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Belief, Evidence, and Uncertainty pp 153–156Cite as

Concluding Reflections

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Abstract

Our object in this monograph has been to offer analyses of confirmation and evidence that will set the bar for what is to count as each and at the same time provide guidance for working scientists and statisticians. Philosophy does not sit in judgment on other disciplines nor can it dictate methodology. Instead, it forces reflection on the aims and methods of these disciplines in the hope that such reflection will lead to a critical testing of these aims and methods, in the same way that the methods themselves are used to test empirical hypotheses with certain aims in view. In the Appendix we discuss an application of the confirmation/evidence distinction to an important problem in current ecological research and in the process suggest ways of settling some outstanding problems at the intersection of statistics and the philosophy of science.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Forster and Sober’s classic paper on the subject (1994) followed by its evaluation in Howson and Urbach’s standard reference work (2006), Bandyopadhyay et al. (1996) and Bandyopadhyay and Boik (1999).

  2. 2.

    See Strevens (2010).

References

  • Bandyopadhyay, P., Boik, R., & Basu, P. (1996). The curve-fitting problem: A Bayesian approach. Philosophy of Science, 63(Supplement), 391–402.

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  • Bandyopadhyay, P., & Boik, R. (1999). The curve-fitting problem: A Bayesian rejoinder. Philosophy of Science, 66, S390–S402.

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  • Forster, M., & Sober, E. (1994). How to tell when simpler, more unified, or less ad hoc theories will provide more accurate predictions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45, 1–35.

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  • Howson, C., & Urbach, P. (2006). Scientific reasoning: The Bayesian approach (3rd ed.). Chicago and LaSalle: Open Court Publishing.

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  • Strevens, M. (2010). Reconsidering authority: Scientific expertise, bounded rationality, and epistemic backtracking. In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford studies in epsitemology (Vol. 3). New York: Oxford University Press.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Montana State University, Bozeman, MT, USA

    Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Gordon Brittan Jr. & Mark L. Taper

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  1. Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay
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  2. Gordon Brittan Jr.
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  3. Mark L. Taper
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Correspondence to Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay .

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Bandyopadhyay, P.S., Brittan, G., Taper, M.L. (2016). Concluding Reflections. In: Belief, Evidence, and Uncertainty. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy(). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27772-1_11

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