift to constitute its own unity and, precisely, to its own identity recognized so that that identity comes back to it., so that it can reappropriate its identity: as its property.” Ibid., p. 11.
- 31.
And Derrida continues, “This ‘something’ may not be a thing in the common sense of the word but rather a symbolic object; and like the donor, the donee may be a collective subject; but in any case A gives B to C.” Ibid., p. 11.
- 32.
As Derrida asserts “for the gift to be possible, for there to be gift event, according to our common language and logic, it seems that this compound structure is indispensable. Notice that in order to say this, I must already suppose a certain precomprehension of what gift means. I suppose that I know and that you know what ‘to give,’ ‘gift,’ donor,’ ‘donee’ mean in our common language. As well as ‘to want,’ ‘to desire,’ ‘to intend.’” Thus, one must consider “the following axiom: In order for there to be gift, gift event, some ‘one’ has to give some ‘thing’ to someone other, without which ‘giving’ would be meaningless.” Ibid., p. 11. It is worth briefly recalling here that for Derrida, words, concepts, and ideas can be meaningless, as they are only signs that are de-signed to point in particular ways and places.
- 33.
Perhaps this is why, in his more candid discussions in “On the Gift” with Caputo and Kearney, Derrida demands that “my decision is the other’s” and we “have not to account for, but to experience, the fact that the freest decision in myself is a decision for the other in myself.” The ultimately “free” decision is for the other, not of the other. Derrida continues, insisting that “the other is in me; the other is my freedom, so to speak. You can transfer what I’m saying about decision to desire. The desire of my desire is not mine. That’s where desire stops. If my desire for the other, for the tout autre, were simply my desire, I would be enclosed in my desire.” Thus we can conclude that a stable desire demands, also, a stable subject capable of desiring. But for Derrida there is no such subject with such a capacitas. We will consider the lack of “subject” in Derrida in our final chapter, but for now we need only mention how it is necessary that we be subjectless, for this is what allows the gift to properly be gift, as non-phenomenal. That is to say, there is no subject that stands in its way. Jacques Derrida, God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, eds. John D Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 134–135.
- 34.
Derrida suggests that giving orders “le désir d’accéder au propre.” Kamuf very straightforwardly translates this into English to mean that giving orders “the desire to accede to the proper.” This more direct translation leaves Derrida’s concept of desire sounding a bit too passive. For what should draw one’s attention in this phrase is that we want ownership, and though we intend and grasp-for it (not necessarily passively consenting, acceding or yielding), these efforts fail. Purposiveness, ownership, intent, and desire all fail in reference to the gift. Instead of passively giving oneself over to the proper (as the Kamuf translation suggests), one miserably grasps for possession, on-purpose, trying to take ownership. One tries to name the gift on one’s own, but its name is ineffable, even though it is in the horizon of finitude. Jacques Derrida, Donner le Temps: 1. La Fausse Monnaie (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1991), p 36. For Derrida, “Dans la position même de cette question, dans la formu-lation du projet ou du dessein de pensée, à savoir le « afin de » (nous pensons « afin de » (um… zu) penser l’être et le temps en leur « propre » (in sein Eigenes, in ihr Eigenes), le désir d’accéder au propre est déjà, pourrions-nous dire, subrepticement ordonné par Heidegger à la dimension du « donner ». Et réciproquement. Que signifierait penser proprement le don, l’être et le temps dans ce qui leur est ou dans ce qu’ils ont de plus propre, à savoir ce qu’ils peuvent donner et livrer aux mouvements de propriation, d’expropriation, de dépropriation ou d’appropriation? Peut-on poser ces questions sans anticiper une pensée, voire un désir du propre? un désir d’accéder à la propriété du propre? Est-ce là un cercle? Y a-t-il une autre définition du désir? Dans ce cas, comment entrer dans un tel cercle ou comment en sortir? L’entrée ou la sortie sont-elles les deux seules modalités de notre inscription dans le cercle? Ce cercle est-il lui-même inscrit dans l’entrelacs d’un Geflecht dont il ne forme qu’une figure? Autant de fils à suivre.” See also Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 21–22. See also Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 5.
- 35.
For an explication of “thrownness” see book six of Heidegger’s Being and Time.
- 36.
See Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? (New York NY: Harper & Row, 1972).
- 37.
What appears to be contrary to my reading of Heidegger’s position on desire and the gift, Caputo questions Heidegger’s grounding of es gibt das Sein as grounded in “generosity.” In the context of reading Derrida vis-à-vis Heidegger, Caputo suggests that “that gift without gift, without the swelling and contracting of gift-ing, could take place only if everything happened below the level of conscious intentionality, where no one intends to give anything to anyone and no one is intentionally conscious of receiving anything. Such austere, Grinch-like conditions are hardly met at all anywhere. Not even Heidegger’s notion of the es gibt das Sein can meet this requirement, for Heidegger at once seizes upon the generosity embedded in the German idiom es gibt (geben, die Gabe), which is supposed to mean simply ‘there is.’ On this account, the French idiom il y a is better and more ‘value-free,’ more neutral and indeterminate.” John Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida (New York NY: Fordham University Press, 1997), p. 143.
- 38.
Heidegger here appears to be relying upon a theological conception of revelation as a purely gratuitous “event,” which one cannot project or make as an object of desire.
- 39.
Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 23.
- 40.
Ibid., p. 23.
- 41.
Ibid., p. 22.
- 42.
Richard Kearney, “Desire of God: An Exchange” in After God: Richard Kearney and the Religious Turn in Continental Philosophy, ed. Richard Kearney and John Panteleimon Manoussakis (New York, NY: Fordham Press, 2006), p. 96.
- 43.
See also Robyn Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005), p. 45.
- 44.
Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship (New York: Verso, 1997), p, 29.
- 45.
Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 29. Then in Donner le Temps: “Car enfin, si le don est un autre nom de l’impossible, nous le pensons pourtant, nous le nommons, nous le désirons. Nous en avons l’intention.” Jacques Derrida, Donner le Temps: 1. La Fausse Monnaie, (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1991), p. 45.
- 46.
And Derrida continues to express that this occurs “in the sense in which presence, existence, determination regulate the economy of knowing, experience, and living.” Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 29.
- 47.
Ibid., p. 29.
- 48.
“If one wants to recapture the proper element of thinking, naming, desiring, it is perhaps according to the measureless measure of this limit that it is possible, possible as relation without relation to the impossible. One can desire, name, think in the proper sense of these words, if there is one, only to the immeasuring extent [que dans la mesure démesurante] that one desires, names, thinks still or already, that one still lets announce itself what nevertheless cannot present itself as experience, to knowing: in short, here a gift that cannot make itself (a) present [un don qui ne peut se faire présent].” Ibid., p. 29.
- 49.
Ibid., p. 29.
- 50.
Ibid., p. 30. This is a somewhat unfair reading of Kant, especially since the more conventional interpretations of him on this point suggest that this results in a kind of hierarchy between thinking and knowledge. Thinking is the possible, and knowing is that which has already been thought and then confirmed.
- 51.
In Derrida’s words “…the effort to think the groundless ground of this quasi ‘transcendental illusion’ [of the gift] should not be either – if it is going to be matter of thinking – a sort of adoring and faithful abdication, a simple movement of faith in the face of that which exceeds the limits of experience, knowledge, science, economy – and even philosophy.” Ibid., p. 30. Kant, however, only uses the term “transcendent ground,” not “transcendental ground,” as Derrida does here.
- 52.
Ibid., p. 30.
- 53.
Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 149.
- 54.
Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 7.
- 55.
In economy, “one must also render an account of the desire to render an account.” Ibid., p. 31.
- 56.
Derrida says of this “looking for noon at two o’ clock” (chercher le midi à quatorze heure), that “it is as if we were looking for complications,” as if “we wanted to show that we were given to, and even gifted at, tracking the impossible.” This is a common French saying, which colloquially denotes one’s aim to do the impossible, or make the impossible happen.
- 57.
Ibid., p. 157.
- 58.
Ibid., p. 157.
- 59.
And here Derrida reminds of the narrator’s statement in the story that “such conduct on my friend’s part was excusable only by the desire to create an event in this poor devil’s life.” Ibid., p. 157.
- 60.
Ibid., p. 157. This is also a subtle critique of any “restricted economy” that believes in equal trades, on the grounds of a unified currency. Perhaps it is no coincidence that this text finally appeared in publication around the same time at which the European Union was being formed, namely, in the attempt to develop a single, unified currency.
- 61.
Ibid., p. 158. See also Ibid., p. 167. It should be noted here that in Given Time Derrida speaks of “credit” both within the context of “gift” as well as in that of “economy.”
- 62.
Ibid., p. 159. Derrida puts it this way: “With ‘Counterfeit Money,’ we are at the heart of a literary experience or experiment with all the semantic and ultra-semantic resources, the truthless truth, the lawless law, the dutyless duty that are concentrated and lost in the enigma of khre, of khrema, of khraomai, of to khreon, and their whole family : one must, to need, to lack, to desire, to be indigent or poor, and then owe, ought, duty, necessity, obligation need, utility, interest, thing, event, fatality, destiny, demand, desire, prayer and so forth.”
- 63.
Ibid., p.162.
- 64.
Ibid., p.162. Derrida continues, “the gift, if there is any, must go against nature or occur without nature; it must break off at the same blow, at the same instant with all originarity, with all originary authenticity.”
- 65.
This is not a point that Derrida makes explicit in Given Time, but if time is inescapable in both economy and gift, then whenever there is a debt owed, that debt must change and take shape through time, which necessarily leads to an accrual of interest, even when such a debt is between friends. In which case, the interest just accumulates in a more “friendly” way.
- 66.
In continuing to speak of this threatening antithesis, Derrida suggests that it is for the sake of, or “…most often so as to take into account, antithetically, themes that should be important to us today, namely, divisibility, eventfulness, and conditionality.” Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 120.
- 67.
Ibid., p. 120. There is a similar critique of Kant in Derrida’s reading of the Kantian aesthetics in Economists. There he claims that, for Kant “mediation on a disinterested pleasure therefore provokes a moral interest in the beautiful. It is a strange motivation, this interest taken in disinterestedness, the interest of the interestlessness [ le sans- intéret], a moral revenue drawn from a natural production that is without interest for us, from which one takes wealth without interest, the singular moral surplus value of the without of pure detachment…” See also Jacques Derrida, “Economesis” in Continental Aesthetics: Romanticism to Postmodernism: an Anthology, eds. Richard Kearney and David M. Rasmussen (Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 441.
- 68.
Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 163.
- 69.
Ibid., p. 164.
- 70.
Michel Deguy, Donnant Donnant (Paris: Gallimard, 1981), p. 57. As translated by Derrida: “Giving/Giving is the formula/The exchange without market where use value would only be that of the exchange of the gift in which the common is not even sought, abundance of incomparables without measure taking in common, a barter where the garlic flower changes into what is not refused/what do you desire to give/It’s the gesture that counts.” Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 164.
- 71.
Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 30.
- 72.
As Mansfield aptly puts it, “the gift is that which opens the economy and sets it in motion, but it is also that which enlarges it, and by enlarging announces the possibility of the economy’s very limit and breakdown. Indeed it defines the logic of breakdown as an inevitable part of the economy’s most sober operations.” Nick Mansfield, “Sovereignty as its Own Question: Derrida’s Rogues,” in Contemporary Political Theory 7 (2008): p. 371.
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Alvis, J.W. (2016). Desire in Derrida’s Given Time: There is (Es gibt) No Gift Outside the Text. In: Marion and Derrida on The Gift and Desire: Debating the Generosity of Things. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 85. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27942-8_6
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